



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# Cambridge Historical Essays















Cambridge Historical Essays

THE NAVY OF THE  
RESTORATION



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2561

# THE NAVY OF THE RESTORATION

FROM THE DEATH OF CROMWELL  
TO THE TREATY OF BREDÁ;  
ITS WORK, GROWTH AND INFLUENCE

BY

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## INTRODUCTION

“OUR historians,” said Sir J. Knox Laughton at the recent International Historical Congress, “have considered, and therefore people in general have considered, that the navy is merely an engine for fighting battles.” That is an attitude which it is becoming increasingly easy to avoid, because its fallacy is being ever increasingly exposed ; though, until our present standard naval history is superseded, there remains in being a monumental example of that prime fallacy.

It is that fallacy, or rather, that lack of true proportion, which it is particularly necessary to avoid in this study of the Navy of the Restoration. The Restoration period is one of vital interest and importance regarding the development of the Navy as a self-containing, independent service, and as a part of the nation. It is not too much to say that it is during this period that there is the first dawn of a service consciousness—*esprit de corps*. That “very calme and good temper” with which the fleet as a whole took any and every political change that came along was not mere stolid indifference, nor a stupid dull obedience resulting from thick brains ; there was as much live

interest in questions of the day in the Navy as in the Army, but it scarcely ever became so uncontrolled as to gain the upper hand of discipline ; though once, in February, 1660, it rose perilously near the danger point. The naval captain rarely forgot that he was not a mind himself, but a part of a unit, of a squadron or a fleet. The precision of the English ships when manœuvring drew applause from friend and foe alike, and that at a time when tactical manœuvres were in their infancy : no mere letter-of-the-law discipline could have enabled them on the third day of the great Four Days' Fight, when they were shattered and torn by a three days' losing fight against superior odds, to have retired in the perfect order in which they did, one line covering another like a bulwark, a splendid example of a well-ordered retreat. Nothing but loyalty, loyalty to fellow-captains, to the admiral, loyalty to the service, could have compassed such a feat. It is true the fleet was honeycombed with petty personal spites and quarrels but—a contrast to those in the Dutch fleets—they were not indulged in to the service's detriment. Even in the notorious case of the division of the fleet in June, '66, the crime was committed—supposing the story is true—by one man, to curry favour : and the storm of complaints, of abuse, that arose from all ranks of the fleet, was too unanimous to be but the wailings of Englishmen weeping for their

country ; it was the deep and bitter resentment of the professional seaman who sees his profession disgraced by a blunder criminal to him—to the true professional it were better to die than blunder.

The attitude of the Navy towards the Restoration is specially interesting, for then the new spirit was already born but not yet conscious, it could be used, not understood.

Thus, in trying to treat of things in their true proportion, I have given a comparatively small space to the actual fighting, and have endeavoured rather to give space to the things that matter now, to treat of things at that time, not as events between 1658 and 1667, but as threads of a pattern that is still being weaved, spans of a bridge that is still being built. There lies one great danger in the way of such an attempt, one great difficulty ; the danger of looking at the past *as* the past, the difficulty of looking forward from the past to the present instead of merely the reverse. In all cases of naval operations it is as essential to appreciate what the various commanders did not know, as it is to know everything : more so. And to carry the point further, to the question of ideas, there seems to be a great danger in the unconscious assumption of the existence and comprehensibility at that time of ideas which are commonplace axioms at the present day. The most striking case in point



during this period is that of the Mediterranean 'policy' which, though to the modern eye it was clearly practised then, was, with equal definiteness, to them a meaningless, pointless incident or turn of chances.

I have, where possible, gone to original sources for every point; the exceptions to this rule have full references, the most extensive being to the important Sandwich papers brought out by Mr F. R. Harris in his *Life of Mountagu*; not having had access to the originals I have been compelled to take them second-hand; I have given full reference in each case. I have also been unable to see the Dutch MSS. at the Rijksmuseum. For the rest, my main authorities have been the Pepys MSS. at the Pepysian and Bodleian Libraries, and the Admiralty papers at the Admiralty Library and the Public Record Office. I have been compelled to limit the scope of the essay to naval operations in European waters, and consequently to omit the expeditions of Holmes and Harman in the West. I have also but barely touched on the particular questions of 'shipbuilding,' and 'the Flag and the right of Recognition and Salute.' Lest the size of the Bibliography seem disproportionate with the essay itself, I should explain that I have considered the compilation of a comprehensive bibliography one of the most important parts of my work.

My thanks are due to Dr J. R. Tanner, of St John's College, to Mr S. Gaselee, Librarian of the Pepysian Library, Magdalene College, who kindly gave me every facility for access to the Pepys MSS., and also to Professor C. H. Firth, and Mr R. G. Perrin, Librarian of the Admiralty Library, for doing me a like service at the Bodleian and Admiralty Libraries respectively. I am greatly indebted to Mr F. R. Salter, my History Tutor at Magdalene, who, during my absence in Fiji, undertook entire charge of the proofs; also to Mr H. R. Tedder, Librarian of the Athenaeum, who has given me invaluable assistance in the correction of proofs of the Bibliography.

A. W. T.

*January 1915*

P.S. The difficulties attending the correction of proofs under active service conditions, which have greatly delayed publication, will, I trust, at least partially excuse the more palpable faults and omissions which under happier circumstances I should have hoped to correct and repair.

*April 1916*

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## CHARTS

To illustrate the Second Dutch War (1665-1667) *At end*  
Mouth of the Thames . . . . . „



## CHAPTER I

### THE NAVY BEFORE THE RESTORATION

“THE credit of your navy is so greatly impaired that having occasion to buy some necessary provisions, as tallow and the like, your minister can obtain none but for ready money<sup>1</sup>”: so wrote the Admiralty Commissioners to the Council of State two months before the death of the Protector; nor was it the first time that they had written in that strain. The reins of government were indeed already loosening in Oliver Cromwell’s grasp, and the Navy early felt the change. The all too small assignments to the Navy had been diverted in part to the Army, and to pay the salaries of the Protector, the Judges and others. A naval administrator without money is like a sower without seed, and at a decent interval after the death of Oliver the Commissioners again wrote a bitter complaint to the Council giving a vivid picture of the financial condition of the Navy. They wrote, “we have several times laid before you the great straits and necessities of naval affairs and hoped something would have been done.... The late sad change has constrained us to silence, but the need becoming more pressing, and no whit provided for, we must remind you thereof, the

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 6th, 1658.

rather that the receipts assigned to the Navy are again in part diverted and diminished, though falling very short of the charge. We have struggled to keep off clamours, but ships have to be kept abroad upon dead wages, contracts and debts are unpaid, the stores are unsupplied, and contracts for the ensuing year have to be disannulled. We beg that the Navy income may not be diverted, and that some course may be taken to carry on the service<sup>1</sup>."

On September 3rd, 1658, Oliver Cromwell died, and on the 4th his son Richard was proclaimed Protector of England: "the Vulture died, and out of his ashes rouse a Titmouse<sup>2</sup>." The trouble anticipated with so much eagerness by the Royalists seemed to be very far off. The proclamation was peacefully accepted throughout the country: the fleet under Rear-Admiral Bourne "made bold to manifest the truth of its affection by the expense of some powder from the several ships in the Downs<sup>3</sup>"—a proceeding for which Bourne was severely reprimanded<sup>4</sup>: which did not, however, prevent him from 'making bold' once again, on this occasion "to expend some powder to solemnize the funeral of his late Highness<sup>5</sup>," precisely 14 days before that ceremony took place. Apart, however, from such small contre-temps, the fleet adapted itself very readily to the change of government; and, with one or two exceptions in the Mediterranean squadron, there were no objections raised by the commanders against subscribing to an

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 14th, 1658.

<sup>2</sup> *Heath's Chronicle*, p. 409.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 8th, 1658.

<sup>4</sup> *Rec. Off. Adm. Sec. In Letts.* September 10th, 1658.

<sup>5</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 9th.

address, which Mountagu prepared, swearing fidelity to the "undoubted rightful Protector<sup>1</sup>" as against royalist and republican. Indeed the fleet showed at this juncture the same loyalty towards its admiral that made it so important a force a year and a half later.

The change of government did not mean improved administration or finance so far as the Navy was concerned. A spasmodic attempt was made to remedy some of the abuses of absenteeism among the dockyard officials, but there was no alteration made at the root of the evil; the shortness of supply continued and, inevitably, its consequences developed and worsened. The political split that was growing, between the supporters of Richard and Fleetwood and his republicans, had a twofold result, in increasing the neglect of the Navy and in still further weakening the credit of the government: a strong healthy debtor is a more reliable person than one who is constitutionally weak. When it became necessary to set out a fleet, in November and again in February, the cry of the Navy Commissioners was for ready money. "Unless there be a present supply of money to provide necessaries," they write on February 14th, "there will be a full stop to your affair, for our credit is gone....The hemp merchants deliver not what they have, because not paid for the former; timber, plank, cordage, and the like, not to be gotten because no compliance with bills....Although we know that of late we have given good price for several provisions, yet now—men's stocks and credit being drawn out who have usually dealt with us—other men

<sup>1</sup> *Brit. Mus. E. 999, 12, "A true Catalogue."*

will not deal upon any terms<sup>1</sup>." Contractors, seamen and dockmen alike suffered from this intolerable neglect. Some ships had already gone 2½ years unpaid at Richard's accession—some actually being still unpaid in the spring of 1660, a period of 4 years without pay<sup>2</sup>. Some contractors were bankrupt, others had paid the State's debts with their own money, others borrowed to pay them. An estimate of the debts of the Navy to November 1st, 1658, gives the total as £541,465. 14s. 7d., of which £160,000 is due on bills already signed, £266,257 due for wages of seamen, £25,000 for wages in dockyards<sup>3</sup>. Eight months later the total has risen to £703,703. 16s. 3d., £210,000 due on bills, £317,600 in wages to seamen, £38,000 in wages in dockyards: the growing charge to December 1st is estimated at £549,490, making a total of £1,253,193. 16s. 3d., "towards which the provision already made exceeds not the summe of £260,000..." the remainder "falls much short of answering the pressing occasions of the Navy unto which they are applied." "Present action" needs £20,000 a week and upward, while since May 31st "there has not been received £8,000 a week<sup>4</sup>."

The following pathetic little series of letters is typical of the ever increasing volume of entreaties and complaints with which the Navy Office was inundated:

"DOVER, *July 2nd*, 1659.

Our need at Dover is so exceeding great that we are constrained to cry out to you to help us to the money due

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* February 14th, 1659.

<sup>2</sup> *S. P. Dom. Int.* CCXXII. f. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Adm. Lib. MSS.* 8, Orders and Warrants, 1658-60.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* July 8th ("Report touching money for supply of Navall occasions").



to this poor town. Our condition is so bad that we are weary of making known our wants...3 quarters account due to us....

*August 6th.*

Is so much out of pocket, and so much engaged, that he cannot remain silent, but must still be begging a supply.

*August 10th.*

Hopes pity for their condition at Dover and an order for some money, as they are always in action, and as speedy with dispatch of business as any port in England<sup>1</sup>."

etc., etc.

"Let me be an humble petition," writes Major Bourne, a commissioner, "in y<sup>e</sup> behalfe not only of many hundreds of poore seamen and their distressed wives and children who are ready to starve (having their just pay kept back) and in y<sup>e</sup> name of many poore widdowes and families who are in danger of utter ruine for want of due payment for their goods; But also in behalf of divers other persons who tho' their estates are larger yet suffer extremely both in reputation and loss of Trade by a non compliance w<sup>th</sup> them in point of payment, who have given a vast credit to the Nation for supply of Navy stores...<sup>2</sup>."

With shortness of money came also the inevitable shortage and badness of victuals, and the State Papers contain numerous complaints against both quantity and quality. "At Woolwich," writes Vice-Admiral Goodson, "I find the men are victualled with fiery salt, old and rusty meat, and this not only by report but have seen and tasted some of it myself. At this place,

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1658-9, 1659-60 *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 187, f. 1.

when men have been at their labour all day, they cannot get their provisions till night<sup>1</sup>.”

In the face of such facts as these in the administration of the Navy, it is not a little surprising to find quite a considerable activity on the part of the State ships. It was probably the inertia of Cromwell's naval energy. He had initiated a naval policy which necessitated, and made use of, an effective permanent fleet: and even though the idea of a fleet as a purely diplomatic argument was not yet appreciated, the principle that a fleet was a unit that was usable for other things besides a battle *mêlée* was already deeply set. The new government acted on, if it did not understand, the principle, and the year following the death of Oliver is one of a naval activity that is extraordinary, in the light of the financial difficulties, when it is remembered that England was not at war and had no specially warlike thoughts against any of her neighbours.

Since 1657 there had been war in the Sound between Denmark and Sweden: in the summer of 1658 the Netherlands, after remaining neutral for some time, joined to support the Danes, and early in November they gained a hard-won victory. In the meantime the English government had decided to interfere with the object of ensuring a reasonable balance of power in those waters: neither a Dutch nor a Swedish supremacy was likely to favour the English trade. Sir George Ayscue was to go out and endeavour to mediate between Denmark and Sweden. The original idea was that two “fit vessels<sup>2</sup>” should accompany him. Early in

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* February 10th, 1659.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* October 25th, 1658.

November, however, a fleet<sup>1</sup> was ready to sail for the Sound under the command of Goodson : Ayscue was to go with it. On the 17th Goodson sailed from the Downs. Winter had already set in, and the English fleet, meeting some very rough weather, was forced to put in at Sole Bay. There Goodson was kept until the beginning of December. He made use of the time to supply the fleet with pilots or their substitutes : originally he had only one pilot. After “rummaging the fleet, according to the sea phrase,” he found six mates and midshipmen somewhat “acquainted with the Sound,” whom he distributed amongst the ships<sup>2</sup>. At length, early in December, he got clear of the coast and made for the Scaw, meeting with winter gales and heavy seas, and being “hurried to and again by the foul weather.” Not until the 15th did the fleet arrive off the Scaw, and then “on account of the ice and violent cross winds<sup>3</sup>,” it being impossible to get into the Sound, it was decided at a council of war to return to England. The following day the fleet was scattered by a violent snowstorm and gale, and when the whole of it had reached the English coast by December 30th, it was found that no less than 12 ships had more or less serious defects, one being entirely dismasted.

This unfortunate experience did not, however, deter the Parliament from preparing a still larger fleet to go to the Sound in the following spring. For a time the question was in doubt as to whether it should be sent: news of the Dutch preparations settled it. “It is a

<sup>1</sup> List in *S. P. Dom. Int.* cxcv. ff. 72-3.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 30th, 1658.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* December 21st.

shame," writes a news-letter, "that wee should sitt still at home with our hands in our pocketts, and to let the Dutch goe with so great a fleete into the Sound, and so probably have it delivered up by the Dane unto them, and we sit still at home, and not to come and interpose by way of mediation to keepe the balance equall betweene those two Princes, that the Dutch may not take it from them both, and give a law to us as to our navigation, the wooden walls of the nation<sup>1</sup>." At the end of February, Parliament decided to send a fleet. On March 12th, Mountagu, having been appointed 'General-at-Sea,' went on board his flagship, the *Naseby*, on the 22nd he set sail with a fleet of 51 sail including 18 of 50 guns and over, 13 between 40 and 50, and 8 between 40 and 26. On April the 6th the vessels anchored in Elsinore Roads. He had arrived before the expected Dutch reinforcement, and immediately made precautions against their arrival, setting guards in the entrances to the Sound while he himself lay before the town and castle of Elsinore. He sent a letter to Opdam, the commander of the incoming Dutch fleet, explaining his mission; he desired Opdam's "assistance in promoting the peace" and asked, "that you will not suffer the fleet or fleets under your command to act in hostility against, or give any further assistance to either side, or act in such a way as may occasion jealousy between England and the United Provinces, whilst these endeavours are on foot<sup>2</sup>." In the meantime Goodson was given orders that if the Dutch attempted to relieve Copenhagen he was to

<sup>1</sup> *Clarke Papers*, III. 183.

<sup>2</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 64, f. 43, printed in *Thurloe S. P.* VII. 645.



engage them "and fight with, sink, take or destroy such of them as shall proceed to pass through as aforesaid; the which myself and the rest of the ships of the fleet...shall second and stand by you in<sup>1</sup>."

At the same time that he wrote to Opdam, Mountagu had written to the Kings of Denmark and Sweden also explaining his mission, "a common friend to you both, contributing what in me lyes to remove those difficulties, that may be in the way of the peace<sup>2</sup>." The term 'common friend,' however, was not one that was true in any but a very superficial sense. The one constant factor in the negotiations was the utter distrust that the Dutch and English had of each other: Mountagu's feeling was best illustrated by his precautions; De Ruyter wrote home "that the English, as far as he was able to judge by their manner of Proceeding, seemed ill intentioned, notwithstanding all their fair Protestations, and that he believed they turned Affairs in that manner, with Design to favour Swedeland<sup>3</sup>." Mountagu had corresponding suspicions concerning the Dutch and the Danes. Consequently it was almost inevitable that his good relations with Sweden should prosper rather at the expense of his 'common friendship.' Then came the news that the two Dutch divisions under Opdam and De Ruyter intended to unite—which would have given them a united fleet of over 80 ships. In a council of war it was decided to berth the ships "in the most advantageous manner to hinder the conjunction<sup>4</sup>." Before

<sup>1</sup> *Sandwich MS. Journal*, i. 67 in Harris, *Life of Mountagu*, i. 124.

<sup>2</sup> *Thurloe S. P.* vii. 645.

<sup>3</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 215.

<sup>4</sup> *Sandwich MS. Journal*, i. 87-90, in Harris, *op. cit.* i. 128.

even this plan could be put into execution there came the news which changed the whole face of matters so far as Mountagu and the English were concerned. Richard Cromwell had been deposed. His last instructions to Mountagu show how much the whole policy of the English towards the Dutch was changed: "you shall carry yourself friendly towards them and use your endeavours that by consent they may not give their assistance to the Dane, until the issue of the treaty be known, but not engage with them unless it be in your own defence<sup>1</sup>." The fleet accepted the new political change with the "very calme and good temper<sup>2</sup>" that characterises it through the recurring changes at this time; at a council of war it was decided, in the light of the new instructions, to withdraw northward to the Scaw, and from that time the English fleet is of interest merely as the focus for the intrigues that finally won over Mountagu to Charles, and through him, the fleet.

The other scene of active naval action was the Mediterranean. In July, 1658, it had been resolved in council, "on consideration of the Mediterranean trade, that a fleet be continued there of the same strength as formerly<sup>3</sup>": consequently Capt. John Stoakes remained out in those waters doing useful work in the way of pirate-catching<sup>4</sup>, of which the most noteworthy incident

<sup>1</sup> *Thurloe S. P.* VII. 666.

<sup>2</sup> *Public Intelligencer*, May 31st-June 6th, 1659.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 27th (Council Proceedings, 5).

<sup>4</sup> Piracy was not by any means confined to the Mediterranean: the Irish Sea was a favourite haunt of pirates, a large number of whom were Spanish. "There are great complaints by merchants of pirates being on the coast and none of the state's ships to look after them. . . . There are no less than 5 pirates now upon the coast, some carrying 22 guns apiece. . . if some course is not taken to secure the coasts all

was the capture of Victorio Papachino, "the prince of Spanish pirates." "He was so confident as to give us chase, taking us for three Baccallas men," writes Capt. Bonn of the *Phœnix*. "We chased him for nearly seven hours before we could bring him by the lee, and would not have effected it then had not his sails been all shot to pieces. The force of his vessel is ten guns and some pedereros. She sails well, on which account Papachino always kept her full of men for the purpose of boarding.... The news of his being in our hands is very welcome in this place, and the French are no less joyful than ourselves<sup>1</sup>." Successes such as this, a peace with Tunis, and the quietening down of the sea-rovers in the Mediterranean, gave an opportunity for Stoakes and his squadron, as being no longer necessary, to be recalled and "the public charge eased<sup>2</sup>." At the end of July the English squadron left the Mediterranean once more at the mercy of the Corsairs. Not yet was it realised that for a Mediterranean policy to be effective, to be a policy, it must essentially be continuous and without gaps of time or force.

trade will be spoilt." (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 29th, 1659.) Such is an official report from the Lancashire coast. Another official account from Ireland tells of worse things, 14 vessels lost in a week off Londonderry, from Coleraine: "there are 17 vessels, great and small, ordered to ply this coast, so that it lies under a universal ruin," off Carrickfergus 28 vessels have been lost in eight days. (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 13th.) It is probable these stories are exaggerated; however, in May, 1660, it was noted in council "that there are now at present ten Pyrats which ly upon that coast" (Barnstaple) *Add. MSS.* 22,546); in March, 1659, the only warships in the Irish Sea at all were the *Guift Prize*, 16 guns, and the *Fox*, 14 guns. (*Carte MSS.* 73, f. 227.)

<sup>1</sup> *S. P. Dom. Int.* CLXXXIII. 96.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* February 18th, 1659.

The following list will give a better idea of the real condition of the Navy before the Restoration than pages of description. There seems no reason to doubt its fundamental accuracy.

“A List of the fleete of this Commonwealth both at Sea and in harbour, with accompt of their respective stations and present condition and the time they have been unpaid. March, 1659.

		<i>Months</i>	
		<i>Guns</i>	<i>unpaid</i>
<i>In the Hope</i> being foule and out of victuall and unfitt for service till they be repair having laide there since 20th Dec. last.	<i>James</i> (V.-Ad. Lawson)	56	10
	<i>Worcester</i> .. ..	48	14
	<i>Yarmouth</i> .. ..	40	10
	<i>Portland</i> .. ..	38	25
	<i>Centurion</i> .. ..	44	19
	<i>Maidstone</i> .. ..	40	33
	<i>Dover</i> .. ..	40	27
	<i>Dragon</i> .. ..	40	22
	<i>Taunton</i> .. ..	40	25
	<i>Elias</i> .. ..	38	38
	<i>Dartmouth</i> .. ..	22	38
	<i>Pearle</i> .. ..	22	41
	<i>Nightingale</i> .. ..	24	39
	<i>Convert</i> .. ..	26	37
	<i>Kentish</i> .. ..	38	10
	<i>Winsby</i> .. ..	40	14
	<i>Nampturch</i> .. ..	40	25
	<i>Hampshire</i> .. ..	36	10
	<i>Foresight</i> .. ..	36	32
<i>In the Downes</i> and sent forth upon severall occasions of convoy, etc., many of them being foule.	<i>Marmaduke</i> .. ..	36	16
	<i>Bradford</i> .. ..	22	24
	<i>Forrester</i> .. ..	22	32
	<i>Norwich</i> .. ..	22	12
	<i>Wakefield</i> .. ..	22	19
	<i>Grantham</i> .. ..	24	3
	<i>Cheriton</i> .. ..	20	30
	<i>Lizard</i> .. ..	16	14
	<i>Weymouth</i> .. ..	16	16
	<i>Drake</i> .. ..	12	39
	<i>Martin</i> .. ..	12	8
	<i>Nonsuch</i> (Ket.) .. ..	8	9
	<i>Eaglett</i> .. ..	8	25
	<i>Larke</i> .. ..	10	20
	<i>Roe</i> (Ket.) .. ..	8	33
	<i>Swallow</i> .. ..	6	37
	<i>Lilly</i> .. ..	6	13
	<i>Cignett</i> .. ..	6	13
	<i>Hart</i> .. ..	6	37
Total men .. ..		..	4565





*Ships now refitting and victualling.*

As additional guard for the Channele		<i>Richard</i> 66	} Chatham
		<i>London</i> 64 (Sr. Ri. Stayner)	
		<i>Speaker</i> 54	
		<i>Plymouth</i>	} Deptford
<i>Swiftsure</i>	} Woolwich	<i>Reserve</i>	
<i>Essex</i>		<i>Convertine</i>	
<i>Newcastle</i>		<i>Assistance</i>	
<i>Guift</i>		<i>Adventure</i>	
<i>Pembroke</i>		<i>Rosebush</i>	
<i>Paul</i>			

3210 men.

*Ships gone convoy to the Streights.*

<i>Leopard</i>	..	..	50	13
<i>Preston</i>	..	..	40	16
<i>Jersey</i> ..	..	..	40	15
<i>Elizabeth</i>	..	..	40	14

710 men.

*Ships at Jamaica.*

<i>Diamond</i>	..	..	36	22
<i>Coventry</i>	..	..	22	23
<i>Hector</i> ..	..	..	20	32
<i>Chestnutt</i>	..	..	10	25
<i>Cagway</i>	..	..	8	38
<i>Pearle</i> ..	..	..	4	48
<i>Dolphin</i>	..	..	4	36

495 men.

*Ships in Harbour.*

Portsmouth		Chatham		Woolwich		Deptford	
<i>Andrew</i>	56	<i>Sovereigne</i>	100	<i>Newbery</i>	54	<i>Amity</i>	30
<i>Moncke</i>	54	<i>Resolution</i>	80	<i>Bridgwater</i>	54	<i>Assurance</i>	34
<i>Lyme</i>	54	<i>Naseby</i>	80	<i>Indian</i>	48	<i>Sophia</i>	26
<i>Marston</i>		<i>Dunbarre</i>	64	<i>Gt. Charity</i>	42	<i>Halfmoone</i>	30
<i>Moor</i>	54	<i>Triumph</i>	64	<i>Beare</i>	36	<i>Wexford</i>	18
<i>Gloucester</i>	54	<i>George</i>	56	<i>Augustine</i>	26	<i>Cornelion</i>	12
<i>Mathias</i>	46	<i>Rainbow</i>	56	<i>Westergate</i>	26	<i>Vulture</i>	12
<i>Welcome</i>	36	<i>Victory</i>	56	<i>Rose</i>	6	<i>Blackmore</i>	12
<i>Guinny</i>	30	<i>Unicorne</i>	56			<i>Kinsale</i>	10 <sup>1</sup>
<i>Francis</i>	10	<i>Vanguard</i>	56				
		<i>Lyon</i>	56				
		1 gt. galley					

<sup>1</sup> Carte MS. 73, 227.

## CHAPTER II

### THE NAVY AND THE STUART RESTORATION

NEGLECTED as was the history of the Navy until the latter end of the last century, ignorance had resulted in an almost absolute non-recognition of the influence of the fleet upon the Restoration and the intrigues and negotiations accompanying it. The more modern refusal to recognise that influence is, however, less comprehensible. It is possibly true that merely as an armed force the fleet "could only apply pressure by intercepting trade and cruising outside ports,"—by blockade "in circumstances which made effective blockade impossible<sup>1</sup>"; but as a moral force the Navy was far from being negligible on either side of the Channel. There were simple reasons for this. In England after the death of Cromwell every party, every political force, had lost half its power through divisions and dissensions; there was the Army against the Parliament, Lambert against Monk, the Rump against the 'Secluded Members,' minor sect against minor sect, petty faction against petty faction, until no man knew where to turn for authority and there was no 'power' in the land. The one exception to this rule

<sup>1</sup> Hannay's *Royal Navy*, I. 298; cf. also *Camb. Mod. Hist.* IV. 485.

of chaos and disunion was the Navy. There were of course differences of opinion, of belief, among officers and men; there are plenty of signs that all shades of opinion, from royalist to republican, were represented in the fleet; but the important fact is that opinions seem to have had no effect on discipline as regards the fleet as a whole. In that sense it is true that the Navy followed and 'did not lead<sup>1</sup>' at this critical time; it did follow its commander—a unique discipline and obedience which at that time gave it a special prestige and power. The fleet had no politics beyond those of its commander. It was the royalist tendencies of Mountagu that brought it back in haste from the Baltic, the—apparent—parliamentarianism of Lawson that took it up to Greenwich to demand a free parliament, and again the royalism of Mountagu that took it over to Scheveling to meet Charles.

Across the Channel the prestige of the Navy had an added importance. The position to which Cromwell had raised the English Navy still claimed a healthy respect from the European powers and they were closely interested—possibly more so than the English themselves—to see which party was to have the control of the one reliable force the country owned. According as to whether he could show the Navy on his side or not, so would be the provision or the lack of that financial support and diplomatic toleration which were so essential to the practical working of Charles' schemes. "I am to tell you by his Majesty's command," writes Clarendon, "that if any impressions could be made upon the Navy, or a part of it, that five or six ships would

<sup>1</sup> Hannay's *Royal Navy*, I. 298.



betake themselves to his service, the consequence and reputation of it would be so great that all would be done from hence and from France that could be wished<sup>1</sup>." 20,000 pistoles were to be promised to the officers and men of these ships. "You may think," he continues, "that such a sum of money if it be in our power, might hire ships to do our work as well, and it may be it would do so, but the money can be in our power to no other purpose, nor upon any other terms, than upon getting off part of the English Navy, which would persuade those who would assist us that the rupture and divisions are in truth as great as we report it. Whereas, while they see the Navy entire and against us, they will not be persuaded that we can make a prosperous attempt." It would indeed have been a vivid proof of the greatness of the divisions if the fleet had caught the general contagion and become divided against itself—though the fiasco of the royalist revolt in the fleet in 1648 scarcely offered good prospects for the success of such a split. But with the conversion of Mountagu and Lawson to royalism the fleet became *ipso facto* a royalist weapon and when the long-wished-for fleet came to fetch Charles back, it was not merely 'five or six ships,' but over thirty of the pick of the English Navy. By the end of April public opinion tended almost universally towards Restoration, largely because it was the obvious and apparently inevitable outcome of events—inevitable because it was widely believed that Monk and Mountagu aimed at restoring Charles and in their hands was a powerful and willing instrument in

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. January 12, 59–60, Hyde to Wright (Rumbold).

the form of the fleet. Because the influence of the fleet during the time between Mountagu's appointment to the command and his arrival at Scheveling is not calculable in any concrete way, is no reason for assuming that it was really negligible. The mere passive presence of that force, believed to be in royalist hands, in the Thames, probably acted as a very liberal royalist education to many waverers.

The process of gaining control of the fleet was on Conversion of the whole a less unedifying spectacle than Mountagu. such an intrigue might be expected to be—possibly because a great part of it is hidden from our view. Mountagu was the most important person to catch and even before he left England for the Sound in 1659, hopes were entertained of him, and it was thought that “there might be application made to him of no small hopes<sup>1</sup>,” and it was not long before Charles opened negotiations. “I am assured by so many who believe they know much of your mind and purposes,” wrote Charles, “that you have much affection for me, and a resolution to do me all the service you can, that I think it necessary you should know from myself, that I am very willing to be served and obliged by you, . . . and you may be confident I shall never expose you upon any rash undertaking for the vindication of it, but concur with you in such counsellis as are most proper, and shall give you all evidence of my being heartily your most affectionate friend<sup>2</sup>.” But Mountagu was

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon MSS.* 60, f. 465.

<sup>2</sup> *Clarendon MSS.* 60, f. 436, May 9th, 1659, a Draft in Hyde's hand.

“withall extreme cautelous<sup>1</sup>,” and he had besides a real regard for Richard Cromwell : it needed more than tactful or flattering letters from Charles or his followers to make him royalist. The republicans at home soon provided the necessary impetus. The deposition of Richard left the government in the hands of a republican militarism particularly distasteful to Mountagu, and from him they received “no assurance, only compliment<sup>2</sup>”; so, “as if resolved to declyne all the precepts and examples of Policy in the Christian world, by aggravating a malcontent in supreme command so far out of reach<sup>3</sup>,” they deprived him of his lodgings at Whitehall, his regiment of cavalry and pay, sent out as Vice-Admiral, John Lawson, a man who had few reasons<sup>4</sup> for being well disposed towards him<sup>5</sup>, and, as a final proof of their petty inability either to trust or to dismiss, they sent out three new commissioners, Honeywood, Boone and Algernon Sidney, to act as joint plenipotentiaries with Mountagu—in other words, to act as a check on his actions.

The royalists were more clever, and Mountagu now became the centre of secret intrigues of which he was a more or less passive subject, Whetstone and

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. 488, June 15th, Mr Herbert’s report on M. to King.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 10th, 1659.

<sup>3</sup> *Clarendon MSS.* 61, f. 172, June 10th.

<sup>4</sup> In January, 1656, Mountagu, then young, inexperienced, absolutely ignorant of the sea, had been appointed joint commander of the fleet with Blake over the head of Lawson, an experienced seaman and fighter. Lawson resigned.

<sup>5</sup> “Lawson’s fleet, appointed to guard the Narrow Seas, is rather to bring Montague to reason.” *Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 10th, 1659.

Edward Mountagu<sup>1</sup> the go-betweens, and Charles and Clarendon the authors: everything that tact, persuasion and bribery could do was done, down to the offering of an earldom, the Garter, any command or office he might desire<sup>2</sup>. But Mountagu's caution was only equalled by his secrecy, he was not to be enticed into any immature or rash attempts, and the King got scarcely anything more satisfactory or tangible than the 'compliments' that had annoyed Parliament. It is evident, however, that by August the Admiral was a virtual, if not a confessed convert, for in that month there came an opportunity for him to prove his good or ill will towards the King without at the same time unduly endangering his own skin.

It was an opportunity after Mountagu's own heart and he made full use of it, both defensively and offensively.

As we have seen, the fleet had been originally sent to the Sound to maintain the balance of power in that quarter, to balance the Dutch support of Denmark by affording Sweden the moral support of a large fleet: it was, in other words, a natural continuation of the Cromwellian policy of hostility to the Netherlands. The change of government in England, however, brought a change of official

Return of  
Baltic fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Ed. Mountagu was the Admiral's cousin; Whetstone, O. Cromwell's nephew.

<sup>2</sup> *Clarendon MSS.* 61, ff. 291 (Whetstone's instructions), 303 (to Mountagu), 335 (to Morland); 62, f. 30 (to Hyde). In *Clarendon S. P.* III. 497 (Hyde to Ed. Mountagu) there is even a suggestion that Gen. Mountagu should take any ships that would follow and appear off some good harbour in the King's name.



policy; republican ascendancy put republican sympathies in power, and republican Holland became, in the eyes of Fleetwood and his friends, the natural ally of a republican England. Consequently the new commissioners were given instructions favouring Denmark rather than Holland, and between July 25th and August 4th an agreement was come to between Holland and England that their combined fleets should force a settlement and compromise upon the combatants<sup>1</sup>. The King of Sweden protested at this arrangement, "telling the English lords, 'I accept of you for my mediators, not for my arbitrators, for as much as you continue in the terms of good friends; and for you' (turning himself to the lords Netherland commissioners), 'I refuse you for my mediators, since you are my enemies<sup>2</sup>'"; and in this protest he had the sympathies of Mountagu with whom he had been on the best of terms throughout the negotiations. A policy thus in itself distasteful to Mountagu was made but little less so to him by its chief upholder, Algernon Sidney, one of the new commissioners. It is unnecessary here to trace the story of the antagonism and inevitable quarrel between these two men, the one capable, inquiring and republican, the other clever, secretive and royalist<sup>3</sup>; it is only the final stage of it that has a direct bearing on the movements of the fleet. Up to the time of the change in English policy

<sup>1</sup> Manley, *Late Warres*, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup> *Thurloe S. P.* vii. 736.

<sup>3</sup> Harris in his *Life of Mountagu*, vol. i. pp. 142-157, gives a detailed account of it, quoting largely from the *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, i. 109-128.

the English and Dutch Fleets had acted as armed sentinels on each other, manœuvring to obtain strategic positions ; and late in July Goodson had written from the Sound : “ the change of government hath putt a longe stoppe to affaires here, the Dutch not well knowing how to deale with their old antagonist our present Parliament. Their fleete and wee have bin long facing one another in this and the Belt<sup>1</sup>. ” But now that they were to act in combination there was no need for the continuance in the Sound of such large fleets, while with the English the victualling question was becoming serious. A proposal was set on foot that proportional number of ships from each fleet should be withdrawn to return to their respective countries. Sidney trusted the Dutch to carry out their side of such an agreement, Mountagu—rightly as it proved—did not, and he came to a decision, on which he promptly acted, to return with the whole fleet. He described the whole proceeding to Richard Cromwell a few weeks later : “ when y<sup>e</sup> victualls of y<sup>e</sup> Fleete was spent to a months proportion at whole allowance the consideration of sending y<sup>e</sup> whole or a part of it home became necessarye, and after much discussion amongst y<sup>e</sup> plenipotentiaries at last wee resolved to send it all home, 3 of us beinge for it and only Coll. Sidney against it.... Two very powerful reasons were y<sup>e</sup> Dutch would send away none of theire Fleete whereby if wee had left fifteen shippes behind it would have beene useless and at theire mercye, and y<sup>e</sup> other y<sup>e</sup> absolute necessity<sup>e</sup> for want of victualls, wee could not have been supplied

<sup>1</sup> *Clarke Papers*, iv. 29.

in any way wee could devise<sup>1</sup>." In other words Mountagu was quite determined to return home: he knew that a royalist rising in England was imminent and he fully appreciated the effect that the proximity of the fleet under his command would be likely to have. The delay caused by Sidney, however, proved fatal to any royalist hopes Mountagu may have had. The sporadic risings throughout the country had fizzled out before the fleet reached England, and Mountagu, helpless and yet suspected as he was, went into retirement and the command of the fleet passed to the yet unconverted Lawson.

Thus it looked as though Mountagu and the fleet had failed, as though the time and trouble, tact and promises, expended on his 'conversion' had been wasted. In reality, however, a big step towards ensuring final success had been taken; Mountagu's was the bigger one of the two names the fleet would follow, and, the leader secured, it only remained to supply a safe and favourable opportunity for him.

Mountagu's caution had led him to a right appreciation of the weakness as well as the strength of the fleet in this question of Restoration. No fleet could lead the nation in an unpopular direction, it could force obedience to no unwished-for government; and in September, 1659, the nation as a whole (if that can be spoken of as a whole which is split and torn into innumerable squabbling sects and factions) did not yet want the Stuarts back. The nation knew not what it wanted—a mystery that was finally solved partly by

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 312, cf. also *Tanner MSS.* 51, ff. 69-127.

elimination, by experience, of things it did not want, partly by an admixture of tact and bluff on the part of three men using the fleet as their instrument<sup>1</sup>.

It was not until the early part of December that the Navy took any concerted or decisive action with regard to the civil disturbances and changes<sup>2</sup>. By that time England, and especially London, was heartily tired of the vagaries of military rule under the name of the "Committee of Safety"; notice was made of "strange discontents growing in the City and other places<sup>3</sup>," and on December 13th, Lawson, in the name of the fleet in the Downs, wrote to the Mayor and Aldermen of London enclosing a declaration "in order to the removal of the interruption that is put upon the Parliament the Thirteenth of October last<sup>4</sup>."

Navy v.  
Army.

<sup>1</sup> A tabulated summary of the whole process is contained in a MS. list of the "*Ten Changes of Government in England*: from May 1659 to May 1660, viz.: 1. In May 1659 Richard Protector. 2. In the same month Wallingfordhouse. 3. In June following the Rump restored. 4. In October a Committee of Safety. 5. In December the Rump againe. 6. In January Genll. Monk. 7. In February y<sup>e</sup> seclused Members. 8. In March a Councell of State upon y<sup>e</sup> dissolution of y<sup>e</sup> seclused members. 9. In Aprill a parliament convened. 10. In May y<sup>e</sup> King Lords and Commons." This is on the fly-leaf of "*An Exact History of the several changes of Government in England*" (1648-60). *Brit. Mus.* E. 1917 (2).

<sup>2</sup> On November 4th, a party of naval officers, including Stayner and Wm. Goodson, had written a letter to Monk remonstrating with him for his opposition to the English army (printed in Whitelocke's *Memorials*, p. 687): the ineffectiveness of which proceeding is a good example of the futility of any attempt of any part of the Navy to act as an independent power instead of merely as an instrument in the hands of a leader.

<sup>3</sup> *Monthly Intelligencer*, December, 1659. (*Brit. Mus.* 669, f. 22 (51).)

<sup>4</sup> The Declaration is printed in the *Mercurius Politicus* for December 22-29, p. 975; and Lawson's letters in the *Public*



This, however, had no effect and received no answer, so Lawson took a more practical method of showing the firmness of his intentions, and on the 17th he was sailing up the Thames, much to the alarm of the existing authorities. Sir Henry Vane and some military officers went down the river to meet him and endeavoured their utmost to persuade him not to come further up the river, but Lawson was quite firm and irresistible, and the same evening he came to anchor off Gravesend with his fleet of some 24 ships. Vane and his companions made feverish, futile attempts to win over Lawson, or even to obtain the removal of part of the fleet down the river : but Lawson had the whip-hand and kept it. On the 21st he sent a second letter to the Mayor and Aldermen enclosing the declaration and a copy of the previous letter : and as, on this occasion, the fleet was near enough to lend point to their resolve—"if it cannot be done by Christian and friendly means...to use our utmost endeavor for the removal of that Force" (put on Parliament by the army officers<sup>1</sup>)—the effect was immediate, and success rapid : the plans of the army officers fell to pieces at the touch :

*Intelligencer* for December 19-26, p. 967 (*Brit. Mus. E. 773*), also in Granville Penn's *Memorials* (Penn wrongly dates the second letter the 29th), with a *Narrative of the Proceedings of the Fleet*, II. 186. The declaration is an interesting and noteworthy exception to the usual navy attitude of no interest and non-interference in civil matters : it "disclaimed the interest of Charles Stuart," and advocated the maintenance of the "maimed or dismembered," and of widows and orphans of sailors, the abolition of tithes, excise, and of impressment "in any military employment either by land or sea, otherwise than in the defence of his country."

<sup>1</sup> See previous reference.

“December 17th. The Council took care to issue forth immediately the writs for the election of a Parliament, and it is thought they had proceeded vigorously therein, but for Vice-Admiral Lawson his declaring (this day) for the Old Parliament, which began to put the council of officers at a stand<sup>1</sup>.” So complete was the ‘stand’ to which they were put, that by the 24th their rule was a thing of the past, and Parliament House again open and clear of guards: on the 26th the Rump of the Long Parliament sat once again. In spite of appearances there were not wanting people to say that the Navy action was all part of a royalist plot<sup>2</sup>, and it was probably that fact and also a certain undesirable restlessness in the City, which led Lawson to send a third letter to the Mayor and Aldermen on December 28th, speaking of “Charles Stuart’s party” and suggesting the advisability of a “total, absolute, and publicke disowning and discountenancing of them<sup>3</sup>”: and on January 7th he was “still in the Thames, to awe the City which talks high<sup>4</sup>.”

Affairs in England at this moment were in an extraordinary state of ferment: “truly,” writes Hyde to Bennett<sup>5</sup>, “the People there (in England) are so

<sup>1</sup> *Monthly Intelligencer*, No. 1, December, 1659 (*Brit. Mus.* 669, f. 22 (51)).

<sup>2</sup> Baker’s *Chronicle*, p. 698. How little truth there was in this suspicion may be gathered from *Clarendon S. P.* III. 628 (Broderick to Hyde, December 16th). “Lawson with his two squadrons attempted the Tower, and negociate in all parts of the Nation, never considering themselves embarked in the same ship with us. . . . They say the King offers nothing.”

<sup>3</sup> *Brit. Mus.*, *Thomason MSS.* 669, f. 22 (43).

<sup>4</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. 640, Lambourne to Hyde.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 647, January 17th, 1660.

fantastical and change their minds so often, that I believe they who live within twenty miles of London, and receive letters thence every day, know as little what will be done the next day as we do," and again, "I believe if you did at this instant receive twenty letters from London of the same date with our last, you would receive so many several opinions of the state of affair there, according to the constitutions of the persons who write<sup>1</sup>": any attempt to detail the course of all these changes would fortunately, however, be out of place here; they may be briefly summarised.

Apart from Lawson, the one force, the one man in the country was George Monk, commander of the Army in Scotland, a man of action, to be frightened neither into tears like Fleetwood, nor into supercautious inactivity like Mountagu. Until he heard of Lawson's declaration and move up the Thames, Monk had contented himself with improving the fitness and discipline of his army and with keeping up more or less futile negotiations with Fleetwood and Lambert: on the receipt of the news from the Thames and from London he started on his march south to London. Lambert's army in the north of England melted before Monk who made a slow unopposed progress through England: it was not until the end of January that he came as near as St Albans. There Lawson and his captains "presented their Acknowledgments to Gen. Monck at St Albans, who gave them a very courteous reception<sup>2</sup>." On February 3rd, with 5600 men Monk entered London, his forces "in very good plight and

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. 641.

<sup>2</sup> *Public Intelligencer*, January 23rd-30th, 1660, p. 1052.

stout officers<sup>1</sup>." A week later he declared against the Rump and for a fully representative Parliament, a death-knell to the Rump which caused universal joy—that night, says Pepys, "Bow bells and all the bells in all the churches as we went home were a-ringing... and at Strand Bridge I could at one view tell thirty-one fires<sup>2</sup>." It was the beginning of the end: the whole attitude towards Charles had altered in a week or two: "Everybody now drinks the King's health without any fear, whereas before it was very private that a man might dare do it<sup>3</sup>."

And now it was that the Navy again became a vital factor—not as an independent force, but as an all-important instrument in the hands of Monk, Mountagu and Lawson. The nation no longer hated the idea of the Restoration but was still in a doubtful, touchy mood: both tact and bluff were needed if the King was to be restored without a hitch. Monk had the necessary qualities and means for both. Though neither he nor Mountagu, who had been appointed joint General-at-sea with him, showed their hands, there is no doubt that by the beginning of March they were determined in their own minds as regards the Restoration. On March 6th Mountagu told Pepys that "he did believe the King would come," though he thought he "would not last long...unless he carry himself very soberly and well<sup>4</sup>": and by

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, February 3rd, 1660.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* February 11th. There are a number of letters from Pepys to Mountagu describing events in London from October onwards in *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 320 and foll.

<sup>3</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, March 6th.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*



March 18th Monk was in definite negotiation with the King.

With Mountagu and Monk converted there remained one important person to be made sure of. Conversion  
of Lawson. In spite of the command he had held, Mountagu was no true seaman, and, though his tact might soothe some opposition, he was not the man whom the seamen would follow naturally : but Lawson was. Sailor born and bred, he was a sailors' leader, a man whom they would follow with less question than any. His conversion then was necessary if the fleet was to be a reliable instrument of Restoration. As early as December 16th, Broderick had written, "if the King would find some means to treat with Lawson it is not improbable but he may in some measure be wrought upon<sup>1</sup>" : Broderick's next notice of him on December 30th speaks volumes of the intervening fortnight, "Lawson...a Sea-Fairfax, so sullen, so senseless, of so obstinate a courage and so wayward an animosity...<sup>2</sup>." Lawson was evidently a hard nut to crack ; during December and January he took, as we have seen, every opportunity to disclaim the interests of Charles Stuart, but after Monk's arrival in London he seems to have adapted himself to changing circumstances. We hear of no protest from him against Monk's treatment of the Rump—though he was still in the Thames with his fleet ; later on he sent his congratulations to Mountagu on his appointment to command of the fleet<sup>3</sup>, an appointment whose outcome he must have foreseen ;

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. 629 (Broderick to Hyde).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 355.

and on March 23rd he welcomed Mountagu on board the *Swiftsure* and stepped down to second in command. "The Fleet is now secured to your Majesty's service, by Lawson's proffer to do what Mountagu shall direct him," writes Lord Mordaunt to the King on the 24th, "Mr Bremes has wrought him so to it<sup>1</sup>": and that is all that appears of the process of Lawson's conversion.

It remained to convert the fleet itself in order to ensure success. Pepys, who was with the Conversion of the fleet. fleet as Mountagu's secretary (and incidentally remarks, "I pray God to keep me from being proud or too much lifted up thereby"), gives vivid glimpses in his Diary of the gradual preparation of the fleet for royalism. On March 29th he gives a hint of what a difficult task Mountagu and the royalists would have had with the Navy unaided by Lawson: on that day he writes: "this evening was a great whispering of some of the Vice-Admiral's captains that they were dissatisfied, and did intend to fight themselves, to oppose the General. But it was soon hushed, and the Vice-Admiral did wholly deny any such thing, and protested to stand by the General<sup>2</sup>": an incident which rather gives the impression that even Lawson had had some difficulty in controlling some of the officers. Mountagu, however, was determined to have his fleet as thoroughly reliable as possible. "After dinner" (April 1st), says Pepys, "My Lord did give me a private list of all the ships that were to be set out this summer, wherein I do discern he hath made it his

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. 706.

<sup>2</sup> *Pepys' Diary*, March 29th.

care to put by as much of the Anabaptists as he can<sup>1</sup>." Lists of commanders and officials were also drawn up by Pepys and Creed, and against any doubtful characters notes were made, such as "distracted," "uselesse, and in matter of attendance," "querie his affection," "Anabaptist," etc.<sup>2</sup>; further procedure was as follows: "At night he (Mountagu) bid me privately to get two commissions ready, one for Capt. Robert Blake to be Captain of the *Worcester*, in the room of Capt. Dekings, an anabaptist, and one that had witnessed a great deal of discontent with the present proceedings. The other for Capt. Coppin to come out of that into the *Newbury* in the room of Blake, whereby I perceive that General Monk do resolve to make a thorough change, to make way for the King<sup>3</sup>." On April 8th, Mountagu and the fleet sailed from the Thames and anchored in the Downs on the following day: London needed overawing no longer; and the Straits of Dover being the highway of the ever-increasing stream of intrigue and negotiation between Charles and his would-be subjects, the presence of the fleet in the Downs had a special strategic importance. Pepys with his exceptional advantages is again the best chronicler of events in the Navy at this time: "April 17th. He" (Mountagu) "told me clearly his thoughts

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, April 1st.

<sup>2</sup> *Carte MSS.* 73, ff. 264, 402; 74, f. 490.

<sup>3</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, April 15th. M. wrote to Monk complaining of Dekings and Captain Newbury—the former had "designed in the river very weake and undutifull thinges"—but with characteristic caution asked that "if any thinge be done towards them, a motion by any member of the Councell may doe it, and take off any unkindnesse from mee towards them." *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 399.

that the King would carry it, and that he did think himself very happy that he was now at sea, as well for his own sake, as that he thought he might do his country some service in keeping things quiet<sup>1</sup>.” “21st. This day dined Sir John Boys and some other gentlemen formerly great Cavaliers, and among the rest one Mr Norwood, for whom my Lord give a convoy to the Brill, but he is certainly going to the King. For my Lord ” (cautious ever) “ commanded me that I should not enter his name in my book. My Lord do show them and that sort of people great civility. All their discourse and others are of the King’s coming, and we begin to speak of it very freely<sup>2</sup>.” Now too, after years of stern Puritanism the spirits of the fleet began to rise : on the 23rd “ the first time that we had any sport among the seamen ” ‘ my Lord ’ himself “ fell to singing of a song made upon the Rump, with which he played himself well<sup>3</sup>.” “ Every man begins to be merry,” and supper parties with music after them became the fashion : “...to supper, where...we had very good laughing, and after that some musique ” not quite satisfactory to the critical Pepys—“ Mr Pickering beginning to play a bass part upon the vial did it so like a fool that I was ashamed of him<sup>4</sup>.” On May 1st, “ the happiest May-day that hath been many a year in England,” “ they were very merry at Deal, setting up the King’s flag upon one of their maypoles, and drinking his health upon their knees in the streets

<sup>1</sup> Pepys’ *Diary*. M. was evidently not at one with present day opinion that the influence of the Navy was insignificant.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* March 26th.



and firing the guns<sup>1</sup>." Two days later Mountagu made public to the Fleet the King's Declaration<sup>2</sup>. "This morning my Lord showed me the King's declaration and his letter to the two Generals to be communicated to the fleet.... Upon receipt of it this morning by an express, my Lord summoned a council of war, and in the meantime did dictate to me how he would have the vote ordered which he would have pass this council, which done the Commanders all came on board, and the council sat in the coach (the first council of war that hath been in my time), where I read the letter and declaration; and while they were discoursing upon it, I seemed to draw up a vote, which being offered, they passed. Not one man seemed to say no to it, though I am confident many in their hearts were against it. After this was done, I went up to the quarter deck with my Lord and the Commanders, and there read both the papers and the vote; which done, and demanding their opinion, the seamen did all of them cry out, 'God bless King Charles!' with the greatest joy imaginable." This form was repeated throughout the fleet, Pepys going from ship to ship reading the Declaration to vote, "not one through the whole fleet showing the least dislike of the business<sup>3</sup>." The next day Mountagu sent, simultaneously, an account of the proceedings to the King<sup>4</sup>, and an application to Parliament

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 1st.

<sup>2</sup> "King Charles II. his Declaration to all his loving Subjects, dated from his Court at Breda in Holland 4/14 of April, 1660." London, 1660, 4°, pp. 8.

<sup>3</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 3rd.

<sup>4</sup> *Clarendon MSS.* 72, f. 165, also printed in Lister's *Life of Clarendon*, III. 104.

for permission to send that account to the King. He had something about which to be satisfied, he had justified his extreme caution and tactfulness in gradually educating the fleet up to royalism, in accustoming them to the idea of Restoration, by the success with which his ultimate appeal met ; and though he thought Monk “ but a thick-sculled fool ” he was willing “ to let him have all the honour of the business<sup>1</sup>, ” knowing that the King himself knew the due proportion of merit to be assigned to each. Then followed a week of gay bustle in the fleet ; ordering of alterations, of music and flags, pulling down “ all the State’s arms in the fleet, ” setting up the King’s, and all the other multitudinous preparations necessary for what was a change not merely of rule, but of national spirit.

Parliament and its commissioners were now the  
 Fleet at only cause of further delay of the King’s  
 Scheveling. return—delay which the King begged  
 Mountagu to cut short by crossing to Holland. Monk  
 too wrote to Mountagu “ that the King’s friends  
 thought his Majesty’s present repair to London was  
 absolutely necessary, and therefore he wished mee  
 (Mountagu) to sail and waft the King over as soon  
 as I could<sup>2</sup> ” : this Mountagu, after “ a high debate  
 with the Vice and Rear-Admiral<sup>3</sup> whether it were  
 safe to go and not stay for the Commissioners<sup>4</sup>, ”  
 decided to do without waiting for the Commissioners,  
 and on the 12th he sailed for Holland, arriving off

<sup>1</sup> Pepys’ *Diary*, May 3rd.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted from *Sandwich MSS. Journal* by Harris, *op. cit.* vol. I. p. 182.

<sup>3</sup> Lawson and Sir Rich. Stayner.

<sup>4</sup> Pepys’ *Diary*, May 11th.

Scheveling on the 14th. On the following day the Court moved to the Hague, and there were gay times there in which most of the fleet joined as opportunity allowed. Pepys for instance, as his habit was, did himself well ; and in the experience he had one morning, " being not very well settled," of mistaking " the sun rising for the sun setting," he was probably far from unique in the fleet<sup>1</sup>. The King too had his joys : when he received the money that had been brought over for him he was " so joyful, that he called the Princess Royal and Duke of York to look upon it as it lay in the portmanteau before it was taken out<sup>2</sup>."

In the meantime several days very rough weather prevented the King from visiting his fleet. But on the 16th he appointed his brother, James, Duke of York, Lord High Admiral of England<sup>3</sup>, and on the 22nd the new Admiral went out to his fleet amidst general salutes, Mountagu offering " all things to the pleasure of the Duke as Lord High Admiral." " Nothing in the world but going off of guns almost all this day<sup>4</sup>."

The fleet of which James then took command numbered 32 ships of war of all sides, of which the principal were :

<i>Naseby</i> ,	Gen. Mountagu, Capt. Cuttance	80 guns,
<i>London</i> ,	Vice-Adm. John Lawson	64 guns,
<i>Swiftsure</i> ,	Rear-Adm. Sir Rich. Stayner	60 guns,
<i>Richard</i> ,	Capt. Jno. Stoakes	70 guns,
besides four other ships of over		50 guns.

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 14th-26th, contains a full and vivid account of the festivities before and during the King's crossing to England.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* May 16th.

<sup>3</sup> The patent only dates from June 6th.

<sup>4</sup> Pepys' *Diary*.

On the following day the King himself came on board with the rest of the Court amidst Restoration. "infinite shooting off of the guns, and that in a disorder on purpose, which was better than if it had been otherwise." After dining in great state Charles purged the fleet of the more obtrusive of the unpleasant memories by rechristening a number of the ships: the *Naseby* became the *Charles*, the *Richard* the *James*, the *Speaker* the *Mary*, the *Dunbar* the *Henry*, the *Winsby* the *Happy Return*, the *Lambert* the *Henrietta*; some lower rate ships also changed their names. "That done," says Pepys, "the Duke of York went on board the *London* and the Duke of Gloucester<sup>1</sup> the *Swiftsure*. Which done, we weighed anchor, and with a fresh gale and most happy weather we set sail for England." The voyage was short and prosperous; all, from the King downwards, very merry. On the 25th the fleet arrived off Dover and the general spirits rose still higher. At breakfast the King and the two Dukes paid a tactful compliment to the seamen to whom they owed so much; "there being set some ship's diet before them, only to show them the manner of the ship's diet, they eat of nothing else but pease and pork, and boiled beef<sup>2</sup>." Gifts of £50 for Mountagu's servants and £500 for the officers and men of the King's ship were an earnest of the practical nature of the gratitude to the fleet Charles felt and meant to demonstrate. The reward of the rest of the fleet and of Mountagu in particular was yet to come, and in the meantime the

<sup>1</sup> Charles I's youngest son: died of smallpox in September of that year.

<sup>2</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 25th.



King and Court landed at Dover and set off for London to the accompaniment of enthusiasm that was almost hysterical in its fervour.

The fleet had done its work ; it remained for the country to do due honour to the King who  
Rewards. had been brought back to them. The combination of tact, patience and bluff had proved successful : tact with the seamen, patience and bluff with the nation : it is not surprising that Mountagu was pleased with himself for his share in the proceedings. " My Lord," says Pepys<sup>1</sup>, " almost transported with joy that he had done all this without any the least blur or obstruction in the world, that could give an offence to any, and with the great honour he thought it would be to him."

He had not long to wait for the expected reward. The day after the King's departure a letter arrived from the Lord Chancellor announcing to Mountagu that he had been created an Earl and asking what style he would take so that the patent might be prepared<sup>2</sup> : on the following day came Sir Edward Walker, Garter King-at-Arms, with the George and Garter, and in the presence of all the commanders Mountagu was forthwith installed as Knight of the Garter. The rest of the fleet had longer to wait : but anticipation—the King had promised a month's pay all round—kept them merry ; Pepys tells of Cuttance, Stayner and Lawson " drinking all day," and perhaps it was to check the exuberance of spirits that on the 4th " the King's Proclamation against drinking, swearing and

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, May 25th.

<sup>2</sup> *Carte MSS.* 223, f. 210.

debauchery, was read to our ships' companies in the fleet<sup>1</sup>." It was not until July that the ships received the promised 'gratuities,' of which the principal were—the *Charles* (late *Naseby*), £801. 19s. 6d., the *London*, £580. 13s. 6d., the *Swiftsure*, £444. 13s. 6d., and the *Royal James* (late *Richard*), £369. 4s. 3d.<sup>2</sup> Lawson and Stayner were knighted on September 25th.

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 4th.

<sup>2</sup> Brit. Mus. *Add. MSS.* 9311.

## CHAPTER III

### ADMINISTRATION

#### 1. *Civil. Navy Office.*

THE restored Stuarts had every reason for having a due regard for the Navy and its importance. During their exile Cromwell's effective naval policy both in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and the prestige it had gained for the English Navy, pointed a moral of the truth of which they had had practical experience before their restoration, when they found how necessary for them was some sound naval support. The effectiveness of that support once gained gave added point to the moral. Fortunately for the Navy, however, inclination and interest, as well as strategy and diplomacy, were present to encourage the Stuarts to a practical care for Naval affairs; not only was there Prince Rupert, the enterprising leader of the forlorn royalist squadron of 1649-50, but James, Duke of York, the King's brother and now Lord High Admiral, had been destined for that post from boyhood, and if ever personal interest and administrative skill could compensate for lack of practical experience, they did so in his case.

It was no easy task that James took up when he

became head of the Navy. The Commonwealth and the Protectorate had bequeathed two things to him: a policy, and a debt. The policy was, briefly, that of a large and effective fleet both for political and commercial purposes; and herein lay the sting of it for the new rulers; it was a compulsory policy. Had James been inclined to neglect or reduce the fleet public opinion, or rather commercial opinion, would soon have made itself effectively felt through Parliament. Divine Right was no longer a working doctrine in practical politics; petitions out of Parliament and resolutions in it, neither could be ignored without risk of unpleasantness, unpleasantnesses might be dangerous, and the dominating principle of Charles II's rule was his determination not to go on his 'travels' again. Cromwell's regard for the protection of trade, and the further increase of that trade, had led to a far higher standard of expectation on the part of merchants, and the political consciousness which no amount of 'loyal' declarations or the like could destroy, gave that expectation a practical power.

It was the irony of fate that, at the same time that he inherited an unavoidable policy, James  
Initial Debt. also inherited with it a heavy debt that could not but dog any efforts he should make towards securing increased efficiency. As we have already seen, the political chaos that followed on the death of the Protector, the weak and changing governments, the general sense of insecurity, had had their inevitable effect on the Navy; mismanagement and neglect had left the department practically bankrupt. In February of that year the wages debt to seamen alone amounted



to nearly half a million<sup>1</sup>, some ships having gone unpaid for as much as four years, and the total debt of the Navy in June must have amounted to over three quarters of a million<sup>2</sup>.

It was organisation rather than reorganisation that the Navy needed. Cromwell had made a practical weapon of the fleet and had demonstrated some of its uses, but the machinery behind it had been personal and individual rather than official and departmental: and, despite its drawbacks, departmental administration is absolutely necessary to give reliability and permanency to a great service. In other words, the Navy had to be officialised and formalised into the shape of one of the public services.

James recognised what was necessary, and the best test of what he did to meet that need is the fact that the structure he set up lasted without any vital changes until the beginning of the 19th century.

In the meantime, however, the Navy could not stand still while new arrangements, new organisations were being devised. It was like building a coach on a chassis already and continually in motion—a process having both its advantages and disadvantages, the advantages

<sup>1</sup> *S. P. Dom.* CCXXII. 23.

<sup>2</sup> Tanner in *Camb. Mod. Hist.* v. 170, says they amounted to "more than a million and a quarter": but by 'debt' he apparently means the total charge, which was being continually though inadequately met. According to the official report of July, 1659, the charge of the Navy (including all debts) up to December 1st was estimated at £1,253,193. 16s. 3d., "towards which the provision already made exceeds not the summe of £260,000," "present action" needed £20,000 a week and upward, but "since May 31 has not been received above £8000 a week." (Admiralty Lib. MS. 8. *Orders and Warrants*, 1658-60.)

of evolution and the disadvantages of patchwork. The first step was, on May 31st and June 2nd, to order the provisional continuance of all the standing arrangements with regard to the Navy, the issuing of "monies for the necessities of the Navy" and of "victuals and all things necessary for the Navy, as formerly, until further orders<sup>1</sup>," and in the respite thus given a definite scheme of establishment was drawn up in the form of proposals by Sir Wm. Penn in the name of the Duke of York. On June 27th a committee of eight, including the Duke, Monk and Mountagu—now Earl Sandwich—was appointed "to meet on . . . the 30th of this instant, at eight of the clock in the morning, to consider of a Paper delivered in by his Royal Highness touching the regulation of the Navy, this day read at the board; and . . . to make report unto His Majesty of what they conceive fit to be done thereupon<sup>2</sup>." And on July 2nd, upon consideration of that report, the existing commis-

sions were ordered to "forbear to act  
 New officials. from henceforth<sup>3</sup>," and four "principal officers": Sir George Carteret (Treasurer), Sir William Batten (Surveyor), an unnamed comptroller<sup>4</sup>, and Samuel Pepys (Clerk of the Acts), were appointed, to be assisted by three "commissioners for the navy"—Lord Berkeley, Sir Wm. Penn, and Peter Pett, esquire. Two days later the salaries of the new officials were fixed: the Treasurer £2000 per annum, the Comptroller £500 (including former allowances), Surveyor

<sup>1</sup> Penn, *Memorials of Sir Wm. Penn*, II. 241.

<sup>2</sup> Penn, II. 242; the Proposals are printed in Appendix T. pp. 589-92.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* II. 243.

<sup>4</sup> Sir Robert Slingsby was subsequently appointed.

£490 (including allowances), Clerk of the Acts (including allowance) £350, and £500 per annum to each of the commissioners. Thus the new form of administration was a compromise between the systems of the Commonwealth and pre-Commonwealth times; the offices of Lord High Admiral and the principal officers had been revived only to be part of a commission which came to be known as the Navy Board, and the Commonwealth system of a fixed salary had been combined with the older one of fees and allowances. The choice of new officials afforded on the whole a good omen for the future management of the Navy: with one exception the new men were all men of experience<sup>1</sup> in some branch of military service: the exception was Pepys. Sir George Carteret had already served as Comptroller in 1659, having been brought up to the sea. The testimony of his enemy Sir Wm. Coventry is telling: "he is a man that do take the most pains, and gives himself the most to do business of any man about the court, without desire of pleasure or divertisements," "which," remarks Pepys, "is very true<sup>2</sup>." Sir Robert Slingsby was "almost the eldest sea captain surviving<sup>3</sup>." Sir Wm. Batten had already been Surveyor of the Navy from 1638 to 1642, besides having seen considerable active service. Sir Wm. Penn was a seaman born and bred, "bred up under Sir Wm. Batten<sup>4</sup>"; the debt which the Restoration Navy owed

<sup>1</sup> There are short biographical notices of most of Pepys' colleagues at the Navy Office in Wheatley's *Pepysiana* (companion volume to the *Diary*), chap. IV.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*, October 30th, 1662.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1660-61, p. 16.

<sup>4</sup> *Diary*, August 21st, 1660.

to him was almost incalculable, he was the best English commander whether of a ship or a fleet, and he was a seaman who could turn his practical experience to use in an administrative office ; as we have seen, he was the chief framer of the new naval constitution. Lord Berkeley had served in active service under Turenne for over three years ; while Peter Pett had already served nearly thirteen years as commissioner at Chatham Dockyard, and though his loyalty to the ship-building family of which he came made him unpopular with those not related to him, it is questionable whether it seriously lessened his value to the State as an experienced shipwright. And finally Samuel Pepys, though he had acted as Mountagu's secretary with the fleet in the Baltic and at the Restoration, can have known little or nothing of the Navy, and " so little of accounts that apparently he learned the multiplication table for the first time in July, 1662<sup>1</sup>."

Nor was the principle of utilising experience neglected in the following years. Sir John Mennes, who succeeded Slingsby on the latter's death in 1661, had had wide experience of naval service, though it vexed Pepys " that so great a trust should lie in the hands of such a fool<sup>2</sup> " : and when in 1664 two additional resident commissionerships were created, at Portsmouth and Harwich respectively, the appointments went to men of practical experience ; while in the case of the two other additional commissioners appointed, lack of experience once again notably justified itself in the person of William Coventry, who became one of the

<sup>1</sup> Wheatley's *Life of P.*, prefixed to vol. I. of *Diary*, p. xxvii.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*, April 7th, 1663.



most capable officials in the Navy Office, and ranked very high in Pepys' estimation<sup>1</sup>.

Such was the machinery for the reorganisation and regulating of the Navy. How far the work that ensued was that of one or two men it is very difficult to estimate with any certainty of justice. There can be no doubt that the official head of the Navy, prince though he was, was far from being a mere figure-head: Pepys frequently refers to his practical interest in his office, "he do give himself up to his business<sup>2</sup>," and a mere glance through his official letters<sup>3</sup> will show into what details he went. Beyond that it is impossible with justice to ascribe merit to him, since in his position as Lord High Admiral orders, reforms, and suggestions come above his name though they might be the work of his subordinates: Pepys, Coventry, and especially Penn, were undoubtedly the originators of many of the alterations and improvements in naval administration during the period preceding the Treaty of Breda.

The most pressing question to be dealt with was that of the debt of the Navy which was, says Pepys, "in very sad condition, and money must be raised for it<sup>4</sup>." By the end of August an estimate of the debt had been drawn up and submitted to the Council, at the same time that Parliament received a message from the King "hoping that care would be taken to raise moneys for paying the debts of the Navy<sup>5</sup>." It was not, however, a process to

Retrenchment  
and reform.  
Debt.

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, October 30th, November 20th, 1662 *et passim*.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*, January 20th, 1664 *et passim*.

<sup>3</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, 1660-67.

<sup>4</sup> *Diary*, July 31st, 1660.

<sup>5</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 31st, 1660.

be completed in a month or two, though immediate measures were taken in the form of paying off twenty-five ships then in harbour and provision of £70,000 per mensem for eight months<sup>1</sup>. On November 12th, an estimate was presented to the Commons which set the Navy debt<sup>2</sup> at £1,300,819. 8s. 0d., of which £670,868. 8s. 0d. was needed for "present supply and advancement": "all his Majesty's stores," it was also stated, "are now empty both of victual and all other necessities for the fleet<sup>3</sup>." It is not surprising therefore to find, more than a year later, the Navy Board complaining to the Duke of "the bad condition of the Navy for want of money<sup>4</sup>," and, still later, Pepys exclaiming: "God knows! the King is not able to set out five ships at this present without great difficulty, we neither having money, credit, nor stores<sup>5</sup>." Nevertheless the strenuous efforts made to extinguish the debt met with fair success in the end: on December 3rd, Pepys records: "this day Sir G. Cartaret did tell us at the table, that the Navy (excepting what is due to the Yards upon the quarter now going on, and what few bills he hath not heard of) is quite out of debt; which is extraordinary good newes, and upon the 'Change to hear how our credit goes as good as any merchant's upon the

<sup>1</sup> *Commons Journal*, September 13th, November 6th; also *Parl. Hist.* iv. 143, 149.

<sup>2</sup> i.e. current charge including unpaid debts.

<sup>3</sup> *Parl. Hist.* iv. 143.

<sup>4</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, November 13th, 1661.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* June 28th, 1662. On March 14th, Albemarle wrote to the Duke entreating "a hearing in council for the petition of the hundreds of poor people concerned in the debts incurred for the Navy. He wished to see so many families whom he had a hand in engaging, freed from ruin." *Cal. S. P. Dom.* March 14th, 1662.

'Change is a joyfull thing to consider, which God continue<sup>1</sup> ! ”

The Navy Board, although it was a primary necessity with them to clear off the debt, did not, however, fail to realise that the truest retrenchment is that which is founded on increased efficiency, and though ships were paid off and establishments reduced<sup>2</sup>, special care was directed against unnecessary or wasteful expenditure. As early as October, 1660, an order was given against the excessive use of pilots, it having been found “ by dayly experience, that his Majestie’s ships of all rates, have gotten a custome not to stir out of the Downes, unto any place without an extra Pilott<sup>3</sup>. ” Another item of wasteful expenditure was “ unnecessary and unfitting expense of Powder ” by “ unusuall salutes<sup>4</sup>, ” which was to be put an end to by means of

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, December 3rd, 1663. It is questionable how far Sir G. Carteret’s statement may be considered reliable when we consider an entry Pepys makes in April, 1665: after speaking of “ money to be got for the Navy, or else we must shut up shop, ” he complains “ how Sir G. Cartaret do order business, keeping us in ignorance what he do with his money ” (*Diary*, April 7th, 1665). There can, however, be no doubt that at the end of 1663 the debt was, for a short time, brought within control.

<sup>2</sup> Alterations in establishment (in March and October, 1660) (*Pepys’ MSS.* 2873).

		March.		October.
		War.	Peace.	
<i>Soveraine</i>	..	700	600	500
<i>Henry</i>	..	380	340	280*
<i>Victory</i>	..	320	280	250
<i>Dreadnought</i>	..	240	210	180
<i>Mountague</i>	..	269	220	180

\* Raised to 430 in 1664.

<sup>3</sup> *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 9311.

<sup>4</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS.* 23, *Orders of D. of Y.*

the definite rules regulating salutes which the Duke issued at the beginning of December : that this regulation may probably not have been, from a financial point of view, the minor detail it appears, is evident when one occasion, for example, is noticed on which each ship of an English fleet of over 20 ships fired at least 43 guns—and that duly according to regulation<sup>1</sup>.

The main process of reform and regulation can, however, best be appreciated as the whole that it was if it be considered along the three principal lines of 'Civil Administration,' 'Personnel,' and 'Discipline.'

The first essential towards any reorganisation of the civil side of the service was the purging out of the unnecessary, the impotent, or the incapable ; and on January 28th, the Duke wrote to the principal officers giving directions to that effect. "I desire you," he wrote, "that your first care be to discharge unnecessary workmen in the yards, and y<sup>e</sup> next to sett a mark on such who shall appear to have served either deceitfully or negligently that they may not hereafter be entered into his Majestie's yards upon any occasion of work for the future" : "the ordinary in H.M.'s yards" was to be examined, "who I am informed is in some of them rather fit for an Hospitall than the King's service" : report was also to be made "if you find any to be prodigall," or "if y<sup>e</sup> master shipwrights have put y<sup>e</sup> King to unnecessary charge in repairs, if they have exceeded their estimate<sup>2</sup>." Apart

Civil  
Administra-  
tion.

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> Printed in Penn, II. 265, with error of "commanders" for "commissioners" (vide *Tanner in Introd. to Cat. of Pepysian MSS.* p. 21 n.). MS. copies in *Pepysian MSS.* 2867, p. 352 and 2611, p. 121.



from these preliminaries the real need, however, had been truly summed up in 1660 by Sir Robert Slingsby; he then proposed that, for the regulation of the Navy Office, "which by the frequent vicissitudes of form is still in great confusion, whereby neither are accounts exactly kept, nor sufficient order taken for the rectifying of known abuses, or preventing the like for the future...his Royal Highness would vouchsafe...to regulate the navy by his princely instructions, to be preserved in the office in a book fairly written, as a direction for every officer to walk by in the execution of the duty of his place<sup>1</sup>": and the Duke's letter covered a set of instructions just such as Slingsby had outlined.

These instructions were not new or original, and James speaks of them as a ratification of instructions issued by Buckingham in 1640 "with some small additions and alterations<sup>2</sup>." They had been prepared by Penn in 1660, but the issue of them had been deferred, as the Duke says, "until the want (of money) and in it the pretence of offending<sup>3</sup>" was removed. In one point alone did the new regulations differ from the previous ones in a matter of importance, and that was in an attempt to remedy a serious abuse. In Article 9 the Navy Board and all inferior officers are "to take

<sup>1</sup> *Discourse of the Navy* (printed with Hollond's *Discourses* [Nav. Rec. Soc. vol. VII.]), p. 342. MS. copy in Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 11,602.

<sup>2</sup> Buckingham's instructions are in the Penn Collection at the Brit. Mus., *Sloane MSS.* 3232. The instructions of 1662 in Brit. Mus. *Harl. MSS.* 6287 and 7464, also in *Pepysian MSS.* 2867 and 2611: an imperfect copy of them was printed in 1717 entitled *Oeconomy of H.M.'s Navy Office*.

<sup>3</sup> Penn, II. 265.

care " that they do not " trade in any such commodities as were used in the navy," " or go sharers with any merchant in any way for commodities sold to the navy," lest way was made " for serving and receiving in unfit commodities and at exorbitant rates<sup>1</sup>." In general, however, there are two noteworthy points in connection with these regulations. In the first place there was what they lacked. The very fact that they were in all vital points identical with those issued in 1640 is the root of their insufficiency and consequent failure. The Navy during Buckingham's tenure of office was very different to what it was under James—just the difference between a small profession and a great national service; the increase in purely official business connected with the Navy in those twenty years was enormous. Even after the revival and growth under the Commonwealth the increase was very large. Pepys<sup>2</sup> gives some idea of the growth of the work of his office when he compares the two Dutch wars :

Between May, 1652 and December, 1653

Letters	390	} 678
Orders	288	
Contracts	—	

Between September, 1664 and September, 1667

Letters	5329	} 8848
Orders	3113	
Contracts	406	

The result of this growth was naturally that the old arrangements were absolutely inadequate. One principal official could no longer do work that would occupy

<sup>1</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 7464.

<sup>2</sup> *Pepysian MSS.* 2242 in a marginal note.

a whole department, and yet, the subordinate officials being given no power of initiative or responsibility, the service fell between the two stools. The other noteworthy point is the spirit that the instructions attempt to foster. Article 18 enjoins that the officials are "to be able to trace one another in their distinct and severall dutys." To know his neighbour's duty as his own was to be each official's ideal; a process of mutual spying which experience has seldom proved efficacious.

Six and a half years later the Duke issued to the Navy Board some caustic "Reflections<sup>1</sup>" upon the Instructions of 1662. These 'reflections' were, from beginning to end, entirely the work of Pepys<sup>2</sup>, and, since their truth was practically admitted by the officials in question, form solid support to the opinion that has been widely upheld that he was one of the keenest and most efficient officials this country has had. The work of each of the chief officials is criticised first separately in detail and then jointly. As some idea may be gained therefrom of the way in which the higher administration of the Navy was carried on during this period, a few quotations from them will not be out of place. The Treasurer has "failed in the Annuall

<sup>1</sup> *Harl. MSS.* 7464, also 6003. *Pepysian MSS.* 2242 contains these 'Reflections' and a whole series of papers and notes concerning the enquiry into the conduct of the Navy, 1660-8.

<sup>2</sup> On July 24th, 1668, Pepys "did long and largely show him (the Duke) the weakness of our office, and did give him advice to call us to account for our duties, which he did take mighty well and desired me to draw up what I would have him write to the office" (*Diary*). This Pepys did, "though I know," he says, "it will set the Office and me by the ears for ever" (*D.* August 22nd), and on the 27th the Duke signed a copy of Pepys' letter "without alteration of a syllable" (*Diary*).

makeing up of his accompts and presenting them to his fellow officers...(they being seldome less then Two yeares in arreare)." Concerning the Comptroller, the muster books have been "kept undone many months after, and then committed unto uncertaine hands and many tymes to hands the least qualified for that trust": he "hath not to this day either in peace (when y<sup>e</sup> worke was more easy) or warr (when...it became the more necessary) stated or examined the Accompt of one storekeeper," and also "by the totall ommission (as farr as I can understand) [of the 10th article] the Treasurer's and victualler's accompts have att noe tyme beene knowne to any but themselves<sup>1</sup>." "Soe farr hath the surveyor beene from a Constant knowledge of the state of H.M.'s shippes...that I doe not remember that I have ever hitherto upon my commands of what shippes were most in Readynesse for this or that Perticular Service received other Answer...then that he would send downe to the yards to informe himsele"; also, despite many loans of H.M.'s stores "noe Regular Accompt thereof is knowne to have beene kept. By which how wide a doore hath beene opened to the defrauding his Majesty." Of Pepys' own post as Clerk of the Acts, "there hath not as yet occurred to me any perticulars wherewith to charge him with failor<sup>2</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Diary*, April 7th, 1665 " . . . Sir G. Cartaret do order business, keeping us in ignorance what he do with his money."

<sup>2</sup> This was through no lack of effort on Pepys' part to find out his own failings. Cf. *Diary*, August 15th, 1665, P. told Coventry: "I did depend still upon his promise of telling me whenever he finds any ground to believe any defect or neglect on my part, which he promised me still to do; and that there was none he saw..."



In other words the Instructions of 1662 had been utterly ignored, and with such conduct in high offices it is not surprising that the lower ranks of the service became rotten with corruption and neglect of duty.

Apart from the structural weaknesses of the instructions in themselves—and their essential inadequacy must continually be borne in mind when criticising the Restoration official—the causes of this failure are not far to seek. Pepys' keen eye towards efficiency saw very near to the root of the trouble when, in the course of conversation with Sir W. Coventry over "the unhappy state of our office," he said "that, though the backwardnesses of all our matters of the office may be well imputed to the known want of money, yet perhaps, there might be personal and particular failings<sup>1</sup>." Those "personal and particular failings" were the failings that had become the characteristics of England after the Restoration. Under a King and a Court without honour to man or woman, a King who regarded his kingdom as a source of income and amusement to himself, a Court employed in appropriating that income to itself on every opportunity, it is not surprising that official life was rotten with the same rottenness that ran through the Court. Official honesty was a thing unknown, incomprehensible; to steal from the State was not to steal; neglect of official duty was too general to be even remiss. Even the conscientious Pepys, though after a lapse he frequently reproaches himself for neglect of duty and could on occasion refuse a bribe, "resolving not to be bribed to despatch business<sup>2</sup>," had no scruple in making a gain

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, August 15th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* August 7th, 1665.

for himself provided he could set against that some gain to the State also; as for example on one occasion he makes note: "In one business of deales in £520 I offer to save £170 and yet purpose getting money to myself by it<sup>1</sup>."

The financial embarrassment that dogged the Navy Office from their assumption of office was an obvious reason for many of the defects in their administration. No sooner had they got under hand the cumbersome debt which they had inherited, than fresh shortage of supply met them—accompanied by the hugely increased needs brought on by the second Dutch War. Any collection of naval papers covering the period 1663 to 1667 teems with complaints from officials, entreaties from victims, evidencing the criminal shortage of supply to the Navy. The State Papers and Pepys' *Diary* are specially eloquent on the subject. There are stories of merchants ruined, both great and small, of seamen and workers starving or stealing. Constance Pley, a lady merchant at Portsmouth, writes "beseeching speedy reimbursement for the great sums expended; is deeply in debt; the total amount owing is £17,234, her French creditors, on rumour of war and plague tumble in their bills all at once, and she has not 600 pence to pay with; she begs for money to keep the life in the poor men to whom it is owing<sup>2</sup>." Her partner, Col. Reymer, also

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, September 26th, 1664. Cf. also November 23rd: "Sir G. Cartaret here this afternoon; and strange to see how we plot to make the charge of this warr to appear greater than it is, because of getting money."

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1664-5, September 3rd, 1665; 1665-6, pp. xxxix, xl, November 5th, 1665 *et passim*.

writes that he "would have been aground long since but for his woman partner<sup>1</sup>." One James Kember writes that he "has served for two years as master, mate, and gunner, without ever receiving one farthing. Is utterly undone, not having a farthing in the world<sup>2</sup>." The streets of London and the seaport towns were filled with the unfortunate victims; Pepys writes of "the horrible crowd and lamentable moan of the poor seamen that lie starving in the streets for lack of money. Which do trouble and perplex me to the heart; and more at noon when... a whole hundred of them followed up; some cursing, some swearing, and some praying to us<sup>3</sup>." The inevitable consequence to the Navy Office of this lack of money was loss of credit. When experience taught that the office could neither pay its bills nor its men, men refused to serve or to trade with it. Dealers refused to supply the government with goods except for ready money. Comr. Thom. Middleton writes from Portsmouth that he "is put to his wits' end for want of masts and money: he cannot procure broom, candles, timber, oars or any necessaries<sup>4</sup>." Even when credit was obtained it had to be paid for in hard bargains: Penn and Pett write from Chatham that they "will contract for plank and elm at the best terms possible, but for want of ready money, must pay 4s. or 5s. a load extra<sup>5</sup>." "Reddy money," wrote Middleton, would "save y<sup>e</sup> Kinge 2/6

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 3rd, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* September, 1665, vol. cxxxii. No. 81.

<sup>3</sup> *Diary*, October 7th, 1665.

<sup>4</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 27th, 1665.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* October 25th, 1665.

att least in y<sup>e</sup> pound... besides I finde men not willinge to sell for London pay, saying it cost them more tyme and expense to goe to London to beg it<sup>1</sup>." Appeals on the part of Pepys and his colleagues met with no success: Pepys gives a graphic account of one such interview where he had given "a large account of the charge of the Navy, and want of money. But strange to see how they held up their hands crying, 'what shall we do?' Says my Lord Treasurer, 'why, what means all this, Mr Pepys? This is true, you say; but what would you have me to do? I have given all I can for my life. Why will not people lend their money? Why will they not trust the King as well as Oliver?' And this was all we could get, and went away without other answer, which is one of the saddest things that, at such a time as this,... nothing should be minded, but let things go on of themselves, do as well as they can. So home, vexed<sup>2</sup>."

In short, the civil administration of the Navy of the Restoration, in so far as it was modelled by the Instructions of 1662, failed, and failed utterly. But it is a failure that must not be separated either from the ultimate success towards which it was a stepping-stone, or from the great administrator who arose amidst the ruins and never forgot the lessons of experience he learnt there—Samuel Pepys.

<sup>1</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, cx. f. 61.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*, April 11th, 1665.



## 2. *Discipline. The Fleet.*

Money, or rather the lack of it in the right, and its presence in the wrong places, perpetually hampered if it did not ruin the Duke of York's disciplinary measures also. Yet, nullified sometimes, hampered always, as they were, in more than one case do his measures mark important developments in the Navy.

It was one of the charges most frequently brought against the management of the Navy after the Restoration, that it had resulted in the appointment of 'gentlemen' to commands in the fleet and that to them was due the slackened discipline, the immoralities, the mistakes and the failures from which the Restoration Navy was far from free. It is a subject offering opportunities of rhetoric that have been seized on by many, from Macaulay back to the gentleman whose "illiberal and improper observations<sup>1</sup>" shocked the author of *Marine Architecture*. To a certain extent a substitution of 'cavalier' officers for others whose religious or political sentiments made them unreliable, was inevitable. As we have already seen there was a certain amount of weeding out done by Mountagu and Lawson previous to the actual Restoration, and no doubt that process was continued both by voluntary and compulsory resignation. One of the best known seamen who thus disappear from the Navy was Vice-Admiral Goodson, no gentleman

<sup>1</sup> Charnock, *Marine Architecture*, vol. I. pp. lxxiv-xcv, says "it might have been wished for the sake of decency and propriety" that he "had conveyed his animadversions in somewhat less vulgar terms." MS. of the pamphlet in Rich. Gibson's Collection at the Brit. Mus., Add. MSS. 11,602.

sailor but a true old salt bred from cabin-boyhood up. There is one article of the 1662 Regulations which gives official recognition to the process and at the same time shows the care James took to obviate its drawbacks as far as possible. On the return and paying off of any ship the Commissioners are to make a "strict enquiry ...of y<sup>e</sup> ability and behaviour of all standing officers dureing the voyage (because it hath been necessary to remove and appoint divers warrant officers rather upon presumption of their good affection than that there could be any certainty of their ability) soe that it will be necessary to have a reviewe of such as have been so put in, after experience of them by a voyage<sup>1</sup>." Complaints of "that great evill of putting our navall strength into the hands of our gentry<sup>2</sup>" were plentiful, and not always from the prejudiced or ignorant only; Pepys tells of Coventry referring to the "unruliness ...of young gentlemen captains<sup>3</sup>": one ingenious writer traces one disaster after another, including the loss of *St Christopher*, back to the loss of the ship *Coventry*, owing to the incompetence of its gentleman captain, and from his elaborate chain of consequences draws an equally elaborate chain of arguments<sup>4</sup>. All these writers, however, seem to have been so struck by the convenience of certain definite examples of their case, that they have not looked further and have missed the fact that the spirit they so much deplored in the

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, p. 49.

<sup>2</sup> Brit. Mus. *Enquiries...relating to Safety and Strength at Sea*. Add. MSS. 11,684, f. 26.

<sup>3</sup> *Diary*, July 27th, 1666, also June 2nd, 1663, January 10th, 1665, etc.

<sup>4</sup> Add. MSS. 11,602, ff. 36-46.

Navy was at the time pervading the whole nation. When for instance we find John Lawson, the stern Anabaptist seaman born and bred, solid old Puritan if ever there was one, when we find him broaching bottles of wine for the King's health, or spending a whole day drinking with a little company of his fellow-officers<sup>1</sup>, then we get some idea of the way in which the spirit of the Restoration infected the whole Navy, puritan as well as cavalier. It was the universal reaction from puritanism more than occasional appointments of 'gentlemen captains' that was largely responsible for the sapped discipline in the fleet.

Nevertheless 'Gentlemen Captains' there were, and 'Gentlemen Captains' there would be while there was a cavalier government and the Navy as a service was popular with the gentry. And James took steps to utilise that popularity in a regular and reliable manner. How far he realised the ultimate direction of that step it is impossible to say; but, deliberately or accidentally, he laid the foundations of the present staff of naval officers. On May 7th, 1661, Sir Wm. Coventry

'King's Letter  
Boys.'

issued an order to the effect that "His Royal Highness (being desirous to give encouragement to such young gentlemen as are willing to apply themselves to the Learning of Navigation, and fitting themselves for the service of the Sea), hath determined that one Voluntier shall bee entred on evry shipp now goeing forth; and for his encouragement that hee shall have y<sup>e</sup> pay of a Midshipman<sup>2</sup>"; he

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 7th and June 1st, 1660.

<sup>2</sup> *Adm. Lib. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, 1660-8, May 7th, 1661.

was also to be shown "such kindness as you shall judge fitt for a Gentleman, both in the accommodating him in your Shipp, and in farthering his Improvement." These new arrivals into the fleet were the first of the modern midshipmen. Hitherto the 'midshipman' had been merely a petty officer, having to serve seven years before appointment, but with the appearance of this new class of gentlemen probationers the old office died out<sup>1</sup>. In other words James was determined that since gentlemen must join the Navy they should as far as possible be properly trained to the sea, and from that determination dates the birth of the modern naval officer. That is, briefly, the outline of the one reform during James' administration which had more far-reaching effects than all his other reforms put together.

There was in that connection one other order which again shows the endeavour to remedy the abuse of the 'gentry,' also of undue 'influence' generally, and incidentally gives a glimpse of the manner in which appointments were too often 'managed.' With regard to the filling of vacancies, order was given in November, 1664, that instead of the examination being held at Trinity House, "which is done perhaps formally and slightly and without any regard to the Courage, Prudence, Sobriety or Good Behaviour of the person," it was to be held at Portsmouth "by some of the able commanders, and certificate made in writing of the fitness of y<sup>e</sup> men to be preferred to that charge";

<sup>1</sup> At the same time as the above order, order was given that one midshipman less per ship was to be carried: and in September, 1662, order was given "wholly to omit midshipmen in Ye Narrow Seas." (*Adm. Lib. MS. 24*, September 1st, 1662.)



enquiry was to be held into their qualities and skill : for “ this will be an encouragement to able men to come into the fleet. . . when they know the preferment is to arise from (ability)<sup>1</sup> whereas now they have noe hopes of those preferments but by keeping at London to bee in the remembrances and knowledge of the office<sup>2</sup>.”

The *laissez faire* policy, of which we have already seen Pepys complaining in the Treasury, was in fact very far from being the policy of James or the Navy Office towards the discipline and management of the fleet. It was one continual fight against two or three main springs from which flowed innumerable abuses ; yet it was a fight that was maintained with determination and imagination, against lack of funds and against the spirit of the Restoration. The reform of abuses was indeed of vital importance where the manning of the fleet was concerned. In spite of the powers of the press-

Seamen.

gang the popularity or otherwise of the Navy as a service and a profession made all the difference both to the quantity and quality of the men available. At the time of the Restoration men were actually “ solicitous to be admitted into the service<sup>3</sup> ” ; but after a few years of Restoration finance there was a different tale to tell. In the meantime, however, the Duke and his advisers were quite awake to the need for encouraging a good temper among the men, and one of the first acts of importance dealing with the Navy was the institution of an enquiry into

<sup>1</sup> Word illegible in MS.

<sup>2</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Rawl. MSS.* A. 174, f. 478.

<sup>3</sup> Slingsby's *Discourse of the Navy*.

the Chatham Chest<sup>1</sup>. "Notwithstanding," wrote James to the Navy Office, "that there are sevrall persons who have received hurts and been maimed in H.M.'s Navall Service, which are at present in great want and necessity and cannot receive reliefs from the Chest at Chatham (notwithstanding they have usually contributed to the same) in regard of the great debt at present lying upon the said chest, I desire you will forthwith cause a strict enquiry to be made into the business of the Chest<sup>2</sup>." On February 4th, 1661, he wrote of it again, "having as yet received noe returne from you concerning that business,...I have thought fitt to remind you...<sup>3</sup>." The reminder had little effect, and in July, 1662, Pepys discovers "what a meritorious act it would be to look after" the Chest<sup>4</sup>, an act which lost none of its attractions when he found it would "vex Sir W. Batten, which is one of the ends (God forgive me) that I have in it<sup>5</sup>." As a result of Pepys' endeavours a Commission was appointed and met twice, but did nothing; "unless I have time to look after it," he writes nearly two years later, "nothing will be done, and that I fear I shall not<sup>6</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> It was a fund for relief which had "from the year 1588 or 1590, by the advice of the Lord High Admiral and principal officers then being, by consent of the seamen, been settled, paying sixpence per month, according to their wages there, which was then but 10s. which is now 24s." Pepys' *Diary*, November 13th, 1663. (N.B. In August, 1663, A.B.'s wages were 21s. and contribution to chest 1s. per month, cf. *Rec. Off. Adm. In Letts.*, August 18th 1663.)

<sup>2</sup> *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 9311, October 21st, 1660.

<sup>3</sup> *Adm. Lib. MS.* 24, *Duke of York's Letters*, 1660-8.

<sup>4</sup> *Diary*, July 3rd, 1662.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* August 20th, 1662.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* March 30th, 1664.

His fears regarding both lack of time and its results were well founded, and throughout the second Dutch War the conduct of the Chest remained a public scandal and a crying injustice to those who depended on it.

Early in 1661 the grievance that was in a year or two to assume alarming proportions, had already appeared, and reverence and admiration for their Royal Highnesses had so far been overcome by the feelings aroused by systematic refusal to pay wages with hard cash, that as early as February of 1661 the seamen petitioned<sup>1</sup> for payment of overdue wages. True to his policy the Duke did not ignore the matter, and on February 21st he wrote to Lawson of it: "I . . . chose to be silent in it, untill I had effected somewhat which might bee of advantage to the persons agreived "; though full relief must wait till the next Parliament, " the Commissioners are," in the meantime, " resolved to use soe speedy a way for the Payment of the Ticketts (the dilatory way for which seemingly prescribed in the Act, I suppose was none of the least Grievances) as that is wil bee as satisfactory to the seamen as if they were paid at the same moment with the Shipps<sup>2</sup>." Money due for short allowances was to be paid immediately out of royal treasure, and two days later the Lord Treasurer was ordered to supply £7000 to pay the latter<sup>3</sup>. That was, however, the merest palliation, and bad finance soon resulted in a rotten fleet. Starvation turned many men almost to madness, and mutinies and riots were frequent at all the dockyards. In August,

<sup>1</sup> Copy of Petition in Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 511.

<sup>2</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS.* 24, *Duke of York's Letters.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* February 23rd, 1661.

1663, we hear of Sir John Mennes being attacked by starving workmen and lucky to escape "out of the hands of so rude a multitude<sup>1</sup>" (though Pepys says he "did act as much like a coxcomb as ever I saw any man speak in my life<sup>2</sup>"), in September, 1665, of Pepys being "set upon by the poor wretches<sup>3</sup>," whereon he remarks that they "in good earnest are not to be censured if their necessities drive them to bad courses of stealing or the like, while they lack wherewith to live." In October, 1666, matters were so serious that we hear of "twelve well fixed firelocks" being asked for "for the defence of the Navy Office<sup>4</sup>." On board the fleet itself, mutinies were less frequent since there the men were at least fed and clothed<sup>5</sup>; grievances on the ships were rather about another effect of bad finance—bad victualling. The 'ticket' which was the direct subject of grievance was a kind of I.O.U., signed by the officers of the man's ship, specifying his length of service, which, when signed by the Navy Board, was in effect a warrant on the Treasurer for payment of wages. At first the King had opposed the adoption of the ticket system, "which the King do take very ill<sup>6</sup>," Pepys tells us, but the partial adoption of it—payment of wages "half in ready money and tickets for the other half, to be paid in three months after<sup>7</sup>"—soon developed until the

<sup>1</sup> Rec. Off. Adm. Nav. Board, *In Letts.* 1663.

<sup>2</sup> *Diary*, September 2nd, 1663.

<sup>3</sup> *Diary*, September 30th, 1665.

<sup>4</sup> Hist. MSS. Comm. XV. *Rep. App. Pt. 2, Hodgkin Papers*, f. 167, quoted in Tanner's *Introduction to Pepys' Catalogue*, p. 119.

<sup>5</sup> They could get clothes on their tickets: *vide sub.*

<sup>6</sup> *Diary*, December 3rd, 1660.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*



Navy was practically run on this paper credit. Had these tickets been promptly paid on presentation no harm would have been done and they would have been negotiable for the seamen at very small loss, but the delays and absolute uncertainty of payment depreciated their value and the seamen would lose as much as 25 per cent. or even more in exchange<sup>1</sup>.

Impotent as he was to remedy the primary source of all the trouble, James did his best to meet the secondary difficulties. "I am," he writes in March, 1665, "soe sensible of the necessity of keeping the minds of y<sup>e</sup> seamen in good temper in this tyme of service that I cannot but recommend...that as often as any shippes come into port which have been long out, you present the seamen's demand of Pay by giving them a fitting proportion of their pay for support of their Familyes<sup>2</sup>." The Duke, however, favoured more definite and practical remedies than the one so suggested and on December 8th he issued a "Remedy for the uncertain payment and consequent high rates" containing 14 articles<sup>3</sup>. The articles dealing with the ticket question ordered that any tickets "under y<sup>e</sup> value of twenty pounds be paid when tendered without observation of time or order of payment"; those over £20 were to have precedence; failure on the part of

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1666-7, p. 426; 1665-6, p. 75.

<sup>2</sup> *Adm. Lib. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, 1660-8. Pepys makes a note in this connection of the "unreasonable hardship of y<sup>e</sup> general practice of our Navy of paying those Ships off first where the least sume clears y<sup>e</sup> most men: those who have served longest, and therefore need their pay most being postponed to those who have served least." (*Pepysian MSS.* 2866, *Naval Minutes.*)

<sup>3</sup> *Bodl. Libr. Tanner MSS.* 45, f. 41.

one man to tender his bill for payment was not to "hinder the next to be paid before he come," and "his money shall be reserved for him in the Treasury untill demanded and then paid<sup>1</sup>." Eighteen days later further Remedies were issued<sup>2</sup> which included the provision of a separate court for bills under £20 (except Pilotage and Bills of Exchange)—that is to say, for most seamen's tickets. The unavoidable saving clause, however, effectually nullified these remedies: payment was to be made "as fast as the state of his Maj<sup>ty</sup>'s Treasure shall permit<sup>1</sup>"; the only real remedy was set forth by the Navy Office in reply to the House of Commons Inquiry of 1667—"a supply of money in every place, at all times, in readiness, where and when...any...occasions of discharging seamen shall occur<sup>3,4</sup>."

Systematisation and regulation were as much the need of the military as of the civil side of the naval service, and even during the first seven years of his office some of the Duke of York's orders mark important stages in naval development. Curiously enough in this, as in the case of the civil ones, the new Regulations were far from being original.

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Tanner MSS.* 45, f. 41.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 45, f. 51. The preamble is very typical of the careful and practical nature of most of the Duke's reforms: "I omitted severall particulars," he writes, "least in this time of action the introduction of too many new Rules might obstruct other services untill the practise of those then given being by use become easy should make the addition of others more seasonable." Cf. also the opening of his reply to the Seamen's Petition, February, 1661 *supra*.

<sup>3</sup> Penn's *Memorials*, II. 509.

<sup>4</sup> Another minor point showing the Duke's politic regard for the rights of the seamen is an order of August 13th, 1663, for wages to be paid to men who had been prisoners—their captivity to count as service. (*Adm. In Letts.* 1663.)

The act of 1661 (13 Car. II. c. 9) " for the Regulating and better Government of his Majesty's Navies, Ships of War, and forces by sea " was founded directly upon the articles of war of 1652, which were an elaboration of the ordinances passed in 1647 for Warwick's fleet. They are directed mainly at discipline in the fleet, and set forth in detail the powers and limitations of the courts-martial. Though neither original nor novel in its articles this act remained as the basis of naval discipline for a century ; it was only repealed by 22 Geo. II. c. 33.

The duties of the captain were set forth and regulated by the " General Instructions to Captains " of 1663, and from them it is possible to gain some idea of the inside of naval life. The first instruction provides that " Almighty God be duly Served . . . twice every day by the wholle Ship's Company according to the Liturgy of the Church of England<sup>1</sup>." Nine articles deal with duties connected with the stores and provisions of the ship, and the check to be kept on the Purser and other persons dealing with them. Of the other articles, one provides for a daily muster of the whole ship's company, another that no man is to be employed as an able seaman unless he " hath continued seaven yeares at sea " and is 24 years of age, and no one as midshipman unless he " hath served at least seaven yeares and can navigate the ship " : the captain, in council with the master, boatswain, and gunner, has power to appoint inferior officers and enter them in the ship's book : in port he is to take care to keep officers and men together : he is to protect H.M.'s subjects and trade : he is to compel

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 23, Orders of the Duke of York, 1660-5.*



ships to strike their flag, and to exact payment from English ships for any shots that may have been necessary : prizes in war are to have their hatches ‘spiked up’ immediately : lights and fires to be out after setting watch, no candles for ship’s use except in lanterns ; no tobacco is to be taken except in the fore-castle over a tub of water (if this regulation was kept the spectacle of a huddled circle of seamen solemnly smoking their pipes over the prescribed ‘tub’ must have been not without its humour) ; the top men are not to be hazarded in ‘blowing weather’ : any foreign ship to be searched for any Englishmen serving, but the master of such a ship is to pay such men their due wages (note again the consideration for the seaman) : detailed instructions are given as to the occasion and quantity of salutes and on no account is a salute to be given unless a return of it is certain. The two final instructions are of special interest, one because it was rarely kept, the other because it shows us what training in gunnery was considered necessary. Instruction xxx forbids the captain to take in any merchandise except gold, silver or precious stones ; trading on the part of naval captains was one of the chief of the minor breaches of discipline, and throughout our period this article was far more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Instruction xxix orders that “for the first month the men be exercised twice every week to the end they may become good Fire Men, allowing six Shott to every exercising. That the 2nd month they may be exercised once every week, and after that only once in two months allowing six shott to each time of exercising.”



A month earlier the Duke had issued another set of instructions, which, though they were far from being a deliberate imposition of a uniform, yet must have resulted in more or less uniformity of dress among the seamen. As a matter of fact they were primarily intended to relieve seamen from the extortion of the 'slopsellers' as the clothes vendors were called. Only the "under-mentioned cloathes<sup>1</sup>" were to be sold on board the ships; and here again the 'council' of the captain, master, boatswain, and master gunner (or any three of them) was to have decisive powers, in this case to settle the rates, which were not to be higher than the under-mentioned:

" Monmouth caps	..	..	2/6
Red caps	..	..	1/1
Yarn stockings p.	..	..	3/0
Irish       ,,       ,,	..	..	1/2
Blew Shirts	..	..	3/6
White Shirts	..	..	( ) <sup>2</sup>
Cotton waistcoats	..	..	3/0
,,   drawers p.	..	..	3/0
Neat leather shoes	..	..	3/6
Blew neckcloathes	..	..	/5
Rugs of one breadth	..	..	4/0
Canvas suits	..	..	5/0
Blew suits	..	..	5/0"

The sale of clothes was to be held "always above decks at the Maine Mast in presence of the Captain, officers and the whole Ship's company," largely in order that "Tobacco, Strong Waters or other such like

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 23, Orders of the Duke of York, 1660-5, March 2nd, 1663.*

<sup>2</sup> No price set either in this or in other copy of orders in MS. 20.

comodityes be not sold as cloathes." Debts for clothes could be put down on the seamen's tickets—an unavoidable concession when the men received no ready cash for their wages. The clothes of any deceased seaman were to be sold "at the maine mast" and the proceeds sent to his executors. Though it is evident that these rules must have resulted in a certain uniformity of dress, the fifth article shows that such was not the deliberate intention of them, for it orders that "none of the said cloathes be permitted to be sold to any of the ship's company two full months from their entrance<sup>1</sup>."

The question of the division of prizes and prize-money was another that needed regulation, for not only did it nearly affect the temper of the men, but also it was an important item in the income of the Navy<sup>2</sup>. Embezzlement of prizes meant serious loss to the revenue, and insufficient partition of them meant further discontent among seamen and increased difficulty in manning the fleet<sup>3</sup>. At the outbreak of the war the matter became urgent, and in January, 1665, the Prize Court appointed local sub-commis-

<sup>1</sup> This was made void in November, 1664, owing to the filthy state of many of the new men's clothes. (*Adm. Libr. MS. 23*, November 22nd, 1664.)

<sup>2</sup> Arms and ammunition taken on prize ships formed no small addition to the Ordnance; *vide* orders for delivery to Ord. Dept. *Harl. MSS. 1510*, f. 660 *et passim*. There are two volumes in the Brit. Mus. of *Proceedings of H.M. Commissioners for Prizes, 1664-7. Harl. MSS. 1509, 1510*.

<sup>3</sup> The difficulties and abuses of the press-gang, though the outcome of the financial muddle, are more properly connected with the preparations for war in 1664-5, and are treated of in that connection, *vide pp. 106-9 infra*.

sioners "in the ports of London, Dover, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Bristol, Hull, Newcastle, and other places where it may be thought necessary<sup>1</sup>" (their work having previously been entrusted to the local customs officials<sup>2</sup>), and instructions were issued to them urging them "to exact performance of their duties<sup>3</sup>." Two months earlier than this the other side of the question had been dealt with in order to meet and check the growing scarcity of men: on October 28th, 1664, the King issued a declaration for the "encouragement of seamen and marines<sup>4</sup>" which settled their share of prize-money. Seamen, whether serving on King's ships or merchantmen, were to receive 10s. per ton on all prizes, £6. 13s. 4d. for each piece of ordnance, £10 a gun for every man-of-war sunk or destroyed, and the pillage of all merchandise on or above the gun deck. In March, 1665, the Duke of York diplomatically granted a wider application of these regulations to the case where the prize ship had not resisted, for, he said, "the restrayning y<sup>e</sup> seamen from an indulgence formerly given them would have a consequence too dangerous to be recompensed by y<sup>e</sup> vallue of those goods which wilbe (what ever y<sup>e</sup> order be) very hard to preserve<sup>5</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1664-5, January 21st.

<sup>2</sup> A class much despised by the naval officers.

<sup>3</sup> *Brit. Mus. Harl. MSS.* 1509, ff. 1-102.

<sup>4</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, ciii. 145 (1).

<sup>5</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS.* 24, *Duke of York's Letters*, March 8th, 1665.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE MEDITERRANEAN

Cromwell  
and the  
Mediterranean.

It is difficult to estimate how far the Mediterranean policy of Cromwell and his successors in the government in England was the deliberate piece of diplomatic strategy that it appears to the latter day observer. To the Mediterranean Powers whom it influenced so vitally it could not but seem deliberate : it was so effective. But on the English side, on the other hand, there appears but the most doubtful appreciation of the true inwardness of the policy which later developments have made so distinct. Blake, in 1654, by reason of a three weeks' wait at Gibraltar—against which he and his men fumed—had prevented the junction of the two parts of the French fleet, frustrated Mazarin, and thus offered to modern eyes the first practical example of the true significance of the "Gibraltar defile<sup>1</sup>." His actions within the Mediterranean also had had wide effects and had been the cause of much discomfort and many fears to the Italian powers and France. The convenience of the position of Gibraltar had not escaped Cromwell's notice, and, if we are to believe Pepys (on the authority of Sir Robert Haddocks), "had not y<sup>e</sup> ship which was sent by Oliver with spades and wheelbarrows been

<sup>1</sup> Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean*, I. chaps. 7 and 8.



taken, he had certainly taken Gibraltar<sup>1</sup>." The dominant idea in Cromwell's foreign policy, however, was the war against Spain as a part of his religious policy of Protestantism: and the opportunity of making Dunkirk the base of operations against the Spanish power soon put the idea of Gibraltar in the background, and Mountagu with the largest ships was recalled. Blake, however, remained on the station using Lisbon and Tetuan as his bases, and his famous attack on the Plate fleet in the harbour of Santa Cruz is the most notable naval exploit of the century. But of Mediterranean policy there was now no sign. The two ports mentioned acted as an efficient substitute for the coveted Gibraltar: and at the end of that year (1657), when it was learned that the much vaunted Spanish fleet preparing at Cadiz was never likely to get to sea, all but ten sail were ordered home<sup>2</sup>. The remaining squadron was ordered to protect English trade from the depredations of the pirates of Tunis, Tripoli, and Majorca. It may be said that the continuation of even so small a squadron in the Mediterranean was an upholding and continuance of the policy of a 'Mediterranean Fleet,' a part of a strategic plan. It is difficult to believe that, had the home government actually realised the strategic lessons of the preceding occurrences in the Mediterranean, they would ever have let

<sup>1</sup> *Pepysian MSS.* 2866, *Naval Minutes*. I have been unable to trace any other reference to this ship: a note on the plan in Sheere's *Discourse concerning the Medit.*, however, gives some colour to the story: it is placed beside the neutral ground and runs—"Oliver Cromwell had a design on this place and would have cut this neck of land to make Gibraltar an island."

<sup>2</sup> Corbett, *op. cit.* pp. 332-5.

loose their hold on the instrument whose power had been so strikingly demonstrated. It is true that the maintenance even of so small a squadron as the one under Stoakes in 1658 meant in effect the maintenance of the English influence. But it would seem rather far fetched to read such deep designs of policy and strategy into the simple orders with regard to pirates that were issued to John Stoakes as the commander of the squadron. The question of the protection of trade in those waters had become one of real seriousness. Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Majorca were the bases for the piratical raids of small flotillas of Turkish and Majorcan privateers which respected no flag and were indiscriminate regarding the nationality of those whom they sold into slavery<sup>1</sup>. "I wish something could be done against the Majorcans," wrote Blackborne to Stoakes in September, "there is a great cry here of the damage our English merchants have lately sustained from them<sup>2</sup>."

In the meantime, however, while Cromwell's policy was showing itself in its true light as a repetition of the Elizabethan one of attacking Spain in her Atlantic trade—with the addition of the local action round Dunkirk—Mazarin showed that he had, in a practical way, learnt the lesson of Blake's Mediterranean actions. In April, 1658, he asked for, and received, the co-operation of part of the English Mediterranean squadron. Capt. Whetstone was told off with six frigates to join the French at Toulon where he remained, much to his

<sup>1</sup> Playfair, *Scourge of Christendom*, and Poole, S. L., *Barbary Corsairs*.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 16th, 1658

disgust, for more than a month in enforced idleness. "All that hath been done," he wrote after three weeks of it, "has been nothing but the whole fleet making a show before Marseilles...and yet no appearance of the removal of this fleet, our merchants meantime not only suffering very much, but the enemy growing more and more numerous and insolent every day<sup>1</sup>." The junction of the fleets did, however, satisfy Mazarin's object, and there is no doubt that it formed in the end a very substantial addition to the persuasion towards peace that her reverses in the Netherlands were to Spain. In the meantime also, Stoakes had successfully contrived a treaty with Tripoli<sup>2</sup>. In other words, one of the last noteworthy events Cromwell had the opportunity of seeing during his lifetime was a striking demonstration of the Mediterranean policy in practice; yet within a week of his death, in an order which must have been planned by him, the Admiralty commissioners wrote to Stoakes—"The Council has now ordered that only 6 frigates be kept abroad this winter and that the rest be called home<sup>3</sup>": the remainder were to receive victuals to "enable them to keep at sea, and protect trade, much annoyed by the Majorcans and other pirates in those parts."

Such were the antecedents of the Mediterranean 'policy' at the death of Cromwell. It is in the light of them that the developments of Charles II's reign must be considered. The policy as it is known at the present day, the diplomatic use of the strategic power

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 3rd, 1658.

<sup>2</sup> There is a copy of the treaty in *Rawl. MSS.* A. 185, f. 293.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 9th, 1658.

of a fleet in or at the mouth of the Mediterranean, had been, almost unconsciously, demonstrated; but as a potential weapon it was not yet understood by those in whose hands it lay. Further demonstrations of the principle in practice were needed before its possibilities could be more than vaguely realised. Were it not for that fact, not only Cromwell himself, but Charles and all his advisers also, would lie under the charge of blunders of omission and commission that would have been inexcusable.

It was not long before the universal muddle that followed the death of the Dictator began to have a two-fold effect in the Mediterranean. The squadron being so distant from home, and its importunities for stores and money the less effective, it was the first to feel the effects of the loosened rein, to suffer from neglect. "I earnestly beg that you would seriously provide for it in tyme," wrote Mountagu to Thurloe as early as July, 1658, "the distance is so great to them and the prejudice so intolerable if reliefe come not from England; and truly I give you an account of a necessity to change some of them<sup>1</sup>." The victualling ship sent out in September was merely a stop-gap, and Stoakes had a hard winter of it. The next spring he writes, somewhat pathetically, of a small and almost sinking vessel which he had "made shift to tow" to Toulon, "being unwilling to lose anything, that may make money, be it ever so little<sup>2</sup>."

The political effect also of the changes in England was soon noticeable in the Mediterranean. France appreciated the principle of the 'policy,' if England

<sup>1</sup> *Thurloe S. P.* July, 1658.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* April 12th, 1659.



did not, and with the loss of Cromwell's name the English fleet lost prestige, and with that its force as a diplomatic weapon. Not merely was Whetstone's small squadron no longer desired, but the English ships began to find themselves no longer welcome at Toulon. In the same letter as that quoted above<sup>1</sup>, Stoakes writes, "the different face wherewith I am now treated from my last, makes me jealous these people have already embraced the Spanish interest and do seek to weary us off their port," a fact which led him to add "if there be not a way thought of to procure a port in this seas of our own, the squadron will not be very secure, our interest being so small in these people." A further example of the precarious position of the English influence in those seas comes from Tripoli in the plaintive complaints of the English consul there, who, after bewailing the lack of pay and begging the Admiralty "to consider the remoteness of y<sup>e</sup> place," says, "Here are several who labour all they can to make a breach by persuading the Bassha and others that the peace is of noe force since the death of Oliver Lord Protector in whose name it was concluded," and in the meantime he himself is treated with but little respect<sup>2</sup>.

However, the home government was at this time far too interested in its own domestic tangles to look at the Mediterranean squadron from other than a purely financial point of view: peace had been made with some of the pirates, others had been suppressed, the war with Spain was over<sup>3</sup>, what further need could

<sup>1</sup> *Thurloe S. P.* April 12th, 1659.

<sup>2</sup> *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 22,546.

<sup>3</sup> Peace was first made on May 3rd, 1659.

there be of a fleet in those waters? On June 17th Stoakes was recalled with all the remaining ships. No doubt the political unrest in the fleet itself had its share in bringing about this withdrawal. Soon after the death of Oliver, when the officers had been asked to sign the general declaration expressing goodwill to Richard, trouble had broken out. Capt. Whetstone, who had already given Stoakes "just cause for complaint<sup>1</sup>," had to be sent home under arrest<sup>2</sup>, and in a kind of 'sympathetic strike' one of the other officers, Capt. Saunders of the *Torrington*, deserted with his ship and came home—to find himself imprisoned in the Tower.

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The first naval move made by England after the Restoration, in the direction of the Straits or Africa, was of a commercial and more or less unofficial nature. As early as October 3rd, 1660, the Duke of York was speaking of a "great design" that he and a number of others had "of sending a venture to some parts of Africa to dig for gold ore there": they intended "to admit as many as will venture their money, and so make themselves a company, £250 the lowest share for every man<sup>3</sup>." The project matured, and in the following spring a small expedition was sent out to the Guinea Coast of Africa under command of Captain Robert Holmes. Details are lacking as to its operations, and

Mediterranean  
'Policy' and  
the Straits  
'defile.'

<sup>1</sup> *Thurloe S. P. Adm.* to Stoakes, July 29th, 1658.

<sup>2</sup> There is a collection of papers covering the whole incident in Bodl. Libr. *Rawl. MSS.* C. 381.

<sup>3</sup> *Pepys' Diary*, October 3rd, 1660.

its interest lies principally in its position as the forerunner of the official expedition to the same coast in 1664. It sufficed, however, to irritate the Dutch who considered they had a right to the monopoly of the Guinea trade.

In the meantime, however, diplomatic negotiations were in progress which were to bring the Straits once more into prominence. Even before the Restoration the Braganzas had opened tentative negotiations regarding a marriage between Charles II and Catherine, the King of Portugal's sister. Alliance with England, the natural enemy of Spain, offered obvious advantages to Portugal in their struggle to maintain their independence, and she was prepared to pay a high price for it. In return for a promise of military and naval assistance the Portuguese offered a dowry of two million 'crusados' and the cession of Tangier and Bombay<sup>1</sup>. Both these ports were valuable possessions, but since Spain claimed the one and the Dutch threatened the other, it was but a wise bargain to sell them for a tangible return before they were lost for nothing. The treaty was signed in June, 1661, and England was embarked on an enterprise which she neither understood nor valued at a fraction of its true worth. Indeed it would have been foresight extraordinary had the full importance of the Straits been realised at this time; for the Mediterranean was still eclipsed by the Atlantic in both political and commercial importance, and Louis XIV and Colbert had not yet raised France to that position which made the Straits a determining factor in European politics. On

<sup>1</sup> *Camb. Mod. Hist.* v. 105.

the whole it does not seem to have been considered in England as an especially good bargain, though for reasons of the Portuguese trade it was not unpopular. Tangier was much talked of by some, but then "as the foundation of a new empire<sup>1</sup>." Lawson, however, one of the few persons who seems to have had an inkling of the strategic possibilities of the Straits, speaking from personal experience, said those who possessed it could keep it "against all the world, and give the law to all the trade of the Mediterranean<sup>2</sup>." Sir R. Southwell speaks of Tangier making England "masters of the trade in the Mediterranean<sup>3</sup>," but then he was voicing the opinion of the Portuguese among whom he had lived; and they, in contemporary opinion, exaggerated the value of it as much as the English depreciated it. "Tangier," writes Fanshaw from Lisbon, "is as much over-valued in Cabales heer, as undervalued in England, and it must be only the improvement and enlargement thereof by changing master that can justify these and confute those<sup>4</sup>."

However, with the acceptance of these terms came immediate need for a fleet to take possession of the new ports, and also to fetch the future queen. There was also another matter that called for naval action. The withdrawal of the English from the Mediterranean had had a stimulating effect on the Algerines, and their fleet of corsairs had begun to assume large proportions. A list towards the end of 1659 gave its numbers as 7 ships of between 30 and 40 guns, 8 of between 16-30,

<sup>1</sup> Burnet, *Hist. of My Own Times*, I.

<sup>2</sup> Clarendon, *Life, etc.*, II. 151.

<sup>3</sup> Kennett's *Register*, p. 91.

<sup>4</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 592.



and 3 galleys of 21–28 pairs of oars holding 400–500 men<sup>1</sup>, a total of nearly 7000 men. Complaints of them from English merchants became more frequent; and early in 1661 their fleet must have numbered over 30 ships<sup>2</sup>. Later in the year, when Sandwich<sup>3</sup> was already in the Mediterranean he received a petition from some 160 British slave-prisoners in Algiers, also a list of ten small ships taken there in the course of two months<sup>4</sup>.

On June 14th, Sandwich, with Lawson for his vice-admiral, sailed from the Downs with instructions<sup>5</sup> to obtain a peace treaty with Algiers which should include an undertaking not to search or molest English ships, and he was authorised to bombard Algiers if necessary<sup>6</sup>. Favourable weather brought him to Malaga early in July and to Algiers by the 29th. No time was lost in sending ashore the articles of the English proposals to the Governor. But “hee presently stumbled at y<sup>e</sup> second article y<sup>t</sup> our shipps should be free from searching and without much considering y<sup>e</sup> rest sent me word y<sup>t</sup> they would have noe peace w<sup>th</sup> me rather than Admitt y<sup>e</sup> Article<sup>7</sup>”: and on the following day he suddenly opened fire on the fleet. “Wee resolved to veere in two or three cables nearer y<sup>e</sup> shore and bestowe our

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Rawl. MSS.* A. 185, f. 76.

<sup>2</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 343.

<sup>3</sup> Mountagu had been created Earl Sandwich in the summer of 1660.

<sup>4</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, ff. 606, 7.

<sup>5</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Ibid.* 74, f. 338, draft copy of instructions, cf. also 74, f. 449; 274, f. 2; and 73, f. 512.

<sup>6</sup> At the same time the Earl of Marlborough was sent out with five ships and some troops to take possession of Bombay.

<sup>7</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 520, let. fr. Sandwich, August 8th.

Broadsides upon them the w<sup>h</sup> we did for two or three houres together<sup>1</sup>." However, as the wind was contrary and would have made it difficult to reach the Turkish ships it was decided to "warp off out of Shott and waite for a fitting opertunitie of winde and weather to carry in y<sup>e</sup> Fleete and Fireships." Sandwich's characteristic caution was not repaid on this occasion and no better opportunity arrived. The Algerines made the most of the opportunity thus given them and in a week had made "a Strong Boome of Masts from y<sup>e</sup> Mouldhead to y<sup>e</sup> Fish Gate, and mounted more guns and made that worke exceedinge more difficult and hassardous." With somewhat more justification for his caution Sandwich decided to give up the attempt. He realised that the essential duty of the fleet was "not y<sup>e</sup> performing one single attempt but to maintaine themselves saileing in these Seas," and disposed his force to "y<sup>e</sup> best advantage for anoyinge them at sea." Patrols of two or three ships were sent eastward and west to the Straits while Lawson with the main body of 9 or 10 remained to ply in the vicinity. Sandwich himself sailed with the remainder of the fleet for Lisbon, there to carry out the diplomatic part of his duties, and arrange for receiving Catherine and as much

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.* There is a glorious printed account of this action in *Carte MSS.* 223, f. 248 : the title is sufficient description : "*The Demands of his G. Majesty the King of Great Britain to the grand seignior or Emperor of Turkey . . . with a true Relation of the great and bloody fight between the English and Turks, the dividing of his M.'s R. Navy into several Squadrons by the Victorious Earl of Sandwich and ever Renowned Sir Jno. Lawson, the battering down of half the City, and all the Castle Walls, the dismounting of the Turkish cannon, the sinking and burning of 18 Great Ships with above a thousand piece of Ordnance, etc., etc.*" London. Printed for G. Horton, 1661.

of the money part of her dowry as he could squeeze out of the reluctant and—according to his own account—impecunious Portugee.

While Sandwich was performing these not altogether pleasant duties Lawson was doing some effective service, and we hear of him keeping in “25 sayle of those Pirates that are fitted and ready to come out<sup>1</sup>,” besides taking one or two small prizes. But questions of far wider import were now coming to the fore and the war with Algiers sinks to insignificance before the threats of a European war between the chief naval powers. The Portuguese were not the only people to appreciate the value of their concessions to England. As we have seen, those precise ports were coveted by Spain and Holland respectively; but the prospect of such accessions to England aroused still wider interests. The Papal Powers were roused by the support given to Portugal against the leader of the Catholic Powers—Spain, while antagonism to her led Louis to give Charles the secret support that finally decided his acceptance of the offer. The main issue, however, lay between Spain and Holland on the one hand, and England and Portugal on the other. In the spring of 1661 it had become known in England that a powerful squadron under De Ruyter was preparing in Dutch waters ostensibly to protect Dutch trade in the Mediterranean. Scepticism was general regarding this alleged object, and many were the doubts concerning the real aim of it. “What the intention of it may be is uncertaine,” wrote the Duke of York in October, “but as for any attack upon y<sup>e</sup> fleete, I cannot thinke

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 596, September 24th.

that they so much desire warr w<sup>th</sup> us, as unprovoked as to goe about it<sup>1</sup>.” As a matter of fact the Dutch themselves were almost as much in the dark, and De Ruyter was only to divulge his orders to two or three principal officers on strictest secrecy, “aux termes du serment qu’ils avoient prêté<sup>2</sup>”: he was to co-operate with the Spanish, not to seize Tangier as many had feared, but to protect the expected Plate fleet. Though such were his actual intentions, the danger in the eyes of the English was that he would seize Tangier before they had time to occupy it, and for weeks the tension was acute. Both Sandwich and Lawson had met De Ruyter’s fleet and there was an outward show of cordiality. Lawson even naïvely asked De Ruyter for his secret signal “afin qu’en poursuivant les Turcs on pût se reconnoître de jour et de nuit<sup>3</sup>,” but there is no evidence that the confidence trick<sup>4</sup> was successful. But with the Dutch fleet an unknown quantity, cruising now one side of the Straits, now the other, the English could not but be on tenter-hooks. The Dutch might at any time be heard of as having seized Tangier, annihilated one of the smaller English squadrons—the Dutch numbered 22 ships in September<sup>5</sup>—anything might happen at any time: the air was full of vague rumours and sudden alarms, and Sandwich was helpless in his ignorance. That the English were not the only victims of ‘nerves’ is instanced by a letter

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York’s Letters*, October 21st, 1661 (to Sandwich).

<sup>2</sup> Brandt, *Vie de De Ruyter*, p. 261.

<sup>3</sup> Brandt, *op. cit.* p. 163.

<sup>4</sup> Corbett, *op. cit.* II. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Brandt, *op. cit.* p. 162.



from Tetuan : Sandwich had visited that port to make a trade treaty<sup>1</sup>, which simple fact so scared the inhabitants that "now," the writer says, "they are hard at fortifying, even calling in Jew merchants to help<sup>2</sup>." At the beginning of October a more powerful scare than the previous ones sent Sandwich post-haste to Tangier. He had "expectations to have found a fleet of Spanish and Dutch men of Warre before this place, and prepared for all events accordingly," only to find all quiet and "hardly a sail of any kinde in the place<sup>3</sup>."

The situation was now, however, somewhat easier, for in addition to Sandwich's squadron at Tangier<sup>4</sup>, Lawson was cruising in the Straits in case of eventualities. The news that De Ruyter had put in to Port Mahon to careen still further eased the tension. But until there was an English garrison in Tangier the crisis was not over or the position without danger. A letter written from on board the *Royal James* gives us a glimpse into the thoughts of the English there at the time, and incidentally shows how practical experience brought that appreciation of the strategic value of Tangier which was so lacking in the home diplomatist<sup>5</sup>. "Lord Sandwich," it runs, "is almost sick with staynge for the Garisons, and with fears lest any plott should be

<sup>1</sup> Harris, *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, i. 154.

<sup>2</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Carte MSS.* 73, f. 623.

<sup>3</sup> *Hist. MSS. Comm.* 15th Rep. App. pt. 2. *Hodgkin MSS.* p. 161.

<sup>4</sup> He sailed from Lisbon with the *Royal James*, *Mary*, *Mountagu*, *Hampshire*, *Princesse*, *Colchester*, *Forester*, and five small vessels. (Harris, *Sand. MSS. Journ.* i. 160.)

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Lawson on the subject. Sandwich also was always enthusiastic about the possibilities of Tangier (Harris, i. 208).

betwixt y<sup>e</sup> Spanyards and people of Tanger. Really y<sup>e</sup> Garison's stay is very dangerous.... This place makes all the world Jealous. Y<sup>e</sup> Spaniard will not beleeve we shall have it yet, and the Duch make them beleeve strange thinges ; indeed this place will make our king feared by all this part of the world<sup>1</sup>." Two days after this letter was written, on January 14th, 1662, an opportunity arose which, being taken by Sandwich, decided the fate of Tangier. Up to that time he had not received the best of receptions from the Portuguese ; they resented the transfer of their town to the English<sup>2</sup> and were showing no signs of being over-eager to hand it over to the prospective English garrison. On January 14th, however, an ill-judged sortie against the Moors, who kept the town in a continual state of semi-siege, threatened to end so disastrously that the governor was forced to ask for aid from the English. Nothing could have been better for Sandwich ; and when he sent, first 80 men, then 120 under Sir Richard Stayner, to help in the defence of the town, the English occupation was assured. " Now," wrote Pepys on hearing the news, " the Spaniards' designs of hindering our getting the place are frustrated<sup>3</sup>." On January 29th Lord Peterborough and the garrison arrived, and the occupation was complete. From that time on, the connection between Tangier and the fleet is conspicuous by its absence. In the early days of the building of the mole the harbour was inadequate for the protection of a squadron of any size<sup>4</sup>, and at no time does any

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Tanner MSS.* 49, f. 139.

<sup>2</sup> Corbett, *op. cit.* II. 27.

<sup>3</sup> *Diary*, February 20th, 1662.

<sup>4</sup> Routh, *Tangier*, 1661-84, p. 79.

attempt appear to have been made to use it as a naval base for the control of the Straits and Mediterranean. On two occasions in particular does this inability or unwillingness to make use of the port as a point whence to control the Straits come into especial prominence. First, in December, 1664, when Capt. Thomas Allin, while waiting for the passing of the Smyrna fleet of merchantmen, chose to ply up and down in the Mediterranean rather than station his small squadron at Tangier and use patrols. On the second occasion the omission had more far-reaching results, for it led to the fatal division of the English fleet in June, 1666, that caused the virtual defeat in the "four days battle."

After the successful occupation of Tangier, Sandwich returned to the less pleasant diplomatic task awaiting him at Lisbon. Haggling over the payment of Catherine's dowry was a lengthy process, and although he could write to Charles that "things have been despatched here with greater haste than this people have been known to make<sup>1</sup>," yet it was the third week in April before he set sail for England with the future Queen on board<sup>2</sup>. The voyage was uneventful, though unpleasant to Catherine who was a bad sailor, and on May 1st the fleet reached Plymouth.

Lawson, in the meantime, had been doing some useful work against the Algerines. "I can conceive y<sup>t</sup> nothing can be better husbandry than y<sup>t</sup> it be pursued vigorously<sup>3</sup>," James had written

The Corsairs.

<sup>1</sup> *Clarendon S. P.* III. app. p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> His fleet included the *Royal Charles, Henry, Roy, James, York, Mountagu, Lyon, Princesse, Breda, Dover, Rubye, Pearl, Elias, Dartmouth, Colchester.* (*Sand. Journ.* in Kennett, *op. cit.*)

<sup>3</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, February 6th, 1662.

in February, and Lawson had carried out that policy with such success that by April he had succeeded in exacting a treaty from Algiers, "they agreeing not to search our ships<sup>1</sup>." Without Algiers the Corsairs were but weak, and Tripoli and Tunis soon followed suit in making treaties with England. At the end of the year Lawson returned home with the squadron "with great renown among all men, and mightily esteemed at Court by all," yet Pepys "found him the same plain man that he was, after all his success in the Straits, with which he is come loaded home<sup>2</sup>." In the spring of 1664 he returned again to the Straits with the new governor for Tangier, the Earl of Teviot. But the lesson he had taught the Algerines was not yet forgotten and he had no serious work until the following year when, he and the fleet having once again returned home in the winter, the Algerines took the absence of the English to be a sign of impotence, and returned to their old habits of preying on English ships. On his return to the Mediterranean he declared war with Algiers again, "though they had at his first coming given back the ships (to the number of eighteen) which they had taken, and all their men," because they had "refused afterwards to make him restitution for the goods which they had taken out of them<sup>3</sup>." The work,

<sup>1</sup> Kennett's *Register*, p. 697 (*Sandwich's Journal*).

<sup>2</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, January 5th, 12th, 1663. Clowes, II. 422, says, after leaving Sandwich in May, 1662, he "took an Algerine pirate of 34 guns; but, ere he was able to effect more, he was recalled to England, Capt. Thomas Allin . . . superseding him in command of the station." Lawson was only recalled permanently, and Allin appointed, on the eve of war at the end of July, 1664, *vide* p. 91 *infra*.

<sup>3</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, May 3rd, 1664.



however, was unfinished when the imminence of war demanded his presence at home, and it was his successor, Capt. Thomas Allin, who finally renewed the treaty of peace on August 30th<sup>1</sup>.

Not one of the most creditable facts in Mediterranean history is the absolute failure on the part of the Christian European powers to unite in any way to crush the "Scourge of Christendom," as the Moorish pirates have justifiably been called. On the contrary, the Moors knew that to make a good bargain with one power they could not do better than repudiate agreements with another, and in 1664 they offered to the Dutch "to Re-establish all things again upon a good Foot, and to break the Treaty concluded with the English<sup>2</sup>." Experience, however, had taught the worth of the Moors' promises, and the Dutch rejected the offer and proposed to England, France and Spain, that a quadruple fleet should be made up to destroy the Corsairs and "utterly ruine their abominable and insupportable Domination<sup>3</sup>." When that proposal was made an incident had already occurred which meant an end to any effective co-operation whatsoever. Lawson's fleet and De Ruyter's had met; to a landsman observer it might have seemed that all the due formalities of a naval greeting had been gone through—gun answering gun in the precise proportions laid down by naval etiquette—but there was a fly in the ointment. De Ruyter had dipped his flag in salute, but Lawson, while

<sup>1</sup> Copy in *Somers Tracts*, VII. 554; they are identical with those made by Stoakes in 1658.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*

duly answering gun with gun, had not lowered his flag. Lawson sent word to De Ruyter to say that his omission was not intended in the least degree as a slight, but that his orders forbade him to lower his flag to any other nation. De Ruyter was not to be mollified, and parted from the English nursing the incident as an insult to his country, and determined never to lower his flag to them again. He wrote an indignant complaint home recounting the incident and proclaiming his intention. John de Witt, however, had a keener wit than De Ruyter, and was also doing his best to avoid a war which the English seemed intent on launching on him. He sent immediate word that the Dutch flag was to be lowered to the English whenever they met, but at the same time such meeting was to be avoided whenever possible. In other words De Ruyter was to swallow the insult. De Witt was not, however, moved to this order solely by his desire to avoid hostilities; he gave the ulterior reason in his letter to the Admiral. "L'intention de l'état," he wrote, "a toujours été de ne faire sur ce sujet aucune distinction de lieux; mais de faire saluer d'une seule et même manière en tous climats indifféremment, afin que les Anglais ne puissent pas alléguer en tems et lieu et inférer de ce qu'on aurait tenu une pratique ailleurs que dans les mers Britanniques, qu'on aurait reconnu qu'ils auraient un plus grand droit dans ces dernières mers, que dans les autres<sup>1</sup>." Such precautions, however, could not prevent minor disputes arising on the same subject continually, and the ill-feeling produced thereby played its part in the ever accumulating mass of

<sup>1</sup> Brandt, *Vie de De Ruyter*, p. 199.

jealousies and spites that were to cause two more wars before their venom was exhausted.

When one fleet is spending its time avoiding another for fear of being insulted co-operation is scarcely likely, and what further action was taken against the pirates was carried out by English and Dutch independently.

In the summer of '63 Tromp replaced De Ruyter, only to be rejoined and reinforced by him a year later about the same time that Capt. Thomas Allin was sent out to relieve Lawson. In the meantime matters were drifting on towards the inevitable conflict and it was in the Mediterranean that the tension was the keenest. It was there that the only active squadrons of the future belligerents were plying, each ostensibly with the same object in view, each crediting the other with deep-laid plots. The late proceedings of Holmes along the Guinea coast and elsewhere were scarcely calculated to deaden the already smouldering animosities nourished by the Dutch against their would-be trade rivals, and the expectation of reprisals made the English watch the Dutch movements as a cat does its enemy.

It was on August 19th, 1664, that Capt. Thomas Allin<sup>1</sup> on the *Plymouth* sailed from the Downs with a

<sup>1</sup> Born 1612, served with Rupert's squadron 1649-50. For details of his proceedings while on this service the best first-hand source is his own personal journal, though for the most part the details with which it is full are more of—doubtful—meteorological than of historical interest. The first lines in a day's note are always on wind and weather—whether a “handsome gale” or what he quaintly calls “very rainy hurry durry weather”;—in addition to such purely professional matters, the chance of a fight or a lost opportunity of one are put down with evident joy or disgust. A seaman and a fighter, his bare, unliterary journal—often little more than a log-

small squadron, to replace Lawson who was needed in England in view of the preparations against the Dutch. Allin's instructions<sup>1</sup> were to consult with Lawson as to the best methods of carrying on the war against Algiers and of preserving the English trade in the Mediterranean. In general he was to "contrive as much as may be to give convoy to his Maj<sup>ty</sup>s Subjects in all their Trade in those parts, . . . that the Turkes may be weary of Warre with his Maj<sup>t</sup> and be brought to a good peace, the obteyning of which" he was "still to ayme at"; though no peace was to be made "unlesse the Shipps of His Maj<sup>ty</sup>s Subjects may passe free from search or any kind of molestation." He was to draw the fleet together at times and have scouts watching De Ruyter so as to be ready for any emergencies against the Dutch, "but not to act anything against them untill further orders unlesse they shall first have done some act of hostility."

It was not till near the end of September that he met Lawson and took over the command of the Mediterranean squadron: he parted from Lawson at Cadiz on September 28th and notes, "I put up my Flagge upon the Maynetopp on this morne about 6 a'clocke 28 Sept. 1664<sup>2</sup>." Two days before that the English and Dutch fleets had for the last time before the war met and parted amicably—De Ruyter bound for the Guinea coast with a squadron of 12 men-of-war with "express orders from the States, to sail towards book—gives a vivid sketch of what the life and work of himself and his squadron was. (*Tanner MSS.* 296.)

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Tanner MSS.* 47, f. 193.

<sup>2</sup> All following extracts are from the journal unless other reference is given.



Cape Verd and the Coast of Guiney ; to reduce the English to reason, and to make them restore by force what they had unjustly usurpt<sup>1</sup> ; Lawson for England in order to do service against the Dutch in the Channel ; and Allin to the service in the Straits where his attack on a Dutch fleet proved to be the first open act of war in the second Dutch war. Perhaps it was the knowledge of what the next meeting would be that caused the ironical cordiality of the farewell greetings on both sides. After plentiful saluting and answering, "De Ruyter," says Allin, "came under our sterne and asked me how I did and saluted me with 7 gunnes and dranke to me I dranke to him and answered him 7 he thanked me 3 the which I answered<sup>2</sup>, when De Ruyter was clear from the Fleet he shott 7 gunnes to bid Sir John farewell...he answered him 7 and then he shott of 7 more."

Allin did not go direct to Algiers, but cruised along the coast of Spain as far as Carthagena without meeting any Turks or pirates ; and it was not till October 31st that he anchored off Algiers, and made efforts to conclude a peace. Possibly the news of Holmes' expedition on the Guinea coast, or more probably Allin's capture of five of their men-of-war, inspired the Algerines with a respect for the English which they had not displayed for the Dutch in their negotiations with De Ruyter in June ; anyhow, from the commencement of the negotiations<sup>3</sup>, the English representatives met with consideration, and with what was apparently an honest

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Cornelius Tromp.*

<sup>2</sup> The punctuation is Allin's.

<sup>3</sup> Details of the negotiations are in Allin's *Journal* ; and *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 4th, 1664.

desire for peace—accompanied by as honest a determination to obtain it as cheaply as possible. The Turks refused any compensation for damage and injuries to trade or for their ill-usage of the consul, and declared that, as the English prisoners had mostly become the property of private men, they could not arrange for their restoration; even the “mayne Article of nott medelling or searching our shippes was much debated, before they would agree with it.” However, peace<sup>1</sup> was finally concluded, and to inform the fleet of the agreement “instead of 3 gunnes” (as ordered) “they shott 30 or upwards from all their castles and forts.” A sumptuous present was sent off to Allin—“300 small loaves of bread, ten leane small beast, not fitt to eate and ten as ill sheepe and a dussin Hens.” On November 3rd the articles were signed, two Turkish, two English copies and one French copy. Unsatisfactory though the terms were in many ways, yet they strengthened English prestige in the Mediterranean, both by admitting to England the freedom of those seas and by having a chastening effect on two other trade disturbers—Tripoli and Tunis.

About this time Allin must have received definite instructions<sup>2</sup> to seize Dutch men-of-war or the rich Smyrna fleet that was soon due through the Straits. He and his captains were spoiling for a fight. On

<sup>1</sup> From Clutterbuck at Leghorn. “The peace with Algiers is laughed at, no satisfaction being given for any damage sustained, but if the Dutch war continue, it may prove advantageous, as the King’s ships will have the Dutch only to look after.” *Cal. S. P. Dom.* December 5th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> Referred to by W. Coventry, *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 15th, 1664. Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 424, writes as though Allin had no orders to attack the Dutch.

November 28th at Malaga he was insulted by two Dutch men-of-war who manœuvred so as to force him to cut his cable, and jeered him as he left. "I wish he had indured it to a breech, that we might have had a just occasion to have done the like to them in the King of Spayne's Chamber it troubled me much." Though it was his aim to catch the Dutch in the Straits there is no sign that he ever contemplated making any use of the new English station at Tangier. On December 1st he writes, "all the captains very earnest to goe to sayle for Trafalgar to lay there expecting the comming of the fleett of Hollanders." A day later in very rough weather he gave chase to a visionary 'Smyrna fleet' off Gibraltar, but owing to bad weather, bad piloting, and darkness, nearly every one of his nine ships ended the chase on shore; the *Nonsuch* and the *Phœnix* were lost, the *Bonaventure* more or less crippled by leaks, and some of the others damaged to a lesser degree. Some of the ships grounded twice before getting clear; misfortunes that were not improved by the continuance of very stormy weather for more than a week—before which time Allin had not unnaturally "had enuffe of it"—or by the fact that when the squadron got back to Gibraltar again on the 11th the Governor there refused them assistance. The next day they received news of the Dutch fleet of 33 sail at Malaga, and after a council of war renewed their resolve to go to Trafalgar and wait there, first calling at Tangier to pick up two other ships of the squadron, thus making the squadron up to eight sail<sup>1</sup>. In the meantime

<sup>1</sup> On the 13th the *Bonaventure* sprung a fresh leak and had to make for Cadiz.

amended instructions<sup>1</sup> had been dispatched to Allin on November 21st from England—"notwithstanding any orders to the contrary...to seize all such ships and vessels belonged to the United Provinces of the Netherlands as you shall meet with." It is certain, however, that Allin did not at the earliest receive them for over three weeks, for on December 17th he complains that he is "hindered taking a dozen great Dutch ships by twos and threes, because only allowed to attack their men-of-war or their Smyrna fleet, and that not in Spanish ports<sup>2</sup>."

The Dutch<sup>3</sup> fleet had weighed from Malaga on the 16th; a fleet of about 30 merchant ships, great and small, convoyed by three frigates under command of Commodore Brakel. The Dutch account runs thus: "we made all together towards the Mouth of the Straights and having passed it on the 28th with some Merchant Ships separated from us; the same night being arrived within 3 miles of Cadiz Bay, Comm. Brakel gave the signal to anchor; the next morning at break of day, we set sail again, and some of our Merchant Ships were scattered from us: The 29th in the morning we met 8 or 9 English ships, upon which Brakel advancing towards their Flag, saluted it with some Guns, but the English Admiral waiting his opportunity till Brakel came up side by side with him, powered in upon him a whole Broadside. When we saw that, we repaid him his change." The Dutch fleet only numbered

<sup>1</sup> Rec. Off. *Adm. Nav. Off. In Letters*, 1664. November 21st.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* December 17th, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> For this Dutch account cf. *Life of Cornelius Tromp*, pp. 258-9.



14<sup>1</sup> when they came in sight of the English, and before the encounter it was still further diminished by six merchantmen who "contrary to the Orders of their High and Mightinesses, and in contempt of their honour... basely deserted us to Retire into the Road<sup>2</sup>." The fight was sharp but short owing to the weather : Brakel, and Roelofsze on the *Koning Salomo* appear to have met the brunt of the sudden English attack ; Brakel was killed and his ships severely damaged, Roelofsze sank with his ship after an hour's fight. The stormy weather prevented the English from using more than their upper guns, "our ship laying downe side soe much that we could ope noe more ports," and also prevented them tacking to return to the fight. Two of the English ships never came into action, though one of them captured an isolated merchantman—the *Santa Maria* : the only other prize was the *Abraham Sacrifice* taken by the *Oxford*. "What was done we did the most, had God pleased to have sent us fayre weather, we had done great service but it was a frett of wind that we could nott handle our sayles to fight<sup>3</sup>." Such was the somewhat ignominious action by which the English opened the Dutch War : on hearing of the encounter the States General published on January 14th<sup>4</sup> a Declaration of War, ordering the seizure of all English ships ; and though Charles did not officially declare war until March, it was only the season of the year and

<sup>1</sup> *Journal*, and *Cal. S. P. Dom.* December 25th, 1664. Cf. Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 423, "thirty merchantmen and three ships of war" at time of action.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Cornelius Tromp*, p. 258.

<sup>3</sup> Allin's *Journal*.

<sup>4</sup> English (old) style.

a mutual need for preparation that postponed further actions.

During the course of the war the Mediterranean saw but little naval action. Concentration with a view to decisive action was the policy of both English and Dutch, and so thoroughly did the former act up to it that they withdrew Allin and his squadron and left no ships of war in the Straits or Mediterranean. Even Tangier was left to itself to be entirely self-defending : a fact which offers some idea of the completeness of the extinction of the 'Mediterranean policy'—if indeed that policy had even yet penetrated into official circles in England. The Dutch, however, were not the men to allow their policy of concentration to prevent the use of the opportunity thus offered. The three men-of-war that were lying in Cadiz harbour awaiting Allin's departure served as a nucleus for a small fleet—sometimes numbering over a dozen ships—which succeeded not merely in annoying English trade, but also in seriously endangering the safety of Tangier. They made no attempt on Tangier itself, for they "durst not come within reach of the cannon<sup>1</sup>": instead they contented themselves with "hovering about the Straits mouth, sometimes in and sometimes out, to wait for our merchant ships<sup>2</sup>," and in October they struck a blow which was far more effective than any bombardment promised to be. The victualling ships intended for Tangier had already been long delayed when in September they set sail under the convoy of the *Merlin* and in the company of some fifteen merchantmen.

<sup>1</sup> *Hist. MSS. Comm. Heathcote MSS.* p. 192.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 195.

When off Cadiz this fleet met nine of the Dutch men-of-war. As a result of the pluck and tenacity of the *Merlin's* captain, who "behaved himself bravely with his 'twelve guns'<sup>1</sup>," only four merchantmen and the *Merlin* actually fell into the hands of the Dutch: nevertheless the incident was a serious blow to the garrison, shattered and inadequate as were the victuals<sup>2</sup>. The only step taken by the English government in any way to compensate for the lack of warships in the Straits, was to grant letters of reprisal to privateers, and in the spring of 1665 the State Papers contain references to eleven ships thus licensed<sup>3</sup>. In other words the Mediterranean 'policy' of England in 1665 was no deep-laid strategic or diplomatic scheme, but a vague idea of 'tit for tat,' of petty private piracy licensed by the State.

So long as the war was confined to England and Holland the English neglect of the Straits and Mediterranean is at least comprehensible, inasmuch as the desired concentration must be in English waters, and Dutch interests in the Mediterranean were comparatively small. With the entrance of Louis XIV into the arena, however, the range of naval action widened, the importance of the 'Gibraltar defile' begins. The English successes of the first year's war, coupled with the ever growing power of Tangier as a naval station, as the mole stretched out further and the harbour grew, gave Louis a prospect of England supreme at sea holding

<sup>1</sup> *Heathcote MSS.* p. 211. *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 3rd, 5th, 10th, 14th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Routh's Tangier*, p. 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* January 28th and March 11th, 1665.



the key to the Mediterranean with which she could lock out all hopes of France's naval growth. Peace overtures failed, so in January, 1666, Louis declared war on England.

The French fleet was divided, part at Toulon under de Beaufort, part under du Quesne on the west coast. Colbert's intention was that Beaufort should have joined du Quesne and if possible united with the Dutch fleet before the English fleet came out<sup>1</sup>. Precisely at this time, however, England made a move which seemed to show the fullest appreciation of the importance of the Straits and Tangier: Sir Jeremy Smith, a man with a fighting reputation, was sent out to the Straits with a small but strong squadron. To all but the English the move seemed brilliant and deliberate. With Jeremy Smith in the Straits, Beaufort's fleet could not be induced to budge, and in the meantime the Anglo-Dutch War continued and France was helpless. And then, as it were to confirm and strengthen that move, a small additional squadron was sent out to escort Sandwich to Spain. In reality, however, Sir Jeremy Smith was sent out primarily to convoy the Levant ships home, and Sandwich's squadron was sent, not to reinforce but to recall. Smith and his squadron were recalled and the Straits left open and neglected at a time when they were the most important of any of the strategic points in European waters. In the light of this fact it is difficult to see how it can be in the least credible that the strategic value of the Straits 'defile' was appreciated or at all

<sup>1</sup> *Lettres de Colbert*, III. i., February 8th-25th, March 2nd-16th; cf. Corbett, *op. cit.* pp. 53-5.



understood by the English authorities. It is true that Albemarle was a firm believer in the doctrine of concentration, but his name as a sound strategist would be gone if he had enslaved himself to that doctrine knowing, as we now know and as Colbert then knew, that the mere presence of that small squadron at that one spot could cancel all the naval efforts of France and make her fleet a helpless pawn. This incident was the first of the great lessons that English naval strategists needed before they could see what all Europe already knew. Nor was that the whole lesson. Fate, in the guise of false news of the French approach and an order, perhaps from Charles, to divide the fleet so as to meet Beaufort, was to drive the moral home; the fleet was to meet disaster and suffer heavy loss by reason of a division of forces which could have been avoided by a true comprehension of the fundamental fact lying at the root of what has since come to be known as England's Mediterranean Policy.

## CHAPTER V

### SECOND DUTCH WAR

1664. *Preliminaries.*

THE occurrences in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Africa were but incidents in a movement that was rapidly and inevitably leading England and Holland into war. At the root of it all was commercial jealousy. The Dutch held the carrying trade of Europe, and the English growth threatened what they pleased to consider as their monopoly. The English too, as Albemarle said, were determined to have a larger share of the trade. "The trade of the world is too little for us two," remarked a naval Captain, "therefore one must down<sup>1</sup>." The Navigation Acts had done their work in irritating the Dutch, if not in actually excluding them in the way intended. Frequent disputes on the vexed questions of the salute and 'Dominion of the Seas' claimed by England added to the general tension. Goaded as she was beyond all patience, Holland was not over-eager for war, and it was a difficult question how the war could be precipitated and at the same time blamed to her with at least some show of plausibility.

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, February 2nd, 1664.

“It seems the King’s design,” says Pepys, “is by getting underhand the merchants to bring in their complaints to the Parliament, to make them in honour begin a warr, which he cannot in honour declare first, for feare they should not second him with money<sup>1</sup>.” The court was ‘mad’ for the war and the idea was intensely popular in the country. There were not wanting, however, sober opponents of it, and Coventry, “setting aside our ability to goe through with it, or rather taking that for granted (to which possibly some objections might bee made from the posture of His Majesty’s stores and treasure)<sup>2</sup>,” was of the opinion that the expected trade advantage was of more than doubtful probability, and besides, “it is not a popular discourse, but it is a true one that the crowne may pay too deare for some present advantage to the People.” But he was a prophet in his own country and the nation was hurried on into the war. The merchants did not need much encouragement to petition to Parliament for redress for their alleged wrongs—estimated in cash at over 4½ millions, including four millions for the Isle of Poleroon taken by the Dutch nearly 50 years previously. The intentionally truculent representations made to the States on the subject by the English Ambassador, Sir George Downing, fanned the smouldering hatred and gave ample proof of the determination of Charles to force a war.

In the meantime naval preparations were necessary and in May Pepys notes, “Mr Coventry prepares us

<sup>1</sup> *Diary*, March 30th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 32,094, ff. 48–50. Notes against a Dutch war shown only to Lord Arlington.

with expectation of an order for y<sup>e</sup> very speedy setting out a squadron of shippes to answer y<sup>e</sup> Dutch preparations<sup>1</sup>." In July a small fleet was ready—though it seems to have been little more than a reinforced Summer Guard<sup>2</sup>—and on July 20th Sandwich hoisted his flag on the *London* in the Downs, and soon after took his fleet out into the Channel to practise them. His orders were to obtain as continual and complete information of the Dutch fleet as possible, and to "preserve His Majesty's honour<sup>3</sup>."

The despatch of Sandwich's fleet was in fact a defensive measure, intended to cover the multitudinous preparations that were still necessary before anything like an effective fleet would be ready for offence in the Channel or North Sea. The Dutch also were for the time absorbed in defensive measures. With them safety of trade was the first consideration and they warned their merchant shipping to sail round the North of Scotland rather than through the Channel. Tromp with a squadron of 25 ships was sent to meet and convoy home the incoming East Indiamen<sup>4</sup>. Thus it was long before any offensive action was taken in home waters; apparently neither wished to attack until their preparations were complete. In August both England and Holland had a squadron preparing to go

<sup>1</sup> Rec. Off. Adm. Nav. Off. In Letts. May 18th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> It consisted of the *London*, *Gloucester*, *Happy Return*, *Dover*, *Kent*, *Drake*, *Plymouth*, *Dreadnought*, *Crowne*, *Breda*, *Guernsey*, *Lily*, *Revenge*, *Elizabeth*, *Hampshire*, *Pearle*, *Hector*, and *Nonsuch*. Vice-Adm. was Allin and Rear-Adm. Berkeley. (Harris, *Sandwich Journal*, I. 214.)

<sup>3</sup> Bodl. Libr. Carte MSS. 73, f. 193.

<sup>4</sup> He met them off Fair Isle in August and convoyed them home without meeting any English. *Life of Tromp*, p. 245.



to Guinea, the latter<sup>1</sup> ostensibly to convoy four West Indiamen there, the former to follow the latter, convoy some Guinea ships and presumably to protect Holmes' conquests. On the 19th, writes Pepys, "Mr Coventry and Sir W. Pen and I sat all the morning hiring of ships to go to Guinny, where we believe the warr with Holland will first begin<sup>2</sup>." On the 20th, Lord Sandwich writes that he has heard that he is to follow the Dutch fleet to Guinea, but says he thinks that the fleet "that first arrives will succeed, and the later one be frustrated or put to disadvantage; therefore a squadron should instantly set out to stop them or sail as soon as they<sup>3</sup>." This is almost the first authoritative suggestion of offensive action. The command of the squadron, however, was finally given to Rupert. "I doubt few will be pleased with his going," remarks Pepys, "being accounted an unhappy man": objections to which Rupert's hot reply was "God damn me, I can answer but for one ship, and in that I will do my part; for it is not in that as in an army where a man can command everything<sup>4</sup>." It was not until the beginning of October that the English fleet for Guinea was ready to sail. In the meantime it was reported that the small squadron under Kampden had been increased to 15, and was to be conducted through the Channel by Tromp and Opdam<sup>5</sup>; but it had not sailed when Rupert weighed from the Hope on October 5th with 12 ships

<sup>1</sup> 10 ships under Kampden.

<sup>2</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, August 19th, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 20th, 1664.

<sup>4</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, August 31st, September 5th, 1664.

<sup>5</sup> It was probably the news of this proposed 'bravado' that led to the staying, alteration and increase of Rupert's 'Guinea' fleet.

bound for Guinea. Rupert never got further than Portsmouth. He reached there on the 15th and the squadron stayed there weatherbound.

The following month was one of feverish haste in naval preparations of every description in England and Holland. In England one of the main difficulties in preparing the fleet was lack of men. The press-gang varied very much in its efficiency in different parts of the country. In the Eastern counties men were ready to volunteer to serve if it had not been for the fact that thus they would have missed their press money. A letter from Norwich says "By the countenances of the men they seem very willing to be employed. A company of 40 marched through the town, with drums beating and other expressions of joy at their taking the water. There would be volunteers enough against the Dutch, if they were to be fought at home and not at Guinea<sup>1</sup>." And from Yarmouth, "The press goes on hotly along the coast; throngs are mustering up and down the streets, frolicking away their press money, and saying, when their friends try to dissuade them from going, that they could not serve a better master<sup>2</sup>." Hull sends 300 men, the full number charged on the port<sup>3</sup>. But in London and in the South and West of the country it was a very different matter. In London and the neighbouring docks, partly owing either to corruption or sheer inefficiency among the press-masters, and partly to real lack of the right type of men, large numbers of landmen—even apprentices—were

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 24th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* October 26th, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* November 15th, 1664.

impressed, many of them the merest boys, and complaints were frequent and urgent. "Most of the pressed men are fitter to keep sheep than to sail in such great ships<sup>1</sup>"; "pitiful pressed creatures who are fit for nothing but to fill the ships full of vermin<sup>2</sup>." From Dover comes the complaint—frequent throughout the country—that "there are many fit for service, but the magistrates will not do their duty<sup>3</sup>." It often happened that the local authorities in a seaport—being personally interested in the men and the ships they served—would give warning of the arrival of the press-gang, and would even directly oppose it.

In Portsmouth, where the so-called Guinea fleet was being rapidly increased, the difficulty was paralysing. Coventry writes for the hastening on of the Thames ships with as many supernumerary men as possible, "for here is great want of seamen<sup>4</sup>." At the end of October an attempt had been made to attract seamen to the service by the issue of a declaration for the "encouragement of seamen," settling the proportion of prize money to be allowed seamen: Coventry orders its issue to all ports for "it hath much encouraged the men heere and was receaved with great joy<sup>5</sup>." The benefit done by it was not, however, very far-reaching, and the greatest difficulty began to be experienced in keeping the men when pressed. The Duke of York went down to Portsmouth and inspected the ships there

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 21st, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* December 1st, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 20th, 1664.

<sup>4</sup> *Bodl. Libr. Rowl. MSS.* A. 174, ff. 491-3.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

on the 11th of November, and reports<sup>1</sup> that things were “in pretty good forwardnes excepting the seamen and somewhat of the victualling<sup>2</sup>,” the men either did not appear after being pressed or deserted after appearance: “it is grown so comon with them to offend in both these kinds, that the pressing of men is of little effect, other than the expending of the King’s Treasure”; within four days “neere 200 men” had deserted<sup>3</sup>. In hopes of remedying this he offered a reward of 6*d.* per head to people—especially managers of entertainments—who should secure the return of any such deserters. This, however, had little effect; 6*d.* was not enough. The only remedy was the vigorous pursuit of runaways and stern treatment of some as an example. “Nothing but hanging will man the fleet” writes Wm. Coventry three times in three successive letters to Sec. Bennett<sup>4</sup>. Numerous remedies for the lack of men were suggested. “The King approves your proposal,” writes the Duke<sup>5</sup> to Rupert and Sandwich, “of turning over y<sup>e</sup> men out of y<sup>e</sup> Company’s Shippes into y<sup>e</sup> King’s Shippes now lying in Harbour and securing y<sup>e</sup> Company’s Shippes in y<sup>e</sup> Harbour untill a fitter occasion for setting them forth. I desire you imediately to put it into Execution; Leaving on board y<sup>e</sup> Company’s shippes y<sup>e</sup> officers and some few men such as you shall judge fitt to Looke to them and their Lading in Harbour.” It was also

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York’s Letters, 1660–6.*

<sup>2</sup> One of the first signs of the administrative defect that hampered the English fatally throughout the war.

<sup>3</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York’s Letters, 1660–6.*

<sup>4</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom. November 13th, 14th, 16th, 1664.*

<sup>5</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York’s Letters, November 2nd, 1664.*



suggested that seamen could be obtained from Guernsey and Jersey and "thus French and Flanders seamen engaged on the King's side who will else be taken by the Dutch<sup>1</sup>." It was even proposed that possible or useful men should be sent home from Jamaica<sup>2</sup>.

Nevertheless the numbers were increased above the usual war establishment<sup>3</sup>; order was given that all the King's ships remaining in harbour were "to be repaired with all possible speed, and rigged and fitted forth to sea<sup>4</sup>"; the ships in the Thames and Downs that were in serviceable condition were to go to Spithead to join the squadron already there. In the meantime, in the absence of any English fleet in or near the Downs, the Duke suggested the provision of some fireships at Dover "that soe in case y<sup>e</sup> Dutch should come into y<sup>e</sup> Downes with a Fleete opportunity might be taken in y<sup>e</sup> night of doing service upon them by fireships<sup>5</sup>."

Meanwhile the 'Guinea' fleet got no nearer its objective. On October 31st Lord Sandwich had hoisted his flag as joint commander with Rupert; and Rupert writes that "the ships will soon be in better condition to meet an enemy, the merchants' goods being put in good order, and Lord Sandwich's arrival will hasten forward those that are in port<sup>6</sup>." Early

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 22nd, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, November 17th, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> *Rec. Off. Adm. Nav. Off. In Letts.* November 17th, 1664. It had previously been lowered below the usual peace rates.

<sup>4</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, November 4th, 1664.

<sup>5</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, November 11th, 1664.

<sup>6</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 30th, 1664.

in November the primary objective of Guinea must have been made secondary to an engagement in home waters with the Dutch fleet under Opdam, to which end Spithead was made a rendezvous for the effective ships in the Thames and Downs. On the 11th and 12th inst. instructions had been given for the seizure of all Dutch ships, "by force if necessary<sup>1</sup>." On the 11th the Duke of York went to Portsmouth to take command of the fleet "where his appearance was useful in forwarding preparations, and delighted the seamen<sup>2</sup>": he divided it into three squadrons<sup>3</sup>, Lawson and Berkeley as vice and rear admirals of his own, Myngs and Sansum of Rupert's, and Ayscue and Tyddeman of Sandwich's squadron: he also had the men in the Guinea company's ships taken out and put on the King's ships<sup>4</sup>. Yet the fleet seemed fated not to sail; on the 13th it was hourly expected to weigh anchor, and the decks were cleared for a fight, yet on the 18th it was still at Spithead and had become by this time a laughing-stock<sup>5</sup>. On the 19th Coventry

<sup>1</sup> Rec. Off. *Adm. In Letts.* November 11th and 12th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 12th, 1664.

<sup>3</sup> Containing respectively 13, 12, and 12 ships (there were also 14 ships not yet ready or assigned to squadrons), Tyddeman was sent to cruise in the Channel with four or five ships to "teach refractory Dutchmen their duty." *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 13th, 1664, and *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.* civ. f. 143.

<sup>4</sup> In pursuance of the suggestion *supra* p. 108.

<sup>5</sup> Earl of Peterborough is "sorry to see the protection designed for Guinea made the subject of raillery." *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 18th, 1664. The Duke of York was the mainstay of the preparing of this fleet; he was "indefatigable" and Coventry writes, "Those who know with what earnestness his Royal Highness entered on this voyage, and how he hastened from London only to be out of importuning against it, will not easily believe him returning. It is certain

reports that it is "so nearly manned that it may now be completed from privateers<sup>1</sup>," and on the same day the ships from the Thames arrived bringing its numbers up to "43 of the bravest ships ever seen<sup>2</sup>."

In the meantime Tyddeman and his small squadron had opened the campaign of attacks on trade which formed the usual preliminaries of a naval war. He opened well on the 20th by capturing the greater part of the Dutch fleet from Bordeaux laden with French commodities. Once opened, this lucrative campaign went on apace. The State Papers tell us of 3 prizes on December 5th, 8 on the 6th, 23 on the 7th; indeed on the 10th Col. Walter Slingsby reports that no less than 150 sail of all sizes have been brought in between Dover and Plymouth since the commencement. On the 27th, the Duke at length succeeded in getting his fleet ready to sail, and weighed from Spithead with a fleet of 45 to 46 sail in rough weather—extraordinarily late in the year for so large a fleet to set out. Coventry writes of it, "...what weather we went out in, of w<sup>ch</sup> if you had been a witness you could have judged that lesse resolution or lesse concernment for the King's service then that of his R.H. would scarce have carryed anybody to sea in such weather. But it seemed the critical time in w<sup>ch</sup> the Dutch must pass if they would attempt it at all, and therefore his R.H. would not be in port<sup>3</sup>." The Dutch fleet never came out and after five days James decided

nothing under Heaven but the King's commands will bring him back again." *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 17th, 1664.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.* November 19th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, cv. f. 125.

to return to port, leaving a small squadron of eight or nine sail under Sir Wm. Berkeley to sweep the Channel. "Doe what wee could wee have not been able to keepe the fleete together," says Coventry, and it was by twos and threes that it straggled back to port. All energies could now be concentrated on the preparation of the fleet for the coming year. "It cannot but be of great advantage to H.M.'s service," writes James, "that his fleete should be ready before the Dutch," and he gives order that "noe costs may be spared on the King's part that may be conducing to this service<sup>1</sup>."

### 1665. *The War.*

"Englishmen, and more especially seamen, love their bellies above anything else, and therefore it must always be remembered, in the management of the victualling of the navy, that to make any abatement from them in the quantity or agreeableness of the victuals is to discourage and provoke them in the tenderest point, and will sooner render them disgusted with the King's service than any one other hardship that can be put upon them."

#### *Pepys' Naval Minutes.*

Such might have been either text or moral of the war, so well is its truth borne out during the course of the war. Indeed, the truth goes even deeper and further than Pepys traced it, for a fleet without food is as immobile as a sail without wind, and time and time again in the war

Preparations.  
Victualling  
Difficulty.

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, December 16th, 1664.*



has the same tale to be told of opportunities missed or left for lack or delay of victuals. Even at the end of 1664 the Duke of York had complained that the fleet had less than the due proportion of victuals<sup>1</sup>; and when in '65 the setting forth of a fleet again became immediate the fatal weakness was straightway brought into strong relief. It was, moreover, a hopeless weakness while the arrangement of the victualling remained as it had been established at the Restoration, when the provision of "all victuals to be provided for His Majesty's ships and maritime causes<sup>2</sup>" had been put into the hands of a single contractor—Denis Gauden. The fault did not lie with him personally; on the contrary, it is very striking to notice how in one complaint after another it is expressly stated that it is not directly against him personally. Of the fleet that went out in April it was written, "noe fleete was ever soe ill supplied for quantities of provision, as, to do the victualler right, none ever better for the goodnesse, against which there is not one complaint<sup>3</sup>." "The victualler is a man of good words, and provides good victuals<sup>4</sup>," writes Coventry at a time when he was nearly frantic with worrying over insufficient victualling. The difficulties were partly inherent in such an attempt to make one man control and arrange the victualling of the whole navy: reliable as he himself evidently was, he could not oversee the work in two or three ports at once: "he usually gave good dispatch, but he could not be in all

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 11th, 1664.

<sup>2</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.*, Docquet Bk. p. 46, cf. Tanner, *Catalogue of Pepysian MSS.* p. 152.

<sup>3</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.*, cxxi. f. 128.

<sup>4</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 15th, 1665.

places<sup>1</sup>." It was, however, the financial difficulty that most hindered efficiency, and afforded Gauden an unanswerable explanation for most breaches of contract; he could not keep his side of the contract unless the government kept theirs, and granted him "an immediate supply of a considerable sum of money and a certain weekly payment": he was not, he said, "in a capacity unless supplied with money to make the provision necessary<sup>1</sup>." It was "too much for any one man's purse<sup>2</sup>."

The factor, however, that gives this question the vital importance—the loss of mobility, the delays and lost opportunities—is best seen at work, where its results can be traced down through the whole course of this war. "The delay in victualling is intolerable," comes the complaint early in April. "After all this expense and pains the fleet is likely to remain unserviceable through defect on the victualler's part.... It will be said that if the victualler send bad victuals it is his loss, they must be flung overboard; but that will not repair the King's loss, if his fleet cannot keep the sea when he has most need of their service." And pessimistically the letter winds up, "Blind and general discourses that 'we have a brave fleet and we will beat them' will not avail, where there is neither money, victuals nor materials to carry on the war<sup>3</sup>."

On April 20th, the fleet set sail for the Dutch coast, ill provisioned and ill stored. "Mr Gauden," wrote Coventry from on board the *Royal Charles*, "hath taken

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 13th and 21st, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, cxxxii. f. 10, September 2nd, 1665.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 4th, 13th, 1665.

care wee shall not be able to stay long abroad, therefore we hope well of the mettle the Dutch pretend to have, and they will come immediately out to us<sup>1</sup>": "If the Dutch find out our condition as to victuals, they will play their game very ill if they come out<sup>2</sup>." He was also much concerned because the men's 'slops' had been left behind. "I thinke," he writes, "the health of the men concerned in their clothes, and men are soe hard to gett that I should be sorry to loose them so slightly<sup>3</sup>." As regards the actual manning, however, things were not so unsatisfactory. "The proportion of land soldiers is large, yet on the whole the commanders who had experience in the late Dutch war say that the fleet is better manned now than then<sup>4</sup>."

The Dutch prohibition of all commerce had shown their determination that all their force should be concentrated on their battle fleet, and that that fleet's primary object should be "to seek out and destroy that of the enemy<sup>5</sup>." For the English, prohibition of commerce was not so necessary, for English trade neither had the volume of that of the Dutch, nor was it so easily threatened on many of its routes: nevertheless decisive engagement was equally the aim of the English fleet. "To try if the Dutch will come out and venture a battle<sup>6</sup>" was the aim of the English admiral. Though both belligerents wished for a decisive battle, there was, however, a difficulty

Strategy of  
the War.

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Rawl. MSS.* A. 174, f. 458 (to Pepys, April 21st).

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 22nd.

<sup>3</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 174, f. 458.

<sup>4</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 18th, 1665.

<sup>5</sup> Corbett, *Maritime Strategy*, p. 158.

<sup>6</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 20th

hindering their attainment of that end. The strenuous efforts that had been made in order to get the fleet out as early as possible had resulted in James' forestalling the Dutch, and when the English fleet was at sea the Dutch were still divided in harbour at the Texel and Vlie. It was obvious that so long as a united English fleet was cruising between those places the divided Dutch squadrons were not likely to come out to be attacked piecemeal. In other words the presence of the English fleet was the very opposite to an incentive to the Dutch to give battle: the very strength of the strategic position the English held in dividing the Dutch, prevented the attainment of the desired decision<sup>1</sup>. There was, however, one factor to provoke the Dutch. De Ruyter—with booty from his tour of reprisal (complementary to that of Holmes)—accompanied by some merchant ships, was expected home soon: the Dutch might be enticed out to defend such an important acquisition of strength. "We thought," says Sandwich, "the hindering their trade to come home, the best provocation to make the enemy's Fleet come out<sup>2</sup>": and consequently the Fleet was ordered to

<sup>1</sup> Coventry gives some idea of the difficulties by which the English admirals were faced: he puzzles as to "what to be done if the Dutch won't come out but send their East India and Smyrna ships to some foreign port, and then do as they please in the Straits and Guinea," and puts the case succinctly—"If we divide our fleet they may come out and do what they please here; if we do not, they carry all before them there" (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 28th, 1665); he is apparently thinking not only of the Texel and Vlie but also of home waters and the Mediterranean.

<sup>2</sup> *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, i. f. 270 (quoted in Harris, i. p. 289). Harris gives a detailed account of discussions in council concerning these questions of strategy: based on the *Sandwich Journal*.



ride at a station some twelve leagues N.W. of the Texel, while patrols supplied what information could be obtained. Impatience, however, soon outweighed strategy, and after two days it was decided to stand in close to the Dutch coast. On the 28th they rode "so near the Dutch fleet as to hear their guns fire<sup>1</sup>." For ten days the English fleet plied up and down along the coast, having come to none but negative decisions—not to attack the Dutch in the Texel, not to prevent their junction "because it would certainly hinder their cominge out to engage us which is the chiefe thinge to be wished for<sup>2</sup>." But now Mr Gauden's care that the fleet should not stay long out began to have effect: on May 10th it was decided to return home to revictual—or rather to make up the stores which had never been complete—and on the 15th the fleet reanchored in the Gunfleet. "You will see what a great disappointment I have had," writes James, "for had he (the victualler) kept touch I had not been forced to come back, and I may say I believe never any great fleet ever ventured to go so far from home and upon an enemy's cost with so smal a proportion of Drinke, for many of the great ships had not one days beere on bord when I came in<sup>3</sup>." In short, the strategic advantage gained by being first at sea was thrown away by bad victualling, not merely lost, but thrust into the hands of the Dutch.

Immediately on the return of the fleet preparations were hurried on and an attempt made to make up the

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 28th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, i. f. 275 (quoted by Harris, *op. cit.* i. 291).

<sup>3</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II.* cxxi. f. 113.

deficiency of beer, food and men. The manning of the ships did not improve as time went by ; short rations and shorter pay did not encourage faithfulness, and desertions were frequent : “ sickness and the Colliers’ great wages having taken many from us since wee came in. The colliers give £8 and £9 per voyage, w<sup>ch</sup> is as much as 7 months pay in the King’s ships and may be performed in a moneth and noe limbes hazarded, the security against being pressed being added what hopes is there our men should stay with us or that others should come to us<sup>1</sup>.” Bad weather also hindered the going out of the victualling ships, and the completion of the stores proceeded at a very slow rate ; promises and forecasts remained unfulfilled. “ For all they say, the fleet cannot saile this fortnight, though they knew the Hollanders were out ; except more victuals come downe speedily we shall be at a stand<sup>2</sup>.” “ The delay of our victuals is the only stop of our going forth to seeke the Dutch whom we are very willing to meet<sup>3</sup>.”

In the meantime, however, the Dutch had come to sea, and proceeded to make the most of the opportunity afforded by the absence from the seas of the English fleet. They had only been out of port six days when they fell in with a fleet which they at first mistook for the English fleet : it proved to be an English fleet of merchantmen from Hamburg laden with the most valuable stores. The mistake concerning nationality had been mutual, and the man-of-war convoy “ mistaking

<sup>1</sup> *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, CXXI. f. 128.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* CXXI. ff. 112, 113.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* f. 128.

the Dutch fleet for the English, fell into it<sup>1</sup>." The loss was a serious one to the government, depending as they did so largely upon the Baltic countries for naval stores, and on receipt of the news the outcry was general. On the 31st Pepys writes, "to the 'Change, where great the noise and trouble of having our Hambrough ships lost: and that very much placed upon Mr Coventry's forgetting to give notice to them of the going away of our ships from the coast of Holland. But all without reason, for he did; but the merchants not being ready, staid longer than the time ordered for the convoy to stay which was ten days<sup>2</sup>." However, whatever the direct cause of the disaster, it was very obvious that had James not been forced to return for lack of victuals, the whole thing would never have occurred. Consequently there was a general demand that the fleet should put to sea forthwith to meet the Dutch, and on the 29th, news of the proximity of the Dutch having apparently been received, the fleet were ordered to be ready to sail the next morning. It was the King's birthday, but, writes Sir Thomas Allin, "we were commanded to fyre noe gunnes only pendants and mast clothes abroad<sup>3</sup>." Early on the 30th the fleet weighed from the Gunfleet.

The two  
Fleets. Numerically speaking the rival fleets were evenly balanced. The English numbered 109 warships, including hired merchantmen, and 28 fireships and small craft, it carried 21,006 men, including marines, and mounted 4192 guns. The flag

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* May 29th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Pepys' Diary*, May 31st, 1665.

<sup>3</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296.

officers and squadrons were : Lord High Admiral (*Red Squadron*), H.R.H. James, Duke of York, with Sir Wm. Penn as Captain of the Fleet on the *Royal Charles* ; *White Squadron*—Admiral Prince Rupert, Vice-Admiral Sir Christopher Myngs, Rear-Admiral Robert Sansum ; *Blue Squadron*—Admiral Earl of Sandwich, Vice-Admiral Sir George Ayscue, Rear-Admiral Tho. Tyddeman ; *Red Squadron*—Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson, Rear-Admiral Sir Wm. Berkeley<sup>1</sup>. The Dutch numbered 103 men-of-war and 30 small fry, including 11 fireships, carried 21,631 men, and mounted 4869 guns. It was divided into no less than seven squadrons, the first, second and fifth of which were commanded respectively by Admirals Opdam, John Evertsen, and Cornelius Tromp ; Opdam was commander-in-chief.

In morale and personnel, however, a gap widens between the English and Dutch. The opportune arrival of the colliery fleet on June 1st had enabled James to meet the fleet's "only lack—that of men<sup>2</sup>" ; and colliery ships' men were some of those most sought after for manning the King's ships. There was no disaffection among the English. There is no evidence that there were any serious differences among the flag officers, while among the lower officers and the men there were no signs of serious discontent or ill discipline. Officers and men alike were eager for the fight, "no rhodomontade but an assurance of beating them<sup>3</sup>." Moreover, as regards the unity of the fleet, the apparently useless excursion to the Texel in the previous

<sup>1</sup> Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 256.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* June 4th, 1665.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* April 18th, 1665.



month must have been most valuable in securing a certain amount of cohesion in the fleet, in practising the amateur tactics of the merchant captains until they had become adapted to fleet discipline. Sandwich apparently had the professional fighter's distrust of the amateur in his attitude towards the merchant captains, for in the council of war he suggested their relegation to the rear of the line, saying the King's captains were "more entire and resolved to aid one another than it is to be feared the others are<sup>1</sup>": but on this occasion his fears were scarcely justified in the event.

The Dutch fleet on the other hand was in a far less sound state. Officers and men were in many cases unreliable and disaffection was widespread. The fact that after the battle four captains were tried and shot for cowardice—not a usual Dutch failing—and six others otherwise punished, affords striking evidence of the morale of the Dutch. Cohesion was almost entirely lacking. The multiplication of squadrons, the lack of cordial co-operation between certain of the flag officers, coupled with the very large proportion of merchant captains, made any practical unity impossible. "Es war somit das Band der Zusammengehörigkeit sehr locker und in Korpsgeist kaum vorhanden<sup>2</sup>."

On the 1st of June, writes Allin, "we spied the fleet, Captain Lambert first, he fyred a gun and lett his topgallant sheets fly. Soe did I and stood for the fleet. They all wayed and stood off to the S.E. the wind E.N.E.

Battle off  
Lowestoft,  
June 3rd, 1665.

<sup>1</sup> *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, I. f. 294, cf. Harris, *op. cit.* I. 299.

<sup>2</sup> Stenzel, *Seekriegsgeschichte*, III. 151.

“fayre weather<sup>1</sup>.” Opdam’s instructions were to the “destroying the English at water or at land, wherever they can meet them<sup>2</sup>,” so it is not quite comprehensible why he thus deliberately refused, or at least postponed, battle, at a time when he held the advantage of the weather-gauge. On the 2nd, resumes Allin, “we made sayle towards them but was very little wind all the forenoone easterly afternoone a fine gale and we rayed them much, we saw one of their ships blowne up but it proved a fireship.” The fire was caused “by the Imprudence of him that commanded it, who was got drunk<sup>3</sup>.” The wind veered to S.W., and early on June 3rd the two fleets were some 14 miles N.N.E. of Lowestoft, the English having the weather-gauge.

At about 3.30 a.m. the action began, the fleets, each in line ahead, passing each other on opposite tacks, S.E. and N.W. The White squadron led the van of the English, the Duke with the Red was the centre, and the Blue the rear. Vice-Admiral Myngs opened the firing, “but very farr off, and soe they fought the first passe to little or noe puepose, the wind at S.W.<sup>4</sup>” About 8 a.m., both fleets tacked again and passed, but again “very farr off that few shott reached, and those layd at Randum<sup>4</sup>.” The Dutch were endeavouring to win the weather-gauge but the superior manœuvring powers of the English balked all such attempts; particularly did the Red squadron do service in this direction, guided by the tactical skill of Penn in

<sup>1</sup> Allin’s *Journal*, *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, I. ff. 259–263, Harris, *op. cit.* I. 298

<sup>3</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 269.

<sup>4</sup> Allin’s *Journal*.

the name of James. At the end of the second pass, as they tacked again, there seemed some chance of the Dutch getting the gauge, but the position of the Red squadron prevented<sup>1</sup>; the Duke had gone so far to windward that supposing they had weathered Rupert's squadron they would still be to the leeward of James, and thus between two fires. So they tacked again to the leeward of Rupert. Thereupon the Duke to prevent a recurrence of the danger tacked into and with the Dutch<sup>2</sup>, and gave order for others to follow suit. With that move the English line became completely disarranged, the Dutch could not tack again, and the battle degenerated into a long straggling *mêlée*. In the course of this, it is unknown whether by accident or design<sup>3</sup> Sandwich with his squadron broke through the Dutch line, a proceeding that must have had a deep and rapid effect on the already weakened morale of the Dutch, and soon after it they began to take to flight. But the fighting in the meantime had been no child's play. The Dutch flagship with Opdam on board had been blown up, but before she went she had crippled the *Royal Charles*, and Lord Falmouth, Earl Muskerry,

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 270. "Because the Duke of York's squadron kept the Weather gage without engaging in Fight, it was impossible for the Dutch to win that Advantage."

<sup>2</sup> *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, I. f. 297, Harris, *op. cit.* I. 303. "His Royal Highness, suspecting the enemy would weather our fleet if we stood on and tacked in our proper berths to make good the like, . . . tacked after the enemy, and commanded me to tack." Allin's *Journal*. "His Highness sent me word to stand in, and I presently stood in soe neere as nott to shoote in vayne."

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *op. cit.* p. 304, apropos of this, gives no quotation from Sandwich's *Journal* to show that the move was deliberate. Hannay, *Hist. of R. N.* I. 341, suggests that some of the Dutch centre flinched and, lying back, left a gap through which the white squadron came.



and Mr Boyle, a son of the Earl of Burlington, had all been killed by a single shot at the very side of the Duke. Vice-Admiral Lawson also was mortally wounded. Some idea of the *mêlée* nature of the fight may be gained from the following extract from Sir Thomas Allin's *Journal* : " I plyed my gunnes very hard for two houres uppon Generall Opdam another flagge man and 2 ships laying on a lyne and a vice Admirall and 4 more 9 in all, but they payd me handsomely...my masts yards sayles and hull very much torne. I setting my mayne sayle to streach ahead from the flagship, cam two new frigatts or scouts fresh upon me I was forced to take and receive all to gett off but pay'd the biggest frigatt (Young Everson) soundly I went and mended what I could but it was late 3 aclocke before I was fitt to fight, in that time Generall Opdam's ship blew up...I was at the taking or beating to yield severall, and at the beating the fleet together that three gott together and were burnt by one of our fire shippes, the same formerly burnt 4 ship all tould of one another. We followed all night<sup>1</sup>."

The flight and chase were remarkable for two things : the splendid tenacity of Tromp, who had collected what ships he could and covered the retreat until his seamen " openly ascribed to a Miracle the Preservation of his Ship and Person<sup>2</sup>," thus considerably lightening the disaster ; and the failure of the English properly to follow up their victory, which, says Evelyn, " might have been a complete one, and at once ended the war, had it been pursued, but the cowardice of some, or

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 274.



treachery, or both, frustrated that<sup>1</sup>." There seems little reason to doubt the truth of the strange story told by Clarendon, supported as it is by the Commons Journal report of the examination of Harman in April, 1668. Briefly put it is this: during the night after the fight, when the English were hard in pursuit, Brouncker, one of the Duke's servants, came up to Captain Harman saying the Duke had ordered sail to be slackened; after some demur, and a clever trick on the part of Brouncker, sail was slackened and the rest of the fleet followed suit. "The Duchess had given a strict charge to all the Duke's servants to do all they could to hinder him to engage too far"—such is Clarendon's explanation of the business. Be the truth of that as it may, by the time the Duke arose in the morning the Dutch were safe in reach of their harbours and the English had lost such an opportunity of crushing the Dutch Navy as they never had before or after<sup>2</sup>. "To confirme the reputation of their victory and to protect themselves against malice and artifice<sup>3</sup>" the council of war decided to return to the Downs with the whole fleet. On June 10th they anchored in Southwold Bay, and on June 18th the fleet was divided between Osely Bay, Harwich, Chatham and the Nore<sup>4</sup>.

The prizes taken from the Dutch numbered about 14 ships, including the *Huis te Swieten*, 70 guns, the

<sup>1</sup> Evelyn's *Diary*, June 8th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> Allin says: "We stood along and saw them at ancor as many as could gett close to the Boys. . . had we had many fyre ships and gone upon them shooting we had distroyed many of them." *Journal*, June 4th. *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>3</sup> Harris, *op. cit.* p. 309. *Sandwich MSS. Journal*, i. f. 302.

<sup>4</sup> List of ships assigned to each, *Rawl. MSS. A.* 195, f. 82.

*Hilversun*, 60 guns, and the *Carolus Quintus* and *Nagelboom*, each 54 guns<sup>1</sup>: and in addition at least 12 ships had been sunk or burned. The Dutch had taken the *Charity*. But two English flag officers and three captains had been lost: Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson, Rear-Admiral Rob. Sansum, Captain James, Earl of Marlborough, of the *Royal James*, Captain Kirby of the *Breda*, and Captain Ableson of the *Guinea*. Apart from these concrete gains and losses this overwhelming victory did not bring much real gain to the English: owing to the failure to follow it up it was very far from having crushed the Dutch. Indeed on the whole it brought rather loss than gain; it made the Dutch desperate, and, as Penn said, "the courage of the Dutch was never so high as when they were desperate<sup>2</sup>," and it was instrumental in scaring Louis into joining the Dutch in their fight against the threatened naval predominance of England.

The fight off Lowestoft had given England for the time being almost undisputed command of the sea and the Dutch began to entertain fears for two homeward bound fleets—De Ruyter on the way back with his booty from the Guinea expedition, and the rich East India fleet of some 30 sail estimated to be worth many millions: either or both of which would have fallen an easy prey to the English fleet. The English designs on these two fleets were agreeably aided by an ingenious and opportune suggestion from Sir Gilbert Talbot, the English envoy at

Bergen  
intrigue and  
fiasco.

<sup>1</sup> Coventry's list in *S. P. Dom. Chas. II*, cxxiii. f. 29, but not complete

<sup>2</sup> Clarendon, *op. cit.*

Copenhagen. Though the proposal originally came from Talbot it appears to have met with great approval from the Danish King, approval that was, however, only practical as far as the cowardice, tempered by greed, which was characteristic of that monarch, would allow : the plan was of the simplest, though the word-play that accompanied it was often of a wonderful subtlety ; it was that when the East India fleet, relying on the neutrality of Denmark, anchored in one of the ports of Norway—Bergen, in all probability—the English fleet was to attack it unhindered by the Danish forts ; the price for which abstention was to be a half share in the spoils. To increase the chances of success and lessen the danger of any trouble falling on Denmark no declaration or notice was to be given to the Dutch ambassador until it was “too late for him to give advice thereof to that fleete to avoid their coast<sup>1</sup>.” By some delicate reasoning this was “somewhat to justify the Honour of the King of Denmark to the world,” and was not to “be drawne into consequence that Denmark consenteth to the violation of their ports, for it is to be understood but a connivance<sup>2</sup>.” Possibly such subtleties were too much for the Danes—though it was more probably nervousness and cowardice wrought up by long suspense ; however, Talbot found that his statement on June 17th—“all is now well”—was somewhat premature. The East Indiamen were long in reaching the coast of Norway and the Danes’ fear of being involved in anything beyond the

<sup>1</sup> Bodl. Libr. *Rawl. MSS.* A. 252, Talbot to Arlington, June 17th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

acceptance of a substantial bribe increased in the meantime. "I met with a greate clamour that I went about to engage this crowne in present warr," Talbot writes on July 15th<sup>1</sup>; he could get nothing in the form of a definite agreement in spite of assurances and promise: "I am heartily sick with having to doe with a timorous and unconstant people: For God's sake let me know what his Majesty will expect from this crowne and I will put them upon a short categorical answer<sup>2</sup>."

There was, however, no time to wait for a more definite agreement; for the East India fleet was by this time in Bergen and De Ruyter reported off the Faroes, and on July 20th Talbot sent a messenger to Sandwich, in command of the English fleet, with verbal particulars of the arrangement "as being not so fitt to be putt to paper"—a comment true in more ways than the one intended. The messenger missed Sandwich, and on July 24th Talbot wrote<sup>3</sup> explaining things and how the governor was to "amuse the Hollanders."

<sup>1</sup> He continues: "They made a greate discourse to me how dangerous it would be for them to engage (in this low condition) to anything that might provoke Holland against them unlesse they might be assured that Sweden would stick fast to England and not make any peace with Holland without the consent of England and Denmark." July 15th, 1665. *Rawl. MSS. A. 252.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> "I have treated with his Majesty of Denmark to give command to the said governor" (of Bergen) "and all officers under him not to looke upon you as an enemy when you shall offer any violence to the Hollanders that ride there. . . . Therefore you are not to be surprised if he seem to be highly displeased with your proceeding and that he make high complaint thereof against you, which nevertheless will be but in show to amuse the Hollanders and excuse himselfe outwardly to the world." *Ibid.* Talbot to Sandwich, July 24th, 1665.



Meanwhile things had not been going too well with the English naval arrangements. The inevitable trouble about victualling and stores which hampered the fleets at every step during this war, was present on this occasion no less than usual; added to that there was some doubt as to the chief command, and a general atmosphere of haste and doubt resulted badly for the fleet. Apparently there was a suggestion that Rupert should share the command with Sandwich<sup>1</sup>, in any case there was a delay in settling the command and a further delay on the part of Sandwich in taking up the command. On Saturday, July 1st, news had been received of De Ruyter's fleet being off Ireland, and at a council of war held at the Nore, at which the King, Sandwich, and Albemarle were present, it was decided to try to intercept it. The command was to be given to Sandwich, whom private affairs claimed till Monday, the 3rd. In the meantime, whether by mistake or for some reason that does not appear, Sir Wm. Penn was given the command and full instructions: the fleet was to sail at the first possible moment to meet the Dutch fleet, to follow them "though they should goe into any Harbour belonging to the King of Denmarke in those parts," and if it was possible "to take or destroy them within those Harbours. . . nor to neglect the opportunity of doing it<sup>2</sup>." Sandwich returned on Monday to find Penn in command and *en route* for Sole Bay; he followed and reached there to find that Penn had taken his orders to hasten out very literally, and that the fleet was just visible on the horizon, bound for the Texel;

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* July 2nd, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 468.

picking up Sir Jos. Jordan with five sail more, which had been unable to get off in such haste, he followed, and came up with Penn on the 6th, ten leagues off the Texel. The haste in setting out had been the reverse of beneficial; not more than two-thirds of the available ships were there<sup>1</sup>, those that were there were "very badly furnished with victuals, liquor, yet worse, wanting 2500 men to what they had last engagement, some shipp's boats and men left ashore for hast of getting out<sup>2</sup>." Not merely might most of these defects have been remedied by even a couple of days' wait<sup>3</sup>, but also the fleet might have united with Sir Thos. Allin's squadron before setting out and thus have been free to cruise wherever might seem best in order to intercept De Ruyter<sup>4</sup>. As it was, Sandwich was bound to a limited cruising ground about the middle of the Dogger Bank, and it was not until July 17th that he was joined by Allin and a squadron of above 20 sail. At a council of war held immediately it was decided, as De Ruyter was almost certain for reasons both of policy and weather<sup>5</sup> to make for Holland by coasting along Norway and Denmark, to override the instructions directing them to await him about the Dogger<sup>6</sup> and

<sup>1</sup> On July 6th the fleet numbered: King's ships, 54; Merchant ships, 15. *Rawl. MSS.* 468.

<sup>2</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 468 (Sandwich's narrative).

<sup>3</sup> There was a stock of provisions at Harwich.

<sup>4</sup> "...which indigent and disunited condition of the Fleete... being the Root where unto in all probability may be assigned the missing De Ruyter on his returne...." *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> "The wind was S...improper to bring shipp's along for Holland and from the North." *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> The usual track of ships going to Holland after going round N. of Scotland.

to make direct for the Naze of Norway with the minor objective of a Flemish fleet of 15 reported at Flackerriy.

The event justified the policy entirely, but the previous delays made it of no avail. On the 21st the English were some 30 leagues off the Naze when they had news of De Ruyter at Bergen a week previous to that. As a matter of fact De Ruyter was by that time near the coast of Denmark, and on July 26th, despite a contrary wind, he reached Delf-Zell on the Ems<sup>1</sup>, having crept along near the coast the whole way from Bergen. Penn's precipitate start thus lost England a great opportunity of giving a crushing<sup>2</sup> blow to Holland's prestige. There remained the opportunity of striking a lucrative blow at her trade and credit, and if sufficiency of pre-arrangement could give success the attempt deserved to be successful.

Though, owing to his move from the Dogger, Sandwich missed Sir Gilbert Talbot's messenger, yet he had a definite idea of the delicate arrangement with Denmark<sup>3</sup>—though apparently he expected active assistance from the Danes. So when, on the 24th, he received news of the presence at Bergen of the fleet of

<sup>1</sup> De Ruyter's Relation in *Life of Tromp*.

<sup>2</sup> "We thank God for having made us take care to avoid them, since we were in no condition to have resisted them." *Ibid*.

<sup>3</sup> "I was induced to expect the King of Denmark's helpe from the advice of the King my Master, that S<sup>r</sup> Gilbert Talbot had written that the King of Denmarke was ready to declare his Treaties broken with Holland, but would be glad to take an advantageous time to say it, which would bee when any considerable substance of the Hollanders was lodged in theire Ports (that then if the English Fleet would attempt them by sea hee would assist and go halfe shares in the prize)." *Rawl. MSS. A. 468*.

28 sail of Straits, French, Portuguese and Dutch ships, it was immediately decided to detach a squadron of 19<sup>1</sup> ships none above fourth rate<sup>2</sup>; Sir Thos. Tyddeman was given command. Calms and north winds, however, hindered their advance and it was July 29th before the combined fleet reached latitude 58° 46'.

On the next day a further council of war was held which lasted six hours unbroken: the position, so far as Sandwich knew it, was a very complicated one—the only complication of which he did not think (or know) being the one which finally ruined the enterprise. There were four main difficulties: “the uncertainty wee had whether De Ruyter himselve were within or noe, which would need a greater force than to attempt only the Harbour at Bergen”; the question whether they could wait for pilots, for they “had not above 3 weekes beene in the Fleetes and scarce any water, which would necessitate speedily to look for supplies<sup>3</sup>”: also he was “expecting the whole Dutch Fleete hourelly to give battle with the rest without” (Bergen)<sup>4</sup>, and there was the possibility that the special squadron might not have completed its task before the rest of the fleet would have to go “for want of subsistance<sup>5</sup>” and might so be shut in by the Dutch Fleet from Holland. There appears to have been a stiff debate on these difficulties, “my Lord proposing what was best to be acted and pressing to heare every man discourse

<sup>1</sup> Eight merchant men-of-war; five fourth rates; four fifth rates; two fireships. Allin's *Journal*, *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> Not more, owing to lack of room in Bergen roads.

<sup>3</sup> Fleet put on 6s. 4d. short allowances on July 26th.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 468.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



the point of our condition what was best to be done<sup>1,2</sup>." While the council was still in progress matters were decided by the arrival of news of nearly 40 sail in or about Bergen, and it was decided to increase the squadron to 20 ships, including one third rate. On that evening, Sunday the 30th, the special squadron for Bergen parted from the main fleet, Tyddeman being provided with every scrap of information as regards the nature of the place which Sandwich had been able to procure<sup>3</sup>.

On Monday, the 31st, Tyddeman and his squadron anchored outside Bergen and sent in a messenger. The governor received him very favourably, and they "sailed merrily on with 14 saile and 2 fireships and 4 ketches<sup>4</sup>" and anchored close under the castle. The governor<sup>5</sup> complained that the English had broken the treaty by entering the harbour with more than five ships and "was very tender not onely of his owne, but his master's honour<sup>6</sup>." As the English representatives<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> Penn wanted to go back and lie before Texel to meet the Dutch Fleet—"God had sent us a wind to make use of." *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> "There was scarce a pilot in the fleete that his Lordship could hear had ever been at Bergen but that he sent for him and discoursed the matter over with him, and for a whole weeks time the map of this place, and the discoursing and questioning upon it was his whole entertainment." Sir Tho. Clifford's account, *Rawl. MSS.* A. 256.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Van Steignon. It is interesting at this stage to note the following opinion of this man and his actions—Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 427. "The governor, unwilling to play the scoundrel upon his own responsibility, behaved himself like an honest man and fired upon the intruders." This was apparently also the Dutch estimate of him.

<sup>6</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 256.

<sup>7</sup> The negotiations were conducted on the English side by Mr Mountagu (son of the Earl of Sandwich : he fell in the ensuing action) and Sir Tho. Clifford.

were coming away to the fleet a gun was fired across the bows of the *Sapphire*, wounding one man ; the English, however, took no notice and continued to berth themselves. Fear of reprisals perhaps led the governor to send to ask for further conference, and “ now he sung another song...he thought it improper to oppose us<sup>1</sup>.” Then ensued a somewhat unedifying contest of haggling over the conditions under which the Dutch ships were to be plundered. The English were in all haste to get to work so as to be clear before the threatened arrival of De Ruyter ; the governor and General Alefeldt<sup>2</sup> on the other hand wished for delay, for they were expecting a Danish fleet of 22 sail by means of which they hoped to monopolise the booty<sup>3</sup> : the English attacking force was also to be limited to six ships. Tyddeman, however, flatly refused to delay, and at daybreak on Wednesday—negotiations had continued throughout Tuesday night—the governor “ sang yet another song ” : “ he confessed ingeniously that the greatest matter that troubled him was the parting with halfe the booty,” he said he had orders to secure the whole if possible<sup>4</sup> and suggested the prizes should be sealed up and left at Bergen until advice came from Denmark : the English, however, insisted on division, and so the conferences<sup>5</sup> ended. Meanwhile the Dutch had been

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 256.*

<sup>2</sup> Commander-in-chief of forces at Bergen.

<sup>3</sup> This fact Alefeldt let slip to Mountagu.

<sup>4</sup> Clifford remarks on this, “ Yr Lordship sees this is another straine then his being a man of honour as at his first conference he so much boasted of.” *Rawl. MSS. A. 256.*

<sup>5</sup> Among the varying ‘ songs ’ sung and tales told by the Danish Governor and Alefeldt it is somewhat difficult to decide which—if any—had any truth in them, though the last—that they wished for

making the most of their opportunity : on the arrival of the English they had been “lying one on another, incapable of execution<sup>1</sup>,” but while the negotiations were proceeding they succeeded in placing four ships in a line athwart the harbour and constructing some temporary forts on land.

Sir Thomas Clifford’s account of what followed solves most of the contradictions which appear in other English and Danish accounts. “At 5 aclocke Wednesday morning wee fell upon the Dutch, with a strict charge and command to each captain not to fire at the towne or castle till they fired at us, and for a while the castle and forts forbore, for neare space of a quarter of an houre, and our men shot low to the Shippes only without annoying the towne, and I believe that the Castle might still have forborne if the Dutch that were called in there, and the rest of them that had placed themselves in the towne and about the rocks had not begunne it, and then it was impossible to hinder our men from firing at them again. About an hour after the fight begunne one or two of our Captains say that the white flag<sup>2</sup> was hung out upon the castle, but the Revenge being to the leeward and perpetually in the smoake we could not discerne it, and the captains doe affirme likewise that all the while the white flagge was hung out, which was for the space of a quarter of an the whole prize themselves—seems most compatible with their mode of conducting negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 21st, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> Danish King gave account to Talbot “that after agreement made to leave 6 frigats to keep in y<sup>e</sup> Hollanders till y<sup>e</sup> order came, the Capt. Shott 200 shott from his whole squadron at y<sup>e</sup> Castle before y<sup>e</sup> governor would fire a gunn, nay he hung out his white flag but all would not doe ; and then he fired . . .” *Rawl. MSS. A.* 252.



houre, the guns from the castle were still fired at us, which we suppose to be done by the Dutch that were called in to strengthen the castle, but being constantly shot at from thence our men would not be hindered from answering them and therefore did not cease firing at them or take any heed to give the Adm. Sir Tho. Tyddeman notice of the white flag out<sup>1</sup>." After about three hours and a half the English were forced to retire: it was a hopeless affair; the wind was South and blowing hard almost straight out of the harbour, thus preventing any use of fireships—for not only would they have had to be towed in, but also they would have been dangerous only to the English ships, which were "moored fast head and sterne quite th'wart of Harbour<sup>2</sup>"—also the Dutch, as we have seen, had moved their ships' guns so that they could all be effective<sup>3</sup> and in addition had landed some 100 pieces and erected slight forts. Thus in all probability the wind and the Dutch would have proved sufficient to defeat the English attempt<sup>4</sup> even had the governor given or been able to give the passive connivance<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 256.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid. 468.*

<sup>3</sup> Thus giving nearly double weight to their broadside.

<sup>4</sup> "Against the disadvantage of y<sup>e</sup> Opposition of Heaven Dane and Dutch I doe not see what could have been effected." Sandwich's narrative, *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

<sup>5</sup> It is possible that the presence of the Dutch in the town and forts was not the only reason for the Danish action: about the 20th of July the French ambassador had been in Bergen and it was reported that "y<sup>e</sup> Towne is full of noise y<sup>t</sup> y<sup>e</sup> French King will assist y<sup>e</sup> Dutch," and on his return to Copenhagen Talbot says of him, "M. Terlon is now quite gone from his stile of neutrality and presseth this king to declare w<sup>th</sup> France and Holland to force England to conditions of peace." *Rawl. MSS. A. 282.*



expected ; on the other hand, had Tyddeman agreed to wait till the Friday as suggested—which would have been very dangerous in the light of the information he had received—he would have obtained that active support from the governor which would have given success ; for on that day the belated orders and letter reached him from Copenhagen bidding him give active support to Tyddeman—Talbot had at length succeeded in screwing the Danish King's courage to the sticking point, just too late. Apart from the underhand negotiations—the responsibility for which rests on Talbot—which preceded this expedition, there was nothing in its failure to discredit Tyddeman or any of the English ships concerned. Possibly the only just criticism was that made by one of the Captains concerned (Coleman of the *Hound*), “Teddeman is a brave man but spent too long in treating with the Dane, who proved very treacherous<sup>1</sup>.”

The English squadron had suffered heavily in the fight, though it lost no ships except possibly one of the ketches, and brought off “one though deare bought prize<sup>2</sup>.” Most of the ships were “shattered more in their masts, rigging and Hulls then scarce ever shippes were seene<sup>3</sup>” : the casualties numbered 357, 118 killed including the Earl of Sandwich's son and no less than 6 captains<sup>4</sup>, and 239 wounded<sup>5</sup>. The Dutch claimed

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 21st, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 468.

<sup>4</sup> Captains Seale of the *Breda*, Hayward of the *Prudent Mary*, Utber of the *Guernsey*, Cadman of the *Hambro. Mercht.*, Lawson of the *Coast Frig.*, Pierce of a fireship. *Rawl. MSS.* A. 256.

<sup>5</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 26th, 1665.

to have lost only about 100 killed and wounded ; their masts, sails and rigging were “extreamely endamaged, so that they will take us several days time to repair them<sup>1</sup>.”

After he was forced to retire Tyddeman anchored outside the harbour to make what repairs were possible, and in the meantime both he and Clifford wished to have further negotiations with the governor to see if some working agreement could not be arrived at. On Friday, August 4th, the governor sent expressions of regret and goodwill to Tyddeman, and finally on Tuesday, the 8th, at 11 p.m.—in spite of opposition in the fleet<sup>2</sup>—Clifford went to meet Van Steignon “in a sayler’s habit, under colour of getting bread and fresh meat,” which, he says, “went very much against the haire with me<sup>3</sup>.” At the conference the governor informed Clifford that “he was descended of a great race, his ancestors for 700 years gentlemen of the empire, and he would not doe any act that should sully the memory of them, that he was allyed to the Duke of Holstein, prince Palatine, etc., etc.<sup>3</sup>” It is difficult to see what other object he had than that of giving Clifford this information, for he refused any assistance ; and in the meantime the Dutch had moored seven ships in line, triple manned them, and brought 30 guns in each ship to bear on a boom they had built across the harbour—this boom, so the governor stipulated, must not be crossed or broken by the English. Clifford thought the idea was that the

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Tromp.*

<sup>2</sup> “Not one of the captains will heare one word of treating with y<sup>e</sup> governor.” *Rawl. MSS. A. 256.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

English were to cripple the Dutch, thus leaving them a helpless prey for the Danes under the guns of the castle : however, whatever the scheme was, it failed<sup>1</sup>, for on the 10th Tyddeman, seeing no reasonable chance of ultimate success and being on short rations, sent a polite note saying that as the wind favoured a return to England he had decided to make use of it : he met Sandwich's fleet off Flamborough Head on the 18th and on the 21st anchored in Sole Bay.

Sandwich and the main fleet had in the meantime been seriously hampered by insufficiency of stores. After they had parted with Tyddeman a gale and very rough weather from the south had driven them away northwards until August 4th, by which time the dearth of provisions made it absolutely imperative for them to make direct for the nearest place on the British coast where at least water should be obtainable—a move which, according to their information, left Tyddeman exposed to the danger of being overwhelmed by a fresh fleet under De Ruyter. It was decided to run for Shetland, and on the 7th the fleet anchored in Bressay Sound ; whence, having watered<sup>2,3</sup>, it sailed on the

<sup>1</sup> Van Steignon, however, did his best to make up for his disappointment : he demanded 100,000 thalers from the Dutch ships as due payment for the protection he had afforded and was affording them, 3000 he took forthwith and was all but taking more when the inopportune arrival of De Ruyter forced him to be satisfied with effusive thanks from the States deputies. He did, however, retain about 40 guns that had been landed—" sie müssten diese zur eigenen Sicherheit behalten, da ihnen im Gefecht sehr viele eigene gesprungen oder zerschossen waren " (Brandt, 318). Cf. note 5, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Sandwich complains that it was " very badd," being " redd."

<sup>3</sup> " In meane time I gave myselfe to y<sup>e</sup> takeing good observation of y<sup>e</sup> Harbour to give y<sup>e</sup> King an account thereof and to

13th to reach Sole Bay on the 21st as we have seen.

On Sandwich's arrival at Southwold Bay, every effort was made to prepare the fleet for speedily setting out again, with the hopes of meeting the main Dutch fleet. It was a difficult task: Sandwich needed some 2500 men<sup>1</sup>—he had had to put off over 1000 sick—besides repairs and stores of all sorts, and the recruits sent to him were not only scanty in number, but so unserviceable in many cases that they had to be rejected “rather than pester and increase the sickness of the fleet<sup>2</sup>.” Some of the least serviceable ships were sent into harbour and their crews appropriated to other ships. But once again the inadequacy of the victualing arrangements hampered the fleet both before and after its setting out, and was largely responsible for the failure to come to any decisive action.

In spite of hindrances, however, the fleet sailed on the 28th, some 110 sail strong. They met with very rough weather and it was not until the 3rd of September that they reached their intended station off the Texel. The same morning they sighted seven or eight sail which they chased, and by sunset had captured them all, including two East Indiamen and four men-of-war<sup>3</sup>.

advise in what places it would be usefull to fortifie there.” *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 25th, 1665.

<sup>3</sup> Two East Indiamen—the *Golden Phoenix* and *Fort of Huningen*; four men-of-war (three of 50 guns, one of 40), the *West-Friesland*, *Groningen*, *De Zevenwolden* and *Hope*, one Straits man, one Malaga man, and other small vessels. The English lost the *Hector*, a fifth-rate frigate. *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 5th, 1665; *Rawl. MSS. A. 195, 185–6*; *Life of Tromp.*



From them Sandwich heard that "the late storme had separated theire whole fleete off the Naze of Norweigh and that they were scattered in the sea round about," and that "the greatest Boddy of their Fleet then together" was some "80 sayle<sup>1</sup>." In hopes of meeting this fleet it was decided to tack to the westward, and on the following morning further reports of them were received. Then ensued three days' calm, and on the 7th it was decided at a council of war not to stay out more than four (? 14) days' time<sup>2</sup>, owing to increase of sickness and lack of victuals. On the 9th they fell in with a further body of over 15 sail of Dutchmen, most of whom were captured—four men-of-war, one of 20 and three of 40 guns and upwards, two West Indiamen and seven or eight fly-boats with provisions for the fleet<sup>3</sup>. Midday the same day a fleet of about 30 sail, half merchant, half men-of-war, was sighted on the weather bow standing for the mouth of the Texel. Sandwich gave chase and tried to get the weather of them, but at 4.30 p.m. they were still two leagues off dead to the windward. The weather worsened, "falling so thick that wee could not see them and blowing<sup>4</sup>": Harman, Berkeley and Jordan nevertheless tacked and stood with the Dutch, but Sandwich, thinking it unfit to endanger so large a fleet as his in a night fight off a dangerous lee shore, called off those that were in chase, stood away to the westward and finally anchored in

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: also *Life of Tromp*, p. 317. According to the latter the Dutch ships were led within reach of Sandwich by the treachery of a pilot.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

Sole Bay on the 11th<sup>1</sup>. Thus was another great opportunity lost to the English—the last opportunity that offered that year before bad weather, ill-manning, and ill-victualling forced the fleet into harbour for the winter. Sandwich was very sharply criticised by the inevitable landsman critic on his return for not having made an attempt at this squadron, but his own justification of his caution seems sound<sup>2</sup>, and even Harman—who did not return to the fleet from the chase—does not seem to have expected the main fleet to have followed him.

Had the fleet, however, been able to stay out longer, they might have met the main body of the Dutch fleet which did not come to anchor<sup>3</sup> till the 24th, being then not more than 80 sail and very weather-beaten : it is not surprising that the Dutch thought that “the English intended nothing less than a Fight, when they saw so fair an occasion to make a Rich Booty without it<sup>4</sup>.” A less cautious and more enterprising leader

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 468 and S. P. Dom. Chas. II, cxxxii. ff. 83 and 85.* In these two encounters the English lost three captains—Lambert and Langhorne and the Captain of the *Hector*.

<sup>2</sup> “To engage ships promiscuously in the night when neither friend nor foe can be distinguished, may occasion God knows how great damage to a Fleete of 150 sayle and upwards as we all were Before daylight they would have been in port or have led us ashore to y<sup>e</sup> ruine of the whole Fleete if wee had persued....It may be remembered wee came ill manned out of Sould Bay, since that wee had 3000 prisoners to guard and their ships taken manned out of us. And if wee had come to engage wee must have taken men out of the Prizes and destroyed them.” (The *Royal James* did so to a 40 gun prize without orders, expecting an engagement.) *Rawl. MSS. A. 468.*

<sup>3</sup> At Goree.

<sup>4</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 319.

than Sandwich might have refused to be overcome by unavoidable difficulties<sup>1</sup>, sent home his prizes as weakly manned as possible, and kept at sea with the rest of his fleet with the object of engaging the shattered Dutch fleet at all costs : a decisive blow at that time might easily have still further weakened the Dutch prestige and morale, have proved a strong argument in the winter negotiations, have checked the French alliance with Holland, and possibly have ended the war.

The Dutch were more persistent in their endeavours to come to some decisive action and on October 11th, despite continued bad weather, De Ruyter sailed from the Texel with a fleet of 90 sail of men-of-war. He cruised at the mouth of the Thames for two or three weeks, holding a more or less effectual blockade; but with that insult to the British 'Dominion of the Seas' he satisfied himself. "The Dutch have sometimes alarmed us," writes one Captain Titus, from Margate, "but never made us a visit. The Body of their Fleet hath all this time rode betwixt the Long-Sands Reach and North Sand Head; and now and then they send some shippes on the back of the Goodwins southwards and sometimes into this Rode. But from hence they have been Terrified by fower old Dismall Honey-combd Gunns, w<sup>ch</sup> every time they were shott of more endangered the gunners than them. They have now left the Coast<sup>2</sup>."

<sup>1</sup> Coventry to Arlington : "hopes the fleet is at sea, but unless the victualler sends supplies they cannot remain long, so that if De Witt stay any time in Norway, they will be obliged to come back and lose the opportunity." *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 2nd, 1665. Sandwich, however, gives bad weather and prizes as his chief reason for return.

<sup>2</sup> *Carte MSS.* 223, f. 293.

Meanwhile sickness was ravaging the Dutch. It was estimated that there were 970 sick in the fleet<sup>1</sup>, and the number ever increasing. In light of this, the approaching winter, and the fact that the English showed no sign of coming out, it was decided to return to Holland, and on November 1st the fleet set sail eastward. With their departure home ended the naval movements of the year.

In the meantime England was under the spell of that 'visitation' that, for a time, all but paralysed her life. The 'Great Plague' that, during the previous year, had been sapping the very root of Holland's mercantile and naval power, now passed into England. Despite official precautions it crept into England along the lines of the North Sea trade. It first appeared in the East Coast towns and London, and gradually oozed, like a sluggish, deadly tide, westward over England, inevitable, unconquerable.

The Navy, however, partly by sheer good fortune, and partly by precautions induced as much by panic as by wisdom, suffered far less than might have been expected, than did the Dutch fleet. This was in part due to the fact that during the worst period of the visitation the greater number of the ships were laid up in harbour unmanned, while the remainder were rigorously kept away from all contact with sources of possible infection. Rather than risk Plague, ships would go without full stores or complement. We hear, for instance, that "several captains refuse to receive clothes, though in great want, for fear of infection<sup>2</sup>";

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 321.

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 12th, 1665.



also of "sicke men that are recovered" lying before the doors of the Navy Office day and night, because, "having been on shore, the captains won't receive them on board<sup>1</sup>." Thus for the most part the ships remained singularly free from the sickness, in striking contrast to the Dutch—the latter estimated that in De Ruyter's fleet off the Thames, besides 140 dead and 355 returned sick to Holland, there were at least 970 men sick<sup>2</sup>. There were, of course, exceptions to the English good fortune: a noteworthy case is that of the *Convertine*, a small fourth-rate ship carrying 140 men, which, in the course of a voyage to Gothenburg, lost 47 men dead, and at her destination had to put 38 ashore besides 10 other sick who stayed on board<sup>3</sup>. The Dutch idea that the English were "debarred by a raging and pestilent distemper from accepting" the offer of battle<sup>4</sup> was but partially true; the plague was but one cause of the lack of men, and, besides men, stores, victuals, and money itself, were all equally lacking<sup>5</sup>.

The dockyards, however, did not escape from the pestilence as easily as did the ships, and though in September Coventry could be grateful that "the yards have escaped in this very great contagion<sup>6</sup>," yet as time went on they began to lose their immunity. At Deptford, Woolwich and Harwich the death-roll was heavy. Portsmouth remained long untouched—"a

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, September 30th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 321.

<sup>3</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* December 25th, 1665.

<sup>4</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 324.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. List of Shortages, *Carte MSS.* 74, f. 234

<sup>6</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* September 11th, 1665

strange mercy<sup>1</sup>”—but in the spring of '66 the plague reached there too, though in a less virulent form. Thus, further to hinder the supply of victuals and stores, there was added to the existing lack of money a lack of men. Beer, almost the most troublesome item of naval victualling, threatened to be shorter in supply than ever; it was reported “on account of the sickness most of the brewers who supply the Navy have discontinued brewing, and others do not brew half the quantity<sup>2</sup>.” From Gosport comes a typical wail that “workmen are dispersed, some dead, others shut up, and others gone away. . . . Until it please God to remove the visitation ‘the work’ cannot possibly go forward<sup>3</sup>.” The fact that at Portsmouth itself the plague never got absolutely out of hand was very probably in no little measure due to the scientific precautions devised by the energetic Commissioner Middleton when he enforced the isolation of some of the carpenters and other dock workers in a kind of quarantine ship, the *Little Francis*: “the men are to stay on board it, to wash themselves and their clothes, and burn rosin and brimstone for 14 days before they are admitted to the yard<sup>4</sup>.”

In view of this added difficulty in the way of victual-  
Victuals.
ling it is surprising to find insufficient
victuals and stores the subject of far
fewer complaints during 1666 than during the previous

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* October 12th, 1665. One physician, no lover of Portsmouth it would appear, explains it thus: “the air of Portsmouth is naturally so pernicious to man that the man whose body is able to be supported in this air is plague free.” (*Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 9th, 1666.)

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* December 25th, 1665.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* April 24th, 1666.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* April 22nd, 1666.

years. The improvement may be traced very largely to Samuel Pepys.

As we have already seen, dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements for victualling was widespread ; it was recognised that they were hopelessly inadequate : and, before the end of the summer of 1665, the Duke of York had proposed that “before the time for the declaration of victuals comes, some men, diligent and able in purse, should be joined with the victualler, it being too much for any one man’s purse<sup>1</sup>.” A few days later the King expressed the same desire, also suggesting that “undertakers be employed in the several ports<sup>2</sup>.” To find men willing to share the thankless work with Gauden was a difficult, if not hopeless, task. The whole question was referred to Pepys for enquiry, and his enquiries impressed him with the truth of “the want of victuals being the whole overthrow of this yeare both at sea, and now at the Nore here and Portsmouth where the fleete lies<sup>3</sup>.” Early in October he tendered his report. Partnership with Gauden had been refused by those most fitted for it, and the alternative remaining was the appointment of local surveyors of victuals at each port to check, examine and report. Pepys’ suggestion met with complete approval, “no more said upon it than a most thorough consent to every word was said, and directed, that it be pursued and practised<sup>3</sup>.” His personal offer was accepted, and on October 27th he was appointed Surveyor-General at a salary of £300 a year. He set about—not over-hastily

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 30th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* September 7th.

<sup>3</sup> *Pepys’ Diary*, October 24th.

—drawing up instructions for his subordinates, thereby displaying to himself his own ignorance of the subject : “ I am ashamed I should go about concerning myself in a business which I understand so very very little of<sup>1</sup>.” He was, however, not the man to be hindered by previous ignorance, and these instructions appear to have been fairly successful. The State Papers, which in 1665 teem with complaints about insufficient victuals, are, during 1666, with few exceptions silent. In July the Duke of York, who had, however, not been at sea with the fleet, told Pepys that his victualling account “ was a good account, and that the business of the victualling was much in a better condition than it was last yeare<sup>2</sup>.” The most striking exception to this general satisfaction was the letters from the Generals at sea a month later, in which they, “ in very plain and sharp and menacing terms,” complained of short supplies, and “ did lay their not going or too soon returning from the Dutch coast, this next bout, to the want of victuals<sup>3</sup>.” Pepys was certain there was “ no reason for it,” and it is evident that the fault lay less with excessive detail and officialdom on the part of the Navy Office—the admirals complained “ that instead of supplies only accounts are sent<sup>4</sup>”—than with lack of detail and excess of bluster on the part of the admirals : “ there hath never,” writes Sir Wm. Coventry in reply to the complaints, “ been any demand made or any account stated sent us, which shewed what was wanting, but

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, December 1st, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* July 26th, 1666.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* August 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 1666.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* A. 174, f. 200.



y<sup>e</sup> demands alwayes were to send victual for the Fleet to compleat till such a time.... We had no ground upon which to compute a further supply<sup>1</sup>." There is extant an interesting table of abstracts of the victualling orders and their treatment by the Navy Office which shows very clearly the businesslike methods that characterised the Navy Office in this connection<sup>2</sup>.

" 12th October, 1665. Duke orders 35,000 men's victuals for y<sup>e</sup> yeare.

14th October, 1665. War-rant by Navy Office to Victualler to goe in hand with providing it.

9th October. D. directs at what port it is to be provided at.

11th October. Let. from Navy Office to Victualler giving same directions.

14th May, 1666. Admiralls desire hasteing of victuals to them and keeping up y<sup>e</sup> fleete with 4 months victuals.

17th May, 1666. Victualler had pressing let. from Nav. Office to that purpose.

17th May. Nav. Office tells them so and that the want of men in the victualling ships is the only hindrance."

The fact that Pepys was so far successful in dealing with the question of the victualling offers Money. pretty convincing proof of his administrative capabilities, for the prime difficulty of lack of money was, if anything, more persistent and overwhelming in '66 than previously. The national morale had been further shaken by the plague, and official

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 174, f. 211*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid A. 174, f. 233.*

business suffered both by omission and commission : " nobody minding the publique, but everybody himself and his lusts<sup>1</sup>." " Want of money in the Navy puts everything out of order. Men grow mutinous ; and nobody here to mind the business of the Navy but myself," writes Pepys<sup>2</sup>. The debts of the Navy were more cumbersome than ever, and early in 1666, " to answer a certain expense and debt of £2,300,000<sup>3</sup>," there was barely £1,500,000, including the Government grant of 1½ million ; a deficit of over £800,000. In October of the same year the deficit was estimated at £930,000<sup>4</sup>—somewhat of a contrast to the £852,000 estimate of 1664 which " God knows " was " only a scare to the Parliament, to make them give the more money<sup>5</sup>."

It was in the face of difficulties such as these that the preparations for the dispatch of the fleet progressed during the spring of 1666. The lack of trust in government pay once again hindered the supply both of men and ships. Merchants had almost to be forced before they would hire out their ships for the King's service, and the very close similarity between the proposed and the ' agreed ' price of hire shows how purely formal was the ' bargaining<sup>6</sup>.' While to meet the old

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, October 15th, 1665.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* October 31st.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* February 19th, 1666 : for details cf. *Pepysian MSS.* 2589, pp. 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> *Pepysian MSS.* 2589, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Diary*, November 25th, 1664.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. List of Hired Merchantmen and prices : *Rawl. MSS.* A. 195, ff. 82-4. In the autumn of '65 and the spring of '66, 23 merchantmen of between 3 and 500 tons were hired at an average rate of 9s. 6d. per ton. Also of smaller vessels between 50 and 100 tons there were hired, in October three, in November five, in January three, and in February seven.

grievance of overdue pay and to facilitate manning, the King was forced to ask the East India Company for a loan of "£50,000 with all speed on good security to pay off the arrears of seamen, without which it will be impossible for the fleet to put to sea<sup>1</sup>."

Although the evil effects to health, morale, and discipline, of a delay in harbour were only too well known—"the sickness increases and the ships are pestered with women; there are as many petticoats as breeches on board some of them and that for weeks together<sup>2</sup>"—it was not until May 29th that Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle arrived in the Downs in command of a fleet of 80 sail exclusive of small craft. Rupert and Albemarle were to be in joint command, despite Rupert's dislike to sharing the command and his unpopularity as a leader. Lord Sandwich was now on an embassy to Spain until a scandal concerning the embezzlement of certain rich Dutch prizes had passed over. The question of the advisability of dividing the command of the fleet between two joint commanders was to be brought forward very forcibly by the coming events.

In the meantime, at the beginning of the year, Louis XIV had declared war on England, and for months had been preparing a fleet, at Toulon and Rochelle, which was to unite with De Ruyter and crush England's naval power. On the same day that Albemarle and Rupert had joined the fleet, a rumour, apparently more or less authenticated, reached London to the effect that the united French fleet under

Division of  
the Fleet.

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* April 19th, 1666.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

Beaufort was already at the mouth of the Channel. At the time, it was believed that the Dutch fleet was still in harbour, and while the main fleet under Albemarle was to stay and watch them, Rupert, with 20 ships, was detached to go down the Channel to meet the French<sup>1</sup>. "A position like that of the English fleet," says Mahan<sup>2</sup>, "threatened with an attack from two quarters, presents one of the subtlest temptations to a commander": that of dividing his forces; which, "unless in the possession of overwhelming force, is an error, exposing both divisions to be beaten separately." That statement, however, makes the very common omission of disregarding the fact that, when the order was given, the Dutch were believed to be in harbour and likely enough to remain there while the English were united and prepared: consequently if Albemarle had gone with his whole fleet to meet the French he would have left the Thames open to De Ruyter, and, conversely, with all the fleet concentrated against the Dutch, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight would have been exposed to Beaufort. The division was not a fault "because it was a necessity<sup>3</sup>." That this fact was not unrealised is shown by the promptitude with which, on receipt of "certain intelligence that the Dutch Fleet is come forth," the King gave order "that his fleet should forthwith be united" and that Rupert and Albemarle should meet each other: "pray hasten all

<sup>1</sup> For official narratives concerning the division of the fleet, by Rupert and by Albemarle, with Coventry's notes, cf. *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 32,094, ff. 196-204.

<sup>2</sup> Captain A. T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power upon History*, p. 118.

<sup>3</sup> Corbett, *Principles of Maritime Strategy*, p. 137.



you can " the orders finish<sup>1</sup>. The true authorship of the order for division has been the subject of many conflicting statements. King Charles is on the whole the most popular scapegoat, but Albemarle and Clarendon have their accusers. Pepys, on the authority of Sir William Coventry, tells a story about it which at least equals the others in authoritativeness, and betters them in point of probability : it rings true of the petty jealousies which infested the post of Admiral of the fleet. After saying " that the proposition did first come from the fleete, . . . and that there was nothing in the whole business which was not done with the full consent and advice of the Duke of Albemarle," " he did adde (as the Catholiques call *le secret de la Masse*), that Sir Edward Spragge—who had even in Sir Christopher Myngs's time put in to be the great favourite of the Prince, but much more now had a mind to be the great man with him, and to that end had a mind to have the Prince at a distance from the Duke of Albemarle, that they might be doing something alone—did, as he believed, put on this business of dividing the fleete, and that thence it came<sup>2</sup>."

The 4 Days'  
Fight. June  
1st—4th, 1666.

However that may have been, the order to rejoin reached Rupert too late to enable him to do more than check the evils done by division. In the meantime De Ruyter with a fleet of about 90 sail had come to sea, and when, early on the morning of June 1st, the wind, which had been easterly, changed to south-west,

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters*, " May 30th, 1666, 12 at night."

<sup>2</sup> *Pepys' Diary*, June 24th, 1666.

he cast anchor about midway between the North Foreland and Dunkirk. Monk was off the North Foreland with the greater part of the English fleet numbering 60 sail. Early the same morning they had weighed with the flood and were standing for Harwich when news came of the Dutch. "About 7 a'clocke our scouts gave y<sup>e</sup> signall, w<sup>ch</sup> was leting y<sup>e</sup> top gallan sailes fly and fireing 2 or 3 guns to let us know they discovered the enemies fleet to the leeward<sup>1</sup>." Two hours later it became known for certain that they were the main Dutch fleet. A council of war was immediately called, at which, largely through the determination of the Duke, it was decided to attack in the hope that the advantage of the wind and surprise (the Dutch were still at anchor) would compensate for the handicap of numbers. After the event Sir John Harman, Rear-Admiral of the Blue, told Pepys that "at the Council of War before the fight, it was against his reason to begin the fight then, and the reasons of most sober men there<sup>2</sup>." The decision, or at least the manner of it, seems to have caused considerable ill-feeling: Penn tells of the commanders saying "that they durst not oppose it at the Council of War, for fear of being called cowards, though it was wholly against their judgement to fight

<sup>1</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 37. The following account is based mainly on a *Narrative from on board the Royall Charles*, *Carte MSS.* 72, ff. 37-8; Let. from a French eyewitness, *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 36; Allin's *Journal*, *Tanner MSS.* 296; *Narratives of Rupert and Albemarle*, *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 32,094, ff. 196-204; also *A true Narrative*, publ. by Th. Newcomb, 1666; *Description Exacte*, pp. 142-5, publ. Amsterdam, 1668; *Life of Tromp*, pp. 37-40; and, of modern authorities, Mahan, *op. cit.* pp. 119-23, and Clowes, *op. cit.* II. pp. 169-77.

<sup>2</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 11th, 1666.

that day with the disproportion of force<sup>1</sup>." The main objection to giving battle, apart from the disparity of numbers, was that being to the windward was a real handicap. "Le meme vent qui leur estoit favorable pour venir sur nous," says a Dutch account, "estoit si violent qu'ils ne pouvoient pas bien se servir de leur artillerie de Flancs, et facilitoit le moyen au nostres d'employer avec beaucoup d'effect leur batteries basses<sup>2</sup>." Coventry, however, makes note of one very sound justification of the Duke's action—that some of the heavier ships, being slow sailers, "could not avoid fighting<sup>3</sup>." Moreover, the disparity of force was more apparent than real, the English having the advantage in size and guns in proportion to numbers.

At 11 o'clock the Duke gave signal to draw into line of battle, and the fleet stood for the Dutch  
June 1st. in column. The Dutch in the meantime lay at anchor in a somewhat disordered array: their rear, under Tromp, lay to the S.E. of the centre under De Ruyter, and so considerably to the windward of him; the van under Evertsen to the N.N.W., and so still further to the leeward of Tromp than was De Ruyter. The wind was high and rising still higher from the S.S.W., and, the sea being lumpy, the Dutch expected the Duke to anchor also; his attack was a complete surprise: it happened, wrote a Dutch captain, "whilst we were busy in unmooring, and had our Anchors yet but half up; we were forced to cut our cables in all haste<sup>4</sup>." The surprise, however, proved of but little advantage to the English. Apparently no

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, July 4th, 1666.

<sup>2</sup> *Description Exacte*, p. 142.

<sup>3</sup> *Brit. Mus. Add. MSS.* 32,094, f. 196.

<sup>4</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 327.



attempt was made to send fireships among the temporarily helpless Dutch ships. The column in which the Duke had chosen to advance was at any time a most difficult formation to retain and especially so in such weather ; consequently, by the time he came in touch with the furthest windward of the Dutch—Tromp's squadron—the line was in some disorder : the *Swiftsure* and six or seven of the head of the van being too far to the windward to engage effectively, and the rear being somewhat straggling.


As soon as the remainder of the van and the centre came in touch with Tromp, Albemarle put up his helm and ran down with the Dutch rear to the S.E. hotly engaged. The Dutch centre and van, however, being thus left to the N.N.E. of the English, tacked to the S.W. and gained the weather-gauge. At the same time a number of the larger of the English ships had borne away to the leeward of the Duke, “ and not only kept us exposed to y<sup>e</sup> enemies shot but to their owne by fireing through and over us to y<sup>e</sup>emie<sup>1</sup>. ”

After nearly three hours' stiff fighting Albemarle tacked back to the N.W. Many of his ships must have already suffered fairly heavily : on his own ship, the *Royal Charles*, the “ sailes were torne to y<sup>e</sup> yards in peeces, and both flag and ensigne shot downe<sup>2</sup>. ” The English tacked simultaneously so that the rear became the van, and their course took them straight into the midst of the Dutch centre and van under De Ruyter and Evertsen, which had up to that time been but slightly engaged. Had the Duke had one fraction of

<sup>1</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*





the genius for tactics with which he has been credited, it would be incomprehensible that, having "attacked a vastly superior force in such a way that only part of it could come into action<sup>1</sup>," he should deliberately, after a severe encounter with that part, have turned to meet and engage with the yet fresh remainder. Nevertheless, by tacking simultaneously and to the N.W. as he did, he made certain that his fleet should bear the very fullest brunt of the Dutch attack. The results were somewhat disastrous. The movement threw the new van into confusion and separated Sir William Berkeley still more from the main body: it brought De Ruyter's fresh ships to the windward and left Tromp to the leeward. The English were between two fires, and both to the leeward and the windward some of their ships were isolated, among the latter, in addition to the *Swiftsure*, flying Berkeley's flag, was the *Henry* flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir John Harman. Both these admirals put up an heroic fight. The former, though boarded simultaneously from every side, his ship disabled and half his men killed, "yet continued fighting almost alone, killed several with his own hand, and would accept no quarter; till at length, being shot in the throat with a musket ball, he retired into the captain's cabin, where he was found dead, extended at his full length upon a table, almost covered with his own blood." Harman's fight was no less fierce, but more successful. He was set on by three fireships in succession; from the first he was freed by "the almost incredible exertions of his lieutenant, who, having in the midst of the flames loosed the grappling-irons,

<sup>1</sup> Mahan, *op. cit.* p. 121.

swung back on board his ship unhurt<sup>1</sup>”; the second set the sails on fire and caused a panic, only checked by the Admiral’s drawn sword; while the third was sunk by the ship’s guns. Evertsen chose that moment to offer quarter, but Harman replied with “No, it has not come to that yet” and a broadside that killed the Dutch Admiral<sup>1</sup>. Harman was in no further danger, and succeeded in bringing his ship to Harwich for repairs, whence he set sail again a day later to rejoin the fleet. “The undaunted Bravery of that English Rear-Admiral cannot but be Admired<sup>2</sup>” wrote the Dutch Admirals in their official report. The losses were by no means entirely on the English side; besides Admiral Evertsen, the Dutch had lost several captains and at least three ships sunk, while both Admiral Tromp and Rear-Admiral Van Nes were forced to leave their dismasted ships and hoist their flags on board fresh vessels.


In the meantime Albemarle with the main English fleet continued on the port tack to the W.N.W., and after some desultory fighting the two fleets were practically clear of one another by 10 p.m.

After a night of repairing, the English found the Dutch at daybreak on the port tack and to the windward. Thanks, however, to better seamanship on the part of his captains the Duke was able soon to obtain the weather-gauge, and the fleets passed on opposite tacks, W.N.W. and E.S.E. The English, numbering 44 sail, were in good order, but the Dutch were crowded and in many cases masked each other’s fire. Tromp in the rear, noticing this, and apparently thinking to

<sup>1</sup> Campbell, *Lives of Admirals*, II. 353–4.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 353.

remedy it, tacked so as to gain the weather of the English van. It was insubordination, however well



intentioned, and it was made far worse in effect by less well-intentioned insubordination in the Dutch van,



which, instead of engaging close, stood broad off to the N. De Ruyter with the centre was forced to do so also in order to keep his fleet together. In the meantime, however, "a most horrid noise of both great guns and muskets" reminded him of the danger in which Tromp, isolated from his friends and surrounded by the English, lay<sup>1</sup>. To succour Tromp, De Ruyter came down on the English on the starboard tack, and they, for fear of losing the weather-gauge, were compelled to leave Tromp and continue on their course. Tromp's squadron had suffered heavily; Vice-Admiral Van der Hulst had been killed, two ships sunk and three utterly disabled, Tromp himself once again having to move his flag.

At the time of the junction between Tromp and De Ruyter the Dutch were in complete disorder, "all the ships huddled together like a flock of sheep, so packed that the English might have surrounded all of them with their forty ships<sup>2</sup>." Yet Albemarle, having gone about, appears to have repassed them without making any serious attack on them, thereby showing a caution in great contrast to the daring of the previous day. "Methinks," says a Dutch captain, "he committed then a strange fault<sup>2</sup>." It is very probable that the Duke was thinking of the danger which a change of wind to the N. (the S.W. wind had already dropped almost to a calm) would bring to his shattered little fleet; it is evident also that the discipline in the English fleet was not all it might have been; consequently, late in the afternoon, retreat was decided on. "Many of our ships being gone, others not doing their duty, and the

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 355.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* p. 347.

Rest much shattered, it was resolved to make a faire retreat<sup>1</sup>."

The most damaged ships were put in the van, and "16 of the greatest ships" were chosen out "to be a bulwark of the rest and bring up the rear in a breast, and so he shoved on the other in a line before him<sup>2</sup>." The retreat was to the W.N.W., and the Dutch followed in a straggling line without much energy until calm and nightfall stopped the fight.

The calm lasted till noon on the next day, when a fresh breeze sprang up from the E. The Duke continued his retreat on the Thames, the Dutch again following without much display of vigour. About two hours later Prince Rupert and his squadron of 20 sail came in sight. "Wee then steered towards the Prince comforting ourselves w<sup>th</sup> y<sup>e</sup> thoughts of renewing the fight by returning on y<sup>e</sup> enemy<sup>3</sup>." About four o'clock, however, half-a-dozen of the Duke's fleet struck on the Galloper Shoal. All got off with the exception of the *Royal Prince*, and before the other ships could tack to relieve her she had been surrounded and yielded without a struggle. Probably it was not so much cowardice as 'nerves' after three days' fighting that was responsible for this incident. The *Royal Prince* was considered to be the finest ship in the Navy, and Coventry wrote regretfully: "a little resistance would have preserved her, and that she was so well able to stand it out. She was like a castle in the sea, and, I believe, the best ship

<sup>1</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 37; cf. "The Duke had Quite Ruined their Fleet before y<sup>e</sup> Prince came in if his shipps had don their parts, for he had but 20 of 57 shipps that stucke to him." *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* p. xxi.



<sup>3</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 37.

that ever was built in the world to endure battering; but she is gone and this is an ill subject to be long upon<sup>1</sup>." The Dutch, finding they could not get her off speedily, burnt her. To intercept Rupert, De Ruyter had detached a squadron of over 20, but Rupert, knowing that the Galloper was between them and him, ignored them. There were huge rejoicings on the Duke's fleet to celebrate the reunion. The English decided to renew the action decisively on the following day.

On the morning of the 4th the wind had veered back to S.S.W. again and was blowing hard. The Dutch were almost out of sight at daybreak, but by 8 o'clock the English came up with them and formed up in line, led by Sir Christopher Myngs in the van, "in very good order<sup>2</sup>." Both fleets were now on the starboard tack, the English to the leeward. For two hours the fight ran thus, the English gradually forcing their way into the Dutch line. No less than five 'passes' to and fro were made. Some of the English ships got through to the windward, some remained to the leeward, and gradually all order was lost. The main bodies under De Ruyter and Albemarle retained their positions respectively. In the meantime Myngs with a few ships had headed the Dutch van which was in full pursuit after him. Tromp and the rear had fallen away to leeward and, taking the initiative into his hands more successfully, and so more justifiably than on the previous day, he overhauled the pursuers and brought them back with him to the main action. The main squadrons had, however, been beating to windward,

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* 1666, p. xxi.

<sup>2</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296. *Allin's Journal.*





so Tromp found himself to leeward of the English centre. In other words, Albemarle found himself between the Dutch centre and the van and rear, between De Ruyter and Tromp. For a time the situation was critical; he was surrounded, both his ship and Prince Rupert's were shattered, and ammunition was running short, when De Ruyter made the move which finally broke up the English line. He gave the signal for his squadron to keep away before the wind. This manœuvre took the Dutch windward ships directly through the English centre in a kind of irregular line abreast. It was a shattering blow, but it left the English in the comparative safety of the weather-gauge, for the wind was blowing half a gale. The Dutch "bore away to leeward," writes Allin with an almost audible sigh of relief, "and, glad to part soe, we stood over for the English shoar<sup>1</sup>"; or as the Dutch account has it, "God, after he had so gloriously favoured the Arms of the Victours, was not pleased they should be utterly defeated by the Destruction of their whole Navy, which appeared as unavoidable: For the shattered Remainder of them miraculously escaped by the Favour of a thick Fog<sup>2</sup>."

The fight marks an important development in naval tactics. In it, for the first time, are we able to trace definite and effective tactical manœuvring of squadrons: in it the fight did not commence with manœuvring and end with a *mêlée*. Unavoidably did the lines become confused in the heat of battle, but they always proved capable of reforming. Especially striking is this in the case of

Tactics of  
4 Days' Fight.

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 163.

the Dutch, who were confessedly the inferiors of the English both in discipline and handiness ; the manœuvres of their centre and rear squadrons on the first day, Tromp's movements on the fourth day and De Ruyter's breaking through the English so as once more to unite his fleet : it is movements like these, during and after the *mêlée*, which mark the beginning of a new era in naval engagement—an era in which the tactical unit was no longer the ship, but the squadron and the line. The criticism of the Comte de Guiche after witnessing the fight will give some idea of the extent to which the English had developed the new system. “ Rien n'égale le bel Ordre et la Discipline des Anglois ; que jamais Ligne n'a été tirée plus droite, que celle que leurs Vaissaux forme, que, lors qu'on en approche, il faut les tous essuier...l'on peut dire, qu'ils vaut bien mieux entrer dans une Flotte d'Angleterre, que de passer auprès ; et bien mieux passer auprès d'une Flotte Hollandoise, que se meler au travers, si elle combat comme elle fit pour lors ; ce qui ne vient que de la lâcheté de quelques-uns, qui s'épaulent tant qu'ils peuvent de leurs camarades. A la vérité,” he concluded, “ l'Ordre Admirable de leur Armée doit toujours être imité ; et pour moi, je sais bien que si j'étois dans le Service de Mer et que je commandasse des Vaissaux du Roi, je songerois à battre les Anglois par leur propre Manière, et non pas avec celle des Hollandois et de nous autres, qui est du vouloir aborder<sup>1</sup>.”

The Dutch had won the battle, but it was a Pyrrhic victory ; they had lost seven or eight ships, many more utterly shattered ; some 2000 men

<sup>1</sup> *Memoires d'Estrades Comte de Guiche*, pp. 251–2, 266.

killed and wounded; and three flag officers killed, including Evertsen, one of their finest leaders. And that in spite of the fact that for most of the fight they had had the advantage in numbers of nearly two to one. Naturally, the English losses were heavier. Berkeley and Myngs killed, Ayscue a captive in Holland; 12 commanders killed; eight ships lost to the Dutch, including ships of 62, 58, 54 and 40 guns; at least 12 ships sunk or burnt, including the *Royal Prince*; and perhaps 5000 casualties and 3000 prisoners<sup>1</sup>.

The fact that the defeat was not a dishonourable one, however, did not prevent the out-  
Popular feeling. burst of a perfect fury of recrimination. The unpleasant fact remained that at the end of the battle the Dutch had been left in command of the sea. The gossip with which Pepys fills his *Diary* at this time is of the universal disgust. "Pierce the surgeon, who is lately come from the fleete, tells me that all the commanders, officers and even the common seamen do condemn every part of the late conduct of the Duke of Albemarle: both in his fighting at all, in his manner of fighting, running among them in his retreat, and running the ships on ground; so as nothing can be worse spoken of. Sir G. Carteret...tells me, as I hear from everyone else, that the management in the late fight was bad from top to bottom.... There is nothing but discontent among the officers; and all the old experienced men are slighted<sup>2</sup>." Nor was the recrimination

<sup>1</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 70; *Rawl. MSS.* A. 191, f. 108 and Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 277.

<sup>2</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 7th, 10th, 1666.

at all one-sided : the Duke professed equal disgust with his subordinates, and writes "that he never fought with worse officers in his life, not above twenty of them behaving themselves like men<sup>1</sup>." The justice of all these complaints is best proved by the narrative of the battle itself, and the above-quoted criticism by the Comte de Guiche offers a suggestive comment on the whole question.

The general discontent had one salutary effect at least : there was no exception to the general unanimity of the opinion that the fleet must get to sea again at the very first opportunity. As early as the 8th and 9th of June, when as yet only vague accounts of the battle were to hand, the Navy Commissioners were arranging and discussing concerning "the haste requisite to be made in getting the fleete out again, and the manner of doing it<sup>2</sup>." The business of manning and victualling was pressed forward with the utmost energy. For once after a battle the victualling had not been the subject of complaint, had not been made the universal scapegoat. There is no doubt that Pepys in his position as Surveyor must have contributed largely to the attainment of this satisfactory result, and, as his *Diary* shows, he now had a busy time in arranging for the renewal of supplies. The provision of men was, however, a more difficult matter, and with increased urgency came increased licence. Desertion was rife, every day men came "flocking from the Fleete<sup>3</sup>," and the provision of substitutes was a difficult problem. More than ever did the press-gang become no respecter

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 7th, 10th, 1666.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* June 9th.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* June 11th.



of persons: "Even our owne men that are at the Office, and the boats that carry us," writes Pepys, "so that it is now become impossible to have so much as a letter carried from place to place, or any message done for us: nay, out of the Victualling ships full loaden to go down to the fleete, and out of the vessels of the Officers of the Ordnance, they press men.... It is a pretty thing to observe that both there (Broad Street) and everywhere else, a man shall see many women nowadays of mean sort in the streets, but no men; men being so afeard of the press<sup>1</sup>."

An additional incentive to a speedy setting forth of the fleet was the fear of a French invasion. The Dutch had come to sea again by the 28th of June, and many rumours of co-operation between them and the French were current, of French soldiers waiting on the coast to be transported, of stores of shovels, pickaxes, wheelbarrows ready to work against English forts, of schemes of invasion so wonderful as to draw even from Pepys the epithet "ridiculous conceit."

By July 13th the English fleet was ready to sail, "but for the carrying of the two or three new ships, which will keepe them a day or two or three more<sup>2</sup>." Six days later they sailed from the Thames for the Gunfleet, leaving Penn behind to see to the manning of the few ships remaining. Albemarle and Rupert were once again in command, but some changes had been necessary in the subordinate commands. The van, the *White* squadron, was under Sir Thomas Allin, with Tyddeman as vice and Utber

The new  
fleet.

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 31st, July 6th, *et passim*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* July 13th.

as rear admirals ; the centre, *Red*, was under Albemarle and Rupert, who were both on the *Royal Charles* flagship, Jordan vice and Holmes rear admirals ; the rear, *Blue*, under Sir Jeremy Smith, with Spragge as vice and Kempthorne as rear admirals. The fleet seems to have numbered 90 ships of the line and about 17 fireships<sup>1</sup>. The Dutch numbered 98 warships and 20 fireships. It was divided into three squadrons ; the van under Jan Evertsen and Tjercke Hiddes de Vries, the centre under De Ruyter, the rear under Tromp and Van Meppel.

Even at the present time the way out of the Thames estuary, along the complicated channels past countless shoals and sand-banks, is a severe test not only of seamanship but also of local knowledge of sands and currents ; but in the 17th century the problem of getting a large fleet of sailing ships safely out to sea was one fraught with danger, and at no time more so than on this occasion. The point of the problem was that it was necessary that either the whole fleet or none of it should come out of the river. De Ruyter was known to be cruising off the Naze, and if one part of the fleet got clear of the sands alone, it would be in danger of piecemeal destruction by the Dutch, while at the same time a return into the Channel would be a very dangerous proceeding. The chart<sup>2</sup> will explain the situation. Rather than risk the dangers of the numerous little shoals lying at the head of Black Deep the English

<sup>1</sup> Contemporary accounts vary largely, as also modern deductions : cf. Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 279, " 81 ships," and Hannay, *op. cit.* I. 372, " 92 ships."

<sup>2</sup> At end of volume.

Admirals had decided to take the fleet out by the Swin channel. But to get safely through the channel to the open sea, both an ebb tide and a favourable wind were necessary : moreover, the great length of the column—perhaps as much as ten miles—added to the difficulty of the move. On the 19th the fleet reached as far as the Middle Ground, where, the wind being too much in the north for further progress, they anchored. For two days they “couldn’t get out for the sands<sup>1</sup>,” or rather, for the wind. At length on the 22nd the wind shifted a little to the west, and the fleet got under weigh. The same evening they anchored in the Gunfleet.

Early on the morning of the 25th the English fleet weighed and bore down on the Dutch in line abreast to the S.E. The wind was N.E. but very light and the fleets drew near but slowly. Probably owing largely to the lightness of the wind, which would make the heavier ships somewhat unhandy<sup>2</sup>, the English line was nothing like so well kept as it had been in the previous battle when it had drawn forth so much admiration. “Our people were very slow to gett into a lyne, and some never did,” wrote Allin, “but shot thorow severall of our ships contrary to a strict order<sup>3</sup>.” The Dutch line was still worse formed, and was more of a crescent than a

St James’  
Fight, July  
25th, 1666.

<sup>1</sup> *Carte MSS.* 72, f. 41.

<sup>2</sup> Hannay, *op. cit.* i. 373, tells an amusing story of a small yacht of Prince Rupert’s, which on the following day, the wind having dropped still further, was sent out to mock De Ruyter, stationed herself opposite the stern of the Dutch flagship and for two hours pelted away with two little ornamental pop-guns, the huge Dutch man-of-war being helpless for lack of wind.

<sup>3</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296, Allin’s *Journal*.

straight line. Consequently, when the English bore up on approaching the Dutch, some ships and some parts of the line came into action before others. The van was the first engaged. "We fell to fighting between 9 and 10," writes Allin, Admiral of the White. "Sir Tho. Tyddeman fought bravely upon his party although the St. George and Ann did him noe service and the Old James did us as little. The Richard and Martha went away from us, the Reare Admiral's divisions did us little helpe. We fell in close and in 4 houres time put them to beare from us<sup>1</sup>." This virtual desertion on the part of ships in action had been not one of the least complaints after the previous battle, and the Duke of York had ordered that there should in future be an enquiry into all cases of ships returning to port during an action, "that soe hereafter it may be looked on as a certaine thing that every man who returns from ye fleet in an engagement must give an account in publique of the reasons induceing him to it<sup>2</sup>." This order would seem to have had some effect, for, besides these cases mentioned by Allin, there appears to have been very little complaint of desertions after this fight.

In the meantime the two centres had engaged and there was some savage fighting. The Admirals on both sides had to move their flags, the *Royal Charles* being forced to fall out of the line to refit, and the *Zeven Provinciën*, De Ruyter's flagship, being completely dismasted in a close tussle with Sir Robert Holmes on the *Henry*—which itself fell permanently out of the line. Between 2 and 3 p.m. the Dutch began to give

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296, Allin's *Journal*.

<sup>2</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS.* 24, *Duke of York's Letters*, July 9th, 1666.



way, and the van and centre made towards the Dutch coast, followed by the English.

In the rear the fight had been more even and prolonged. Accounts vary considerably as to the course of the action there. Tromp appears to have fought with his usual persistence and individualism. In the first encounter he and Meppel gained somewhat the advantage over the Blue squadron—including the destruction of a 64-gun ship, the *Resolution*—and so far from giving way as their van and centre were doing, they forced Smith to give back. As a result, this part of the action became separated from the main battle: and gradually as De Ruyter gave way further to the leeward the struggle between Tromp and Smith became further and further separated until they were lost sight of by the rest of the combatants. As night came on the main fleets drifted slowly towards the Dutch coast, fighting desultorily, leaving Tromp and Smith hammering at each other well into the night up towards the English coast. The following day opened with an almost complete calm, and only in the afternoon did a wind arise which enabled the Dutch to continue their retreat covered by 20 ships under Admiral Bancker. The same evening they came to anchor off Flushing, protected from the English by shoals<sup>1</sup>. In the meantime Tromp was also in retreat from Smith. In the evening of the 26th the fleet off Flushing heard distant firing and stood out to intercept the Dutch squadron; but in the night Smith, through fear of the shallow water, lost touch with Tromp, and on the following day the latter slipped

<sup>1</sup> Cf chart at end of volume.

in between the shore and the main body of the English. The latter pursued until they found themselves in shallow water, when they were forced to desist. Thus was lost another opportunity of dealing a shattering blow at the Dutch navy. In the late battle, though the Dutch had lost four flag officers—Jan Evertsen, Tjercke Hiddes de Vries, Rudolf Coenders and Govert 'T Hoen—and perhaps 20 ships, the English had only taken four prizes, and lost one ship; here was an opportunity of gaining some more solid glory; the chance of cutting off, of capturing perhaps, the 30 battered ships under Tromp's command. The failure brought a torrent of abuse on Sir Jeremy Smith's head, he being accused of cowardice and incompetence at the very least. The official enquiry into the matter acquitted him, however, of all but a slight excess of caution: "he yielded too easily to the opinion of his pilot, without consulting those of the other ships, muzzled his ship, and thus obliged the squadron to do the same, and so the enemy, which might have been driven into the body of the King's fleet, then returning from the pursuit, was allowed to escape<sup>1</sup>."

The wildest rumours were current in England concerning the victory, and it was long before the accurate facts became public. The following paper belonging to Pepys is a fair example of the more sober of the 'authentic' accounts that were current after every naval battle. It is endorsed by Pepys, "a copy of what was read in y<sup>e</sup> pulpitt at Bow."

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* November 3rd, 1666.

“*July 29th, 1666.*

“The Dutch totally routed.

14 ships taken.

26 burnt and sunk.

2 flagg ships taken and out of them 1200 men and what else they would, then sunk them.

Taken in all 6000 men.

Our Shippes have blocked up the Zealanders in Flushing and ride before them.

The Dutch fleete have got into the Texell, we ride before the same.

The Lord Mayor ordereth thanks to be given this forenoone throughout the city<sup>1</sup>.”

The Dutch were, for the time being, demoralised. De Ruyter came in raging against the disgrace of the retreat; “severall of my captains and particularly Tromp shall answer for it<sup>2</sup>,” he is reported to have said. On his own ship he had lost 200 men, and “the rest tellement intimidé y<sup>t</sup> if hee had received another charge hee should not have had a man to fyre a gun, all being resolved to leap overboard and shift for themselves<sup>2</sup>.” The whole of Holland was in a panic; the appearance of the English fleet off Scheveling caused tremendous fright at the Hague, and the most amazing rumours concerning invasion became rife.

This was a state of mind that the English did their best to foster. The fleet made a triumphal progress up the entire coast of Holland, capturing ships, scaring the coast towns; on the 6th they were in sight of the Texel. On the 7th, having heard from a Dutch renegade

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 195, f. 202.*

<sup>2</sup> *Carte MSS. 72, ff. 56-7.*

of a large fleet of Indiamen lying between Vlieland and the mainland, a plan for destroying it was evolved at a council of war. Sir Robert Holmes was to take charge of a squadron of nine low-rate ships, besides a dozen fireships and small craft, and to be given 900 men picked proportionately, 100 from each division of the fleet: the party to land on Vlie Island and burn and destroy all that they could, both stores on the island and ships in the harbour. On the 8th the remainder of the fleet was drawn up in a line N.E. and S.W. from the N. of Vlie towards the Texel and at 8 a.m. the expedition stood away towards the shore. After some delay owing to contrary winds Holmes took his squadron into Ter Schelling roads on the 9th and there attacked over 160 merchant ships and two men-of-war lying at anchor. That afternoon, writes Allin, "we saw divers smoaks arise upon the land which made us judge that Sir Robt. Holmes was prosperous<sup>1</sup>." Strict orders had been given to the men to destroy and not to plunder: to such effect were the orders obeyed that at least 150 Dutch ships were burnt and utterly destroyed, only some 10 or 11 escaping up a creek. On the following day the English landed on the island, burnt and sacked the town—Brandaris—and numerous storehouses. Early on the 11th, after an attempt on Vlie Island had been rendered fruitless by bad weather, Holmes came back to the fleet, he and his men loaded with booty (despite orders concerning plunder), flaunting captured Dutch flags. The affair came to be known and referred to as "Holmes' Bonfire." The loss to the Dutch, both in money and prestige, was enormous; the former,

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296, Allin's *Journal*.



amounting to nearly a million pounds<sup>1</sup>, was irrecoverable, the latter they did their utmost to restore by getting their fleet promptly to sea again : nor were they unsuccessful.

With this further success to their credit, however, Albemarle and Rupert were forced back to England by shortage of victuals—though they made the most of their time on their way back by capturing some more Dutch ships laden with stores. As early as August 2nd the men had been put on short allowance, and by the time the fleet reached the English coast on the 17th the shortage of victuals was serious. As a matter of fact victualling ships had already been despatched but, owing to lack of communications and connection, had missed the returning fleet<sup>2</sup>.

Meanwhile the Dutch preparations were hastening towards completion, and on the 26th De Ruyter was at sea again and making for the Channel in order to effect the long-promised junction with De Beaufort and his fleet. Two days later the English fleet, under sole command of Prince Rupert, set out to find De Ruyter and to prevent the junction. On the 31st they sighted him off the Long Sand and made all sail for him ; in so doing, however, they became entangled in the Galloper shoals, a number of the ships touching, and had to tack southwards until they were clear, when they stood S.E. by S. At daybreak on the following morning the Dutch were seen off the French coast, and Rupert gave chase down past Calais. Then followed an incident which does not speak very highly for either the daring or

<sup>1</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom.* August 10th, 1666.

<sup>2</sup> For question of victuals see above, pp. 112-14.

generalship of the English commander in letting slip an opportunity of attacking the Dutch under favourable circumstances and at a critical time. De Ruyter had driven in close under the French shore, the wind being N.N.E., when part of his fleet tacked to the north towards the English. "Our general," writes Sir Tho. Allin, "tacked also to N. and after then Sir Rob. Holms and severall others and soe did we nott having eyther syne to draw into a lyne nor to fall on. The *Guinea* recd. severall shotts from these ships soe did the *Assurance* from De Ruiter. they tacked soe till 6 aclock and then tacked towards their owne fleett agayne and then Sir Rob. Holms tacked also and stood into shoare after them." The rest of the fleet followed suit, and then, and then only, did Rupert "put out flag of defiance and all stood in to shoare till it was darke and all bore up and tacked and stopt chase<sup>1</sup>." Why Rupert should have deliberately refused to engage at the first opportunity is scarcely comprehensible, for not only are there no dangerous shoals at any distance off the French coast at that point, but also had he engaged then it would have been some way off the coast; the remainder of the Dutch fleet was still nearer the coast, and, lee-shore as it was, there was but a very short stretch before Cape Gris-nez and the practical safety of the wider channel. Such an opportunity did not occur again; stormy weather drove both fleets into harbour, the English to St Helens, De Ruyter to Dunkirk.

For three weeks Rupert held the Straits, Allin being kept at sea with his squadron, and effectually prevented any junction between French and Dutch—

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS. 296, Allin's Journal.*

though it is very doubtful if the union was ever anything more practical than a diplomatic bogey dressed up for his own use by Louis XIV. Towards the end of September, however, the Prince was at sea again, and on the 25th sighted 40 Dutch ships off Dover; he drew into line and was "in a handsome posture to windward of them to gayne there van<sup>1</sup>," when the wind began to rise, and the sea with it. "The Prince tacked to W. and about 5 anchored in their sight, soe might they have done to attend fayre weather had they a mind to fight us but they stood off to the S.E. and S.S.E.<sup>1</sup>"

So ended the naval operations of 1666, and indeed of the Second Dutch War, for the final act in 1667 which turned a triumph into a tragedy and disgrace had but little to do with naval action so far as the English Navy was concerned—wherein lay the tragedy.

In the autumn of the previous year there had been some talk of withdrawing the main  
1667. fleet from service, and in the following spring sending out only light squadrons and licensed privateers in order to attack merely the trade of the Dutch: in 1666 the proposition again came up, but more forcibly. "It was said that the Dutch might best be beaten by sending small squadrons abroad to interrupt and ruine their Trade without which it would be impossible for them to continue the Warr or support themselves in Peace<sup>2</sup>." The financial difficulties under which Charles' government lay lent additional point to the argument. Charles had taken

<sup>1</sup> *Tanner MSS.* 296, *Allin's Journal*.

<sup>2</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* D. 924, *Continuation of the Dutch War*.

to appropriating for his own purposes—especially the payment of soldiers—the money voted for the upkeep of the Navy, and the double prospect of an enquiry into the past and of increased needs for the future was specially unpleasant to the son of Charles I. “Parliament,” says Pepys, “begins to be mighty severe in examining our accounts and the expence of the Navy this war,” and strict enquiries began which put not only Pepys but all the officials and many of the courtiers “into a mighty fear and trouble<sup>1</sup>.”

To lessen the difficulties attending this juncture Charles adopted a two-fold policy, of peace with Holland and, in the meantime, a reduction of naval expenses to a minimum. The chivalrous conduct of the Dutch in honouring and returning to England the body of Sir William Berkeley, who had fallen in the four days’ battle, offered an opening for peace negotiations between England and Holland. Charles, however, relying on a breach between Holland and France<sup>2</sup>, put his terms too high, and the negotiations dragged on. “To justify and maintain this line of conduct he should have kept up his fleet, the prestige of which had been so advanced by its victories<sup>3</sup>.”

<sup>1</sup> Pepys’ *Diary*, September 30th, October 2nd, 1666. On October 10th he makes a note of these complaints:

“They say the king hath towards this war  
expressly thus much..... £5,590,000

“The whole charge of the Navy, as we state  
it for two years and a month, hath been  
but..... £3,200,000

“So what is become of all this sum? £2,390,000.”

<sup>2</sup> Louis XIV had opened a campaign of aggression in the Spanish Netherlands.

<sup>3</sup> Mahan *op. cit.* p. 131.



At the end of September, when rough weather made naval action impossible, Rupert was recalled to harbour, and the process of discharging the fleet, beginning with the first and second line ships on October 2nd, was begun and carried through. Months later, when this policy had borne its inevitable fruit, much complaint was made from English sources of the 'perfidy' of the Dutch, who, under cover of the peace negotiations, had made so base and dishonourable an attack on England. But really it is difficult to see much deeper grounds for these assertions than those of injured pride and dignity. It is obvious that the continuance of the war in the meantime was a fact perfectly understood and accepted by the English authorities, and measures were taken all along the coast for the fortification of important posts against possible Dutch attacks. In the light of later occurrences, the measures taken regarding the Medway have a special interest. As early as December 27th, 1666, the Duke of York had given order: "upon considerations concerning y<sup>e</sup> security of his maj<sup>ty</sup>s shippes at Sheernesse, and y<sup>e</sup> River of Medway, it hath been thought necessary that a platforme should be made upon y<sup>e</sup> point at Sheernesse for 12 guns to be planted upon<sup>1</sup>." A boom was also to be set across the river to protect the ships lying further up stream. Three months later further orders were given regarding "the Safety of H.M.'s ships in the River of Medway": the complement of the guardships was to be increased, and the ships provided with grapnels: the *Dolphin* and two other fireships were to lie inside the chain, while in the upper part of the river

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York's Letters, 1660-7.*

the ships, especially the first and second rate, were to be moored in the safest place: and “besides compleating y<sup>e</sup> chaine for their further security y<sup>e</sup> ships *Charles V* and *Matthias* may be moored w<sup>th</sup> in y<sup>e</sup> chaine . . . that they may bring their broadsides to bear upon y<sup>e</sup> chaine, and that a competent number of seamen be allowed to be borne on them<sup>1</sup>.” Yet, in reality little was done. The fort at Sheerness was never completed—on June 11th, when news of the Dutch fleet in the Thames had scared people into a panic-stricken energy, Sir Edward Spragge was sent down to raise the long-planned fortifications there: but the Dutch arrived before he did. The chain was scarcely better done: by May 10th Pett had written to the Navy Commissioners, “the chain is promised to be dispatched tomorrow, and all things are ready for fixing it<sup>2</sup>”—it had been ordered four months previously—and when done it was only completed in a perfunctory manner and the Dutch had no difficulty in breaking through it.

While the peace negotiations still hung fire, the Dutch were steadfastly resolved on the full maintenance of their fleet, and, if possible, on a revenge for Holmes’ “Bonfire.” On June 7th De Ruyter’s fleet of 80 ships, including 15 fireships, was sighted off the North Foreland: he anchored in the King’s Channel that night. Scouts were sent up the Thames on the following day, and on the 9th a light squadron of 17 men-of-war and 24 fireships and galleons under Van Ghent set sail up the Thames with orders to attack the small English squadron lying in the Hope and also to make

<sup>1</sup> *Adm. Libr. MS. 24, Duke of York’s Letters, 1660–7.*

<sup>2</sup> *Cal. S. P. Dom. May 10th, 1667.*

a descent on the stores and ships lying up the Medway.

London was seized with a panic only equalled by that caused by the Fire. "The dismay that is upon us all, in the business of the kingdom and Navy at this day, is not to be expressed otherwise than by the condition the citizens were in when the city was on fire, nobody knowing which way to turn themselves, while everything concurred to greaten the fire; as here the easterly galle and spring-tides for coming up both rivers, and enabling them to break the chaine<sup>1</sup>." Those who could began to bundle out of the city with their most precious belongings. On the other hand there is a picturesque story reminiscent of, perhaps founded on, Nero's fiddle, "that the night the Dutch burned our ships the King did sup with my Lady Castlemayne, . . . and there were all mad in hunting of a poor moth<sup>2</sup>."

Prince Rupert went off to Woolwich, the Duke of Albemarle to Chatham, to attempt to make some provisions to meet the emergency. Sir William Coventry made frantic appeals for more fireships, and hands were laid on any and every suitable ship. The fireships proved of great service ultimately, but the Prince and Albemarle were too late to be more than onlookers of a pitiable disgrace. In the Medway the fireships were unmanned, the guardships half manned, the forts without guns, and according to some accounts even the chain was not yet in place. Not merely was the work not done, but there were no men to do it when Albemarle arrived. Men who had not been paid for months refused to work in this emergency. Out of 1100 men

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 14th, 1667.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* June 21st.

in pay at Chatham Dockyard not more than three attended to help the Duke in any way.

“Our Seamen, whom no danger’s shape could fight,  
Unpaid refuse to mount their ships, for spite :  
Or to their fellows swim, on board the Dutch,  
Who show the tempting metal in their clutch<sup>1</sup>.”

Pepys tells of many Englishmen heard talking on board the Dutch ships, and crying to their less fortunate countrymen, “We did heretofore fight for tickets ; now we fight for dollars<sup>2</sup>!” ; and there is no doubt that there was no small number of deserters on board the Dutch fleet. De Ruyter gained considerable help in his attack on Chatham from one Captain Thomas Holland<sup>3</sup>, an old Commonwealth captain : and there is also a dramatic story of a cousin of this man going to De Ruyter after the Medway attack and offering to lead him up the Thames, and De Ruyter’s reply, “If you are so brave a man as you have represented yourself to be, I will send you back again to your Master the King, he has now occasion for such valiant men as you are<sup>4</sup>.”

In the meantime Van Ghent had been delayed by unfavourable wind. On the 10th he had gone up the Thames nearly as far as Gravesend—the ships at the Hope having escaped him—but the turn of the tide and the S.W. wind decided him to drop down again to Sheerness. Despite a stout resistance by Sir Edward Spragge, the unfinished fort there caused but little

<sup>1</sup> Marvell, *Instructions to a Painter*.

<sup>2</sup> Pepys’ *Diary*, June 14th, 1667.


<sup>3</sup> Clowes, *op. cit.* II. 289, says “Dolmar”, for which I have been unable to find any authority.

<sup>4</sup> *Rawl. MSS.* D. 924.



hindrance to the Dutch, into whose hands fell the large magazines of naval stores. The Dutch followed the retiring English up the river without venturing further inland from the water, "because the most part of our Land-Troops were separated from us by the foul Weather, the Generall officers thought not fit to engage themselves too far up the country with so few People<sup>1</sup>." At 6 a.m. on the morning of the 12th, being now accompanied by De Ruyter himself, the Dutch moved up the Medway before a brisk N.E. breeze. About noon their van, led by Van Brakel, reached the chain below Gillingham. Albemarle had had two ships sunk outside the boom, the *Unity* stationed outside also, and two very slight batteries on land at each end of the chain. The sunken ships were not in the channel, the *Unity* was promptly fired by fireships, and the chain snapped as a second Dutch ship crashed against it. A short tussle and the Dutch were swarming up the river in all kinds of craft, from man-of-war to ship's boat. The *Amity*, *Charles V*, *Monmouth* and *Matthias* were soon blazing. Just above these ships lay the *Royal Charles*, the flagship during the last campaign; she had only 30 guns mounted, so Albemarle had made every effort to get her towed into safety up the river, but mutinous men would not move a finger to help, and Commissioner Pett of Chatham Dockyard had fled nursing his models which he thought more important to the King than aught else. The *Royal Charles* thus fell an easy prey, was converted into a Dutch flagship, and at the present day her stern-piece is displayed in an Amsterdam museum.

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Tromp*, p. 425.



## DUTCH IN THE MEDWAY.

"A Scheme of the Posture of the Dutch Fleete and Action at Sheerness and Chatham 10<sup>th</sup>. 11<sup>th</sup>. and 12<sup>th</sup>. of June 1667, taken upon the place by J. E." (Drawn and sent to Pepys by J. Evelyn, June 20<sup>th</sup>. The above is a tracing of part of the original in *Rawl. MSS.* A. 195, f. 77-8.)

- |  |                          |          |  |
|--|--------------------------|----------|--|
| 1. The 3 Dutch ships w <sup>ch</sup> .<br>brake y <sup>e</sup> chayne. | 11. Mary                 | } Burnt. | } As they laye when drawne<br>towards Rochester Bridg. |
| 2. 2 sunk ships without y <sup>e</sup><br>chayne.                      | 12. R. Oake              |          |  |
| 3. The Unity.  | 13. London               |          |  |
| 4. The Chayne.   | 14. James                |          |  |
| 5, 6. Two very slight batteries<br>at each end of the<br>chayne.       | 15. The Catherine sunke. |          |  |
| 7. Chas. y <sup>e</sup> 5 <sup>th</sup> .                              | 16. The Princesse.       |          |  |
| 8. The Matthias.   | 17. The Old James.       |          |  |
| 9. The Monmouth as she lay<br>during the Assault.                      | 18. The Guilden Ruiter.  |          |  |
| 10. The Royall Charles.  | 19. The Triumph.         |          |  |
|  | 20. The Rainbow.         |          |  |
|  | 21. The Unicorne.        |          |  |
|  | 22. The Henry.           |          |  |
|  | 23. The Helverson.       |          |  |
|  | 24. Vanguard sunke.      |          |  |

a. A fort with 8 guns.

b. }  
c. } Two other batteries with 21 and 16 Guns.

d. A Battery of 60 guns in y<sup>e</sup> old Dock (not mounted).

Note y<sup>t</sup>. these batteries were not finished til after the fight."

That night the Dutch lay in the Medway between Upnor and Gillingham, they and their handiwork covered by a heavy pall of smoke illumined only by the flickering glow from the burning ships. On the following morning De Ruyter moved further up the river. For a time the garrison at Upnor put up a stout fight, but shortage of ammunition checked them before the enemy would have done so, and the Dutch passed on up to three ships which had been half sunk at the side of the channel; these—the *Royal Oak*, *Loyal London*, and *James*—they fired. Above the latter lay the *Katherine*, sunk in the channel, and, beyond, nine other large ships. However, all but two of the Dutch fireships had been expended and the return passage promised to be dangerous, so no attempt was made against the remaining English ships. The Dutch got away down the river without mishap, taking with them the *Royal Charles* “at a time both for tides and wind when the best pilot in Chatham would not have undertaken it, they heeling her on one side to make her draw little water: and so carried her away safe<sup>1</sup>.”

On his return to the Thames, De Ruyter satisfied himself with keeping a blockade, and it would seem that a slight excess of caution on his part lost him a good opportunity of improving on his Chatham exploit. “De Ruyter might have done much more mischief,” writes an English contemporary, “if he had immediately after the exploit at Chatham seconded it with another in the Thames: for Gravesend was slenderly provided, Tilbury Fort not erected, and the Dutch having a Spring tyde and an Easterly wind, might soon

<sup>1</sup> Pepys' *Diary*, June 22nd, 1667.

have been pass'd Gravesend, and nothing could have hindered but that y<sup>e</sup> Frigatts and Fireshipps might have come up as high as Woolwich at least, and have fired all the ships that were afloat and have endangered the King's Yard and Storehouses<sup>1</sup>." On July 1st he made a fruitless attack on Landguard fort, and a week later, being again at the mouth of the Thames, he divided his fleet into two squadrons; taking one himself, with which he cruised down the south coast of England, and leaving the other in the Thames under Van Nes.

Meanwhile somewhat hysterical preparations had been in progress in London and Chatham. Fortifications had been hurried on, new forts sprang up, new guns were mounted. So eager had people been to block up the fairway in two or three places that in some cases valuable merchant ships, fully stored victual ships, effective fireships, had been indiscriminately sunk. However, the object aimed at was achieved: the stores and dockyards were safe.

For nearly a fortnight Van Nes cruised off the mouth of the Thames, mostly in the neighbourhood of the Gunfleet—and so keeping a small squadron, composed mostly of fireships, securely shut up in the Stour. On the 22nd, however, he weighed from the Gunfleet with about 38 sail, including 13 fireships. On the following day he heard of the presence in the Hope of five English men-of-war and 20 fireships, and thereupon pushed up the river. At noon he reached the Hope and attacked the little squadron there: his success was very partial, he forced them under the guns of Tilbury and five of their fireships were burnt—the wind

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. D. 924.*



being easterly, the English could not make any real use of them—but to achieve so much he expended a dozen of his own. The following day he retired down stream followed by the English, who were now led by Sir Edward Spragge. On the 25th both squadrons anchored at the Nore almost within gunshot of each other.

In the meantime Sir Joseph Jordan had decided to come out from his retreat. For some reason he seems to have come to this decision very suddenly. On the evening of the 23rd he suddenly called in all the seamen, whereupon “y<sup>e</sup> 4th part of our best men tooke y<sup>e</sup> opportunity of their heeles and deserted<sup>1</sup>.” That same evening in a very unprepared condition he set sail. Six vessels had to be left behind; four of them caught up on the following day. On the 26th he came in sight of the Dutch fleet. He arranged his little fleet—seven small men-of-war and 16 fireships—into two squadrons, each led by some of the warships. Spragge’s squadron were eyewitnesses of the ensuing fiasco. “Wee were in hopes to see some Bonfires made of the Dutch ships in return to those they had made of ours too lately, but our Expectations were wholly frustrate, for the Dutch manning out all their small craft and Boats, put the Fireships by or cut off their Boats, so that we lost the greatest part of 15 Fireships and not one of them did execution<sup>2</sup>.” The fireship crews utterly disgraced themselves; they practically refused to attack; two of them, by dint of being pushed on between three of the frigates, attempted to grapple

<sup>1</sup> *Rawl. MSS. A. 195, f. 264.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid. D. 924.*

one of the Dutchmen but failed to do so ; some of the crews fled from their ships in small boats only to be cut off ; two other crews set fire to their ships when completely isolated, thereby affording a striking display of the badness of the materials, for the ships smouldered for over half an hour before they began to burn properly. One of these fireship captains was afterwards shot, and three others drummed out of the service, for their share in this final incident in the war. Jordan, with his frigates untouched, joined Spragge without any further action. Van Nes, being without fireships, made no more attempts in the Thames, and before another opportunity for an engagement arose the signature of the Treaty of Breda on July 31st put an end to the war.

Such was the last melancholy incident in a melancholy war : melancholy not so much in the practical results—though indeed they form a sorry enough case of lives and money squandered, of good work wasted—as in the pitiful spectacle it affords of good material wasted, ruined ; of sturdy, willing seamen become paupers, diseased and mutinous ; of volunteers become deserters ; of fine old seamen captains displaced by foppish courtier ignoramuses, who, as often as not, owed their preferment to some disreputable intrigue in a disreputable court ; of lack of food and bad food ; of lack of pay and pensions ; of state money, stores and prizes embezzled by men of every rank, from the King who ‘ appropriated ’ naval money to help pay for his mistresses and his soldiers, to the miserable dockyard workman, unpaid and half-starved, who ‘ stole ’ ‘ chips ’ to help keep his pitiable body and soul together :

in short, it is the spectacle of a great service, of a nation, being rotted to the core by the foul spirit that came into England with Charles II and his court.

Explanations other than these, however, other reasons, had to be given. The people and the Parliament demanded a victim, and in their demands were coming unpleasantly near the true root of all the trouble, when the scapegoat was found and exposed—the unfortunate commissioner of Chatham Dockyard, Peter Pett.

“After this loss, to relish discontent,  
 Someone must be accused by Parliament;  
 All our miscarriages on Pett must fall,  
 His name alone seems fit to answer all.  
 Whose counsel first did this mad war beget?  
 Whose all commands sold through the Navy? *Pett.*  
 Who would not follow when the Dutch were beat?  
 Who treated out the time at Bergen? *Pett.*  
 Who the Dutch fleet with storms disabled met,  
 And, rifling prizes, them neglected? *Pett.*  
 Who with false news prevented the Gazette,  
 The fleet divided, writ for *Rupert*? *Pett.*  
 Who all our seamen cheated of their debt?  
 And all our prizes who did swallow? *Pett.*  
 Who did advise no navy out to set?  
 And who the forts left unprepared? *Pett*  
 Who to supply with powder did forget  
 Landguard, Sheerness, Gravesend and Upnor? *Pett.*  
 Who all our ships exposed in Chatham net?  
 Who should it be but the fanatick *Pett*?  
*Pett*, the sea-architect, in making ships,  
 Was the first cause of all these naval slips.  
 Had he not built, none of these faults had been;  
 If no creation there had been no sin.”

MARVELL, *Instructions to a Painter.*

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- Monod, Gabriel. *Biblio. de l'hist. de France. Catalogue* jusq. 1789. 8°. 1888.
- Pepys, Samuel. *A descriptive catalogue of the naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene Coll., Camb.* (Navy Records Soc. Publ.) (In progress. Vols. I-III published.) 8°. [London], 1903 etc.
- *Bibliotheca Pepysiana: a descriptive catalogue.* (In progress. Published: Part I, "Sea" MSS.—Part II, Early printed books.) s. 4°. London, 1914.
- \*Revue Maritime et Coloniale. *Table des matières*, 1861-88. Paris, 1870-80-89.  
 (Reference to numerous articles bearing on this period. Unfortunately does not appear to have been carried up to date.)
- Sonnenschein, W. S. *Biblio. of History and Historic Bibliography.*  
 (Sections from "The Best Books" and "The Reader's Guide," Class F. 23, 24, 30.) London, 1891-5. (Rather popular.)
- Stolk, Abraham van. *Atlas van Stolk: Katalogus der Historie-Spot-en Zinneprenten betrekkelijk de geschiedenis van Nederland.* (In progress.) 8°. Amster., 1895 etc.

## II. STATUTES, ETC.

- \*Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum. Ed. C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait. 3 vols. 8°. London, 1911.
- \*Statutes of the Realm. 1660-7.  
 Raithby, John. *Statutes relating to the Admiralty, Navy, Shipping and Navigation of the U.K. from 9 Hen. III. to 3 Geo. IV. inclusive.* 4°. London, 1823.

Also, for Treaties, Dumont, Jean, Baron de Carlsroon.  
Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens;  
contenant un recueil des traitez d'alliance, de paix,  
etc., faits en Europe depuis le règne de Charlemagne.  
8 vols.; Supplément, 5 vols. La Haye, Amsterdam,  
1726-39.

*Parliamentary Journals, etc.*

Parliamentary History. Vol. iv. 1660-88.

Journals of the House of Lords. Vols. ix, x. 1660-6,  
1666-75.

\*Journals of the House of Commons. Vol. viii. 1660-7.

### III. NAVY LISTS

Apart from mere lists of fleets or squadrons, the first  
'Navy List' is probably :

Gloria Britannica, or the Boast of the British Seas, containing a True and Full Account of the Royal Navy of England, shewing where each Ship was Built, by whom, and when, its Length, Breadth, Depth, Draught of Water, Tons, the number of Men and Guns, both in Peace and War, at Home and Abroad, together with every Man's Pay, from a Captain to a Cabin-Boy, truly calculated and Cast up, for a Day, a Week, a Month, and a Kalendar Year, or 13 months and 1 Day. Carefully Collected and Digested by a True Lover of the Seamen. 1689.

### MISCELLANEOUS LISTS

#### 1. *Contemporary.*

\*Pepys, Samuel. Sea Commission Officers. My Naval Register relating to the three following Particulars, viz. 1. The Execution of the Office of High Admiral. 2. The Flag Officers charged with the Fleets; and 3. The Commanders and Lieutenants of all single ships...between May 1660, and...Dec. 1688. Begun



and closed with particular lists of the Officers actually in Commission at each of the said periods.

(Pepysian Library, 2941. See also "Catalogue of Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library," Vol. I. Nav. Rec. Soc.)

\*Pepys, Samuel. A Register of the Ships of the Royal Navy of England from... May 1660, to... Dec. 18th, 1688.

(Pepysian Library, 2940. See also "Catalogue of Naval MSS. etc.")

## 2. *Later compilations.*

### (a) Officers.

Admirals and Captains, A List of, who have lost their lives in the Service, from 1665 to 1801. (See Schomberg's "Naval Chronology," Appendix, Vol. v.)

Captains, A List of, who have served in the Royal Navy of Great Britain, from the year 1653 to 1802. (See Schomberg's "Naval Chronology," App., Vol. v.)

Chaplains of the Royal Navy, 1626-1903. (Comp. by A. G. Kealy, Chapl. R.N.) 12°. Portsmouth, 1903.

Jackson, Sir Geo. Naval Commissioners, 1660-1760. Compiled from the Original Warrants and Returns; by the late Sir G. Jackson, Bart. With Historical Notices by Sir G. F. Duckett, Bt. 8°. London, 1889.

Noblemen and Gentlemen, A List of, who have been raised to the dignity of Admirals in the R. Navy of England and Great Britain... from 1660 to 1801. (See Schomberg's "Naval Chronology," App., Vol. v.)

Secretaries of the Admiralty, Clerks of the Acts, etc. Comp. by Col. Pasley. (See H. B. Wheatley's "Sam. Pepys and the World he lived in," 5th ed., London, 1907, p. 266 etc.)

### (b) Ships.

See \*Clowes' "Royal Navy," Vol. II, for Navy at Restoration.

See Oppenheim's "Administration of the R.N." for Commonwealth and Protectorate Navy.

Charnock's "Marine Architecture" and Derrick's "Memoirs" also contain useful lists

## IV. MANUSCRIPTS

## (a) LIBRARY AND PRIVATE COLLECTIONS

1. \**Admiralty Library.*

- \*6. Orders and Instructions. 1658-60.
- 8. Orders and Warrants. 1658-60.
- 19. Duke of York's Instructions. 1660-2.
- 20. Duke of York's Instructions. 1662-6.
- \*23. Orders of the Duke of York. 1660-5.
- \*24. Duke of York's letters. 1660-8.
- 150. Index of Orders. 1660-1741.

These are all in MS., and with the exception of the last-named are copies, apparently made piecemeal contemporaneously. Many of the originals of Vols. 20, 23 and 24, are among the Admiralty Papers at the Record Office.

2. \**Bodleian Library, Oxford.*

The most important collections in the Library dealing with this subject are four volumes of Sandwich Papers and Letters among the Carte Papers, and twenty-six volumes of Pepys Papers (besides many other volumes that were originally his property in the Rawlinson collection); seven volumes of Sir Thomas Allin's papers and journals in the Tanner collection are also of interest and have not previously been thoroughly examined. There are numerous naval papers scattered throughout these three collections.

Catalogues. *Catalogi Codicum MSS.* P. 4. Cod.

Th. Tanneri. P. 5. *Codd. Rawlinsoniani.* 4<sup>o</sup>. Oxf.

—Calendar of Carte Papers (in MS.).

There are occasional naval papers of the period in all the volumes undermentioned, details being given in cases of special interest or value.

Tanner MSS.

- 45. Administrative reform, 1665-6 etc.
- 47. Tangier and Mediterranean.
- 48, 49, 51, 93, 114.
- 292.
- 294, \*296. Sir Thomas Allin's papers. Journal 1660-7 in 296.
- 297.

## Rawlinson MSS.

## A. 58, 59.

63, 64. Numerous letters from Opdam, etc. to U. States.

66, 67. General, concerning Sound negotiations, 1658-60.

\*170-195 incl. Pepys Papers, of which the following contain matter dealing with this period:—

\*174, 175, 176, 177, 181, 183, 184, 185.

187. Victualling and arrears of pay.

191, 192, 193.

\*195. "in and about the time of the 1st Dutch War 1665-68, designed for the most part for a collection, as I remember, towards the history thereof." Especially 1666-7.

197. Register of Ships.

199.

209, 212, 216.

\*252 }  
\*256 } Bergen.

448. Report on Striking the Flag. 1661.

## B. 451, 455.

\*457. Answer from Pepys for Commiss. of Navy to observations upon Dutch War and the management thereof.

463, 465, 466.

\*468. Sandwich's narrative of Bergen.

## C. 381. Mediterranean.

423. Tangier (see also Pepys' shorthand notes and journal 1667-83, C. 859).

## D. 916. Tangier.

919.

Carte Papers. (Sandwich Papers.) 72, \*73, \*74, \*223

Also occasional papers in other volumes, see MS. Calendar (arranged chronologically).

Clarendon Papers, The, contain occasional papers of naval interest, but are not yet calendared beyond 1663; they are, however, arranged chronologically.

3. \**British Museum.*

## A. General Treatises.

- Add. MSS. 9335. Hollond's Discourses on R.N.  
Slingsby's Discourse.  
11,602. Rich. Gibson Collection. Incl.  
papers on Gentlemen in Navy.  
11,684. Rich. Gibson Collection. Incl. Eng.  
Safety at Sea and Exam. of Dutch action  
at Chatham.  
30,221. Sir Ph. Meadows, etc., on Dominion  
of Sea (f. 13).

## B. Lists of Ships, etc.

- \*Harl. 1247. Numerous lists, 1658-66 (ff. 46, 51, 52, 55).  
Stowe 428. 1658-9.  
Harl. 7464. 1660-91.  
Add. 36,781. 1661 (f. 101).  
Stowe 432, 433. Ships, complement, building. 1656  
and 1662.  
Sloane 4459. 1665.  
Egerton 2543. 1666 (ff. 144-56, 179-81).  
\*Add. 32,094. 1666 (ff. 101-2, 116, 118, etc.).

## C. Orders and Instructions.

- \*Add. 36,782. Register of Orders in Council, Warrants,  
etc., of Adm. and N. Board. 1660-6.  
Stowe 430. Register of Instructions, etc. 1661-92.  
Harl. 7464. Establishment of R.N. Jan. 1662. (Also  
Add. 9311.)  
Harl. 6287. Ditto, with reflections thereon (1668).  
Stowe 142. Instruct. from Jas. D. of York regarding  
Impressment. 1665.

## D. Miscellaneous collections of Naval Papers.

- Harl. 1509, 1510 }  
Lansdowne 194 } on Prizes.  
Add. \*9311. 1660-5, miscell.  
9315. Warrants.  
9317. Chatham Chest.  
9328. Miscell. 1663-.  
Harl. 6287. Incl. Pepys on Victualling and Pursers  
("New year's gift") [also Lansd. 253, ff. 280-94].



- Sloane 1709. Incl. case of Surgeons in R.N. (f. 279).  
 Lansd. 1215. Incl. paper concerning half pay (f. 19).  
 Add. 34,353. Striking flag.  
       18,986. Misc. 1659-.  
       \*22,546. Misc. 1659-.
- Stowe 325. Proposals for Maritime Insurance, 1661 (f. 184).  
 Harl. 6277. Charge of Netherlands war, Sept. 1664—Sept. 1666.  
 Egert. 2543. Minutes by Nicholas of Adm. Commiss. meetings. Oct. 1664—Jan. 1665.  
 Egert. 2618. Sandwich to Albemarle regarding Texel fight. Sept. 1665.  
 Add. 27,999. Bergen (Talbot).  
 Add. 37,425. Report on June 3, 1665.  
 Stowe 744. Dutch War, 1666.  
 \*Add. 32,094. Dutch War, etc.
- |                            |   |
|----------------------------|---|
| Harl. 7010. Accts. of June | } of Rupert and Albe-<br>marle. For narratives<br>concerning division of<br>fleet on June 1, see Add.<br>32,094, ff. 196-204. |
| 1-4, 1666,                 |   |
| Lansd. 777. Accts. of June |   |
| 1-4, 1666,                 |   |
| Add. 4107. Accts. of June  | }   |
| 1-4, 1666,                 |   |
- \*Harl. 4888. Acct. of Division of fleet in 1666.  
 Add. 29,597. Articles against Sir Jas. Smith for action. Aug. 1666.  
 Egert. 928. Minutes of council of war under Allin. 1667.  
 Harl. 7018. Complaints against Pet. Pett. 1667.

#### 4. *Historical Manuscripts Commission.*

- 3rd Report, Appendix. Northumberland, D. of, MSS. of, 1872. (A few papers belonging to, and dealing with, Prince Rupert and his naval command.)
- \*4th Report, Appendix. Bath, Marquis of, MSS. of, pp. 229-37, 1874 (very slightly calendared but containing much valuable material: Sir W. Coventry's papers, including letters on naval administration, letters from Pepys, Holmes, Talbot, Tyddeman, Clifford, dealing with Bergen, Holmes' expedition

- (1664), etc. Also Coventry's Discourse on the management of the Navy. Notes by C. of Councils of War). Some more naval papers in this collection are still more scantily indexed in the 3rd Rep, pp. 180-200.
- 5th Report, App. I. Sutherland, Duke of, MSS. of, pp. 150-78, 1876. (Many letters concerning Restoration, only introducing Navy indirectly.)
- Malet, Sir A., MSS. of, pp. 314-5. (Coventry papers: outbreak of war in 1664-5, letters from and to Albemarle before the four days' fight, 1666.)
- 11th Report, App. V. Dartmouth, Earl of, MSS. of, 1887. (Much naval matter for 3rd Dutch War and after, but little before. Duke of York's Orders: see "Fighting instructions." Details of four days' fight, 1666.)
- 12th Report, App. VII. Le Fleming, S. H., MSS. of (at Rydal Hall), 1890. (Large collection of newsletters covering the period.)
- 13th Report, App. II. Portland, Earl of, MSS. of (at Welbeck), pp. 100-7, 1893. (Orders to Sir Wm. Penn, 1666-7; many of these have been published in the "Professional Life of Penn.")
- 14th Report, App. IV. Kenyon, Lord, MSS. of, pp. 67-79, 1897. (A few papers dealing with the "warr with the Duchy," 1664-7. List of ships, officers, salaries.)
- 15th Report, App. II. \*Hodgkin, J. E., MSS. of, pp. 153-68, 1897. (Valuable collection of Pepys papers, including letters from the Mediterranean from Lord Sandwich and others.)
- 15th Report, App. VII. Somerset, Duke of, MSS. of, 1898. (Sailing orders on various occasions to Capt. Seymour of the "Pearl," 1664-8.)
- <sup>1</sup>\*Heathcote, J. M., MSS. of (at Conington Cas.), 1889. (Fanshaw papers: dealing with negotiations with Portugal, state of Tangier from the time of the English occupation, movements of English fleet in the Mediterranean, letters from Allin and Lawson.)

<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to know in what order to tabulate the publications of the Commission, as the official order appears to vary.

5. *\*Pepysian MSS. at Magdalene College, Cambridge.*

The bulk of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library belong to the period of his secretaryship, but there are ten volumes of "Miscellanies," comprising copies of miscellaneous papers dealing with naval matters, which Pepys intended to use as material for his projected naval history. A volume entitled "Naval Minutes" also contains many interesting opinions and facts noted by Pepys. See the printed Catalogues of the Pepysian MSS. (page 195).

- 488. King James II's Pocket-book of Rates and Memorandums.
- 1490. Papers concerning the enquiry of 1686, including Pepys' "Memoirs relating to the State of the Royal Navy." [The "Memoirs" have been printed (see page 208).]
- 2242. Papers concerning the enquiry into Naval Administration in 1668, including Pepys' report thereon.
- 2554. Mr Pepys' Defence of the Navy. 1669.
- 2589. Expense of the Navy from 1660 to 1666.
- 2611. Penn's Collection (including Instructions, 1653-65).
- 2801. Instructions for Fighting.
- \*2866. Naval Minutes. (These are odd notes of facts, opinions or arguments to be noted, questions to raise or answer, all with a view to the projected history; but their very informality and personal character give them additional value in showing the contemporary view of many and various matters.)
- 2867. Naval Precedents.
- \*2870-79, inclus. Miscellanies, especially
  - 2871. Many details of distribution of ships.
  - 2874. Report on Striking of Flags.
  - 2879. Collection of papers concerning Rights of Search and Trinity House, etc.
- \*2940. Register of Royal Navy Ships, 1660-86.
- \*2941. Register of Sea Officers, 1660-88.
 

("MS. Naval Register relating to the three following particulars, viz.: 1. The Execution of the

Office of High Admiral ; 2. The Flag Officers charged with the Fleets ; and 3. The Commanders and Lieutenants of all single ships employed in the service of the Crown between May 1660...and December 1688, etc.”)

6. *Printed Calendars.*

\*Clarke Papers (Camden Society Publ.). 4 vols. s. 4°. London, 1891–1901.

\*Hyde, Edward, Earl of Clarendon, Calendar of State Papers of, preserved in the Bodleian. 3 vols. 8°. Oxford, 1869–76. (Papers dealing with pre-Restoration Royalist intrigues.)

\*Thurloe, John, State Papers of. Ed. by J. Birch. 7 vols. F°. London, 1842.

(Originals in Bodleian. Many of naval interest : especially Baltic expedition in 1659.)

(b) STATE PAPERS

1. Calendars of State Papers preserved at the Public Record Office.

(a) \*Domestic Series. Ed. by M. A. E. Green.

Commonwealth. 1658–9, 1659–60. la. 8°. London, 1885–6.

Charles II. 1660–1, 1661–2, 1662–3, 1663–4, 1664–5, 1665–6, 1666–7, 1667. Also Addenda 1660–70 in volume 1670. la. 8°. London, 1860 etc.

These contain the great mass of the existing information about the Navy of the Restoration ; official and private letters from officers on service, official correspondence from and to the Navy Office, News-letters, etc. Many are not fully calendared—notably papers dealing with Allin and Holmes—but sufficient information is given to be an adequate guide to the original papers.

(b) Colonial Series.

America and W. Indies. Ed. by W. Sainsbury. 1574–1660, 1661–8. la. 8°. London, 1860, 1880.

(Including many papers dealing with the expeditions of Holmes and Harman, especially the latter.)



- (c) Treasury Books. Ed. by W. A. Shaw. 1660-7.  
1a. 8°. London, 1904.

2. \*Admiralty Papers (see List of Admiralty Records, Vol. I, Pub. Rec. Of. Lists and Indexes, No. XVIII, F°. London, 1904).

#### Secretary's Dept.

Adm. Sec. In-Letters.

Ad. I. 5246. Copies of Orders in Council. 1660-88.  
Out-Letters.

Ad. II. Orders and Instructions. 1665-79.

Index and Compilation.

Ad. X. 10. Abstracts of Captains' Services. 1660-1741.

Ad. VII. 549. List of Captains and Ships (1660-1737).

#### Accountant General.

Accounts. Various.

112. Victualling Accounts. 1657-8.

B. Books 24-44. 1655-68.

Treasurer's Ledgers 1-11. 1660-8.

Miscellanea. Various.

119. Prices of Stores, 1660-1720.

132. 1658-1730. Register of Orders to Yards.

136. 1658-1765.

139. 1662-1731. Orders from Navy Board (Abstracts).

#### Navy Board.

In-Letters.

\*1-14. 1660-7.

2066. 1660-1700. Abstracts of letters from Admiralty.

2507, 2533, 2538-9. 1658-1768-9. Standing orders to Yards.

Miscell.

3117. 1660-7. List and Descriptions of Ships.

3537-8. Miscellaneous.

#### Victualling Dept.

Accounts 47, 48. Sea and Harbour Victualling.

Chatham Chest.

2. 1656-7. Accounts.  
128. Miscell. Orders, etc.

## V. PRINTED AUTHORITIES, CONTEMPORARY

### (a) GENERAL

Aitzema, Lieuwe van, *Saken van Staaten Oorlogh, in ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden.* 6 vols. 4°. The Hague, 1669-72.

(To 1669.)

Baker, Sir Richard. *A Chronicle of the Kings of England (up to 1661. Detailed account of Restoration).* F°. London, 1670.

Basnage de Beauval, Jacques. *Annales des Provinces-Unies, depuis les négociations pour la paix de Munster.* 2 parts. Hague, 1719. F°.

Burnet, Gilbert. *History of my own Time.* 2 vols. 8°. London, 1723-34.—Ed. by M. J. Routh. 6 vols. 8°. Oxford, 1833.—Pt. I. (Chas. II), ed. by A. Airy. 2 vols. 8°. Oxford, 1897-1900.

(Hostilely criticised by many, especially Ranke and Swift: memoirs rather than a history. Nevertheless a cardinal authority, "conspicuously and honourably fair in tone though frequently inaccurate in detail" (Airy).)

Clarendon, Edward Hyde, Earl of, *Life of, by himself:* in which is included a continuation of his *History of the Rebellion.* 3 vols. 8°. Oxford, 1759.

Heath, James. *A Chronicle of the late Intestine war...* to which is added a brief account of the most memorable transactions in Eng., Scot. and Ireland and Foreign Parts from 1662-1675, by J. Philips. F°. London, 1676.

\*Kennett, White, Bp of Peterborough. *A Register and Chronicle, ecclesiastical and civil, ... with proper notes and references towards discovering and connecting the true history of England from the Restoration of Chas. II.* F°. London, 1728.

(Only one volume—Jan. 1660 to Dec. 1662—compiled with extracts from newspapers, tracts, etc., also from Sandwich MS. Journal.)

Whitelocke, Bulstrode. Memorials of the English Affairs ; or an historical account of what passed from the beginning of the reign of King Chas. I. to King Chas. II. his happy restauration. F<sup>o</sup>. London, 1682.

(Very little naval matter. Parliamentary debates on the Baltic.)

(b) MEMOIRS, LETTERS, etc.

Blencôwe, R. W., Sydney Papers, ed. by, consisting of a journal of the Earl of Leicester and original letters of Algernon Sidney. 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1825.

(Letters from A. Sidney while ambassador in Baltic in 1659 ; see also Sydney Papers below.)

Burton, Thomas, Diary of, 1656 to April 1659. 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1828.

(Parliamentary debate on Baltic question.)

\*Estrades, Godefroi Comte d'. Lettres, Mémoires et négociations de M. le Comte d'E., 1663-8. 5 vols. 12<sup>o</sup>. Brux., 1709.

— Ambassades et négociation de M le Comte d'E., 1637-62. 2 vols. 12<sup>o</sup>. Amsterdam, 1718.

— Sale of Dunkirk...in the year 1662, taken from the letters, etc., of the C. d'E. by E. Combe. 12<sup>o</sup>. London, 1728.

(Estrades was largely responsible for the conduct of the French side of the negotiations for the purchase of Dunkirk.)

Evelyn, John, Diary of. To which are added a selection from his familiar letters...Ed. by W. Bray. New editions with life and preface by H. B. Wheatley (4 vols.), and Austin Dobson (3 vols.). London, 1906.

(Very little of naval interest in the Diary. A great contrast in interest and value to Pepys' Diary. Evelyn also proposed to write a naval history but never got beyond the introduction. See below, page 217.)

\*Fanshaw, Sir Richard, Bart. Original Letters of his Excell. Sir R. F. during his Embassies in Spain and Portugal...etc. (1664-5). 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1701. (F. was ambassador to Portugal 1662-3, and Spain 1664-5, when he was superseded by Sandwich.)

- \*Gramont, Armand de, Comte de Guiche. *Mémoires...* concernant les Provinces-Unies. 12°. London, 1671.

(Eye-witness's account from Dutch side of the four days' battle.)

- \*James, Duke of York, [James II]. *Memoirs of English Affairs, 1660-73.* 8°. London, 1729.

(Largely naval, including many of D. of York's orders.)

- Ludlow, Edward. *Memoirs, 1625-75.* Ed. by C. H. Firth. 2 vols. 8°. Oxford, 1894.

(Ludlow was in exile from 1662 till his death. Some account of Republican intrigues with Dutch by an "honest dull man.")

- \*Pepys, Samuel. *Diary of, 1660-71.* Ed. by H. B. Wheatley. 9 vols., and Suppl. vol. (Pepysiana). 8°. London, 1893-9.

(Absolutely invaluable as giving public and official contemporary opinion. His professional position in the Navy Office enabled him to give an unofficial view of the inside of naval administration, the more valuable because unconsidered.)

- *Memoirs of the Royal Navy, 1679-88.* Ed. by J. R. Tanner. s. 8°. [Oxf., 1906.]

- [Sydney Papers.] *Letters and Memorials of State.* Ed. by A. Collins. 2 vols. F°. London, 1746.

(Collections of Letters, etc., of the Sidney family from Elizabethan times; Ewald's life of Alg. Sidney, and Blencowe's collection largely drawn from this. Baltic negotiations, 1659.)

- Temple, Sir Wm., Bart., *The works of.* 2 vols. 4°. London, 1750.

(Including: Vol. I. Life of Sir W. T., by a particular friend.

Observations upon the United Provinces, including "Of their Government," "Of their People and dispositions," "Of their Trade," "Of their Forces and Revenue," etc.

Vol. II. Letters from Sir Wm. T. concerning the 1st Dutch War begun May 1661.

Letters to Sir Wm. T., etc.



Temple was envoy and ambassador at the Hague 1665–8. He arranged the secret Treaty between the Bp of Münster and Charles II. The letters include some from Arlington, Sandwich and Coventry.)

(c) TECHNICAL

Binning, Thomas. *A Light to the Art of Gunnery wherein is laid down the true Weight of Powder both for Proof and Action, of all Sorts of Great Ordnance. Also the True Ball, and allowance for Wind, with the most necessary Conclusions for the Practice of Gunnery . . . etc.* London, 1676.

Bond, Henry. *The Boatswain's Art: or the Complete Boatswain. Wherein is shown a true Proportion for the Masting, Yarding, and Rigging of any Ship . . . etc.* (21 pages.) 8°. London, 1670.

Bourne, William. *The Safeguard of Sailors: or, a Sure Guide for Coasters. Describing the Sea Coasts of England, Scotland, Ireland, France, Flanders, Holland, Jutland, and Norway. With directions for bringing a ship into the principal Harbours.* 1677.

Bushnell, Edmund. *The Complete Ship-Wright. Plainly teaching the Proportion used by Experienced Ship-Wrights, according to their Custom of Building. Also, a way of Rowing of Ships, by heaving at the Capstane, useful in any ship becalmed . . . 1st ed.* 8°. London, 1664.

(48 pages, with diagrams and one plan.)

Childe, L. *A Short Compendium of the new and much enlarged Sea-Book, or Pilot's sea Mirror: containing the distances and thwart courses of the Eastern, Northern, and Western Navigation.* 1663.

(Copy in the Brit. Mus. contains an advertisement list of works on Navigation.)

†Dassie, F. *L'Architecture Navale, contenant la Manière de construire des navires etc.* 4°. Paris, 1677.

(Plans, pictures, and explanations of technical terms.)

Elton, Richard. *The Complete Body of the Art Military, in three books by R. Elton.* F°. London, 1668.

- \*Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. Ed. by J. S. Corbett. (Navy Records Soc. Publ. 29.) 8°. London, 1905.

(Traces evolution of naval tactics ; development of fighting in line. "Sailing Tactics was a purely English art.")

Hayward, E. The size and Length of Rigging for all His Majestie's Ships and Frigates, . . . proportions of Boat-swains' and Carpenters stores . . . for 8 months sea service. F°. London, 1660.

- \*Hoste, Paul ; L'Art des Armées Navales ; avec la Théorie de la Construction des Vaisseaux. 2 vols. F°. Lyon, 1727.

(An English translation and Adaptation by Lieut. Chr. O'Bryen. 4°. London, 1762.)

(The standard authority on naval tactics for nearly a century. Valuable accounts of actions in the war of 1665-7 used as illustrations and examples. With over 130 engravings illustrating tactical evolutions.)

- \*Oeconomy of H.M. Navy Office, The, containing the several duties of the Commissioner and Principal Officers thereof. Being the first Rules established for them by the Duke of York. 12°. J. Browne, London, 1717.

(These are little more than a re-issue of the regulations of the Earl of Northumberland in 1638, with a few minor alterations and a letter of the Duke of York prefixed.)

Vervolgh op het bootsmans praetje van het schip Hollandia. s. 4°. 1672.

#### (d) TRACTS AND PAMPHLETS

In British Museum.

- \*(1) *Thomason Tracts* (see special Catalogue, Lond., 1908, 2 vols. ; none later than 1661) including :

1659. Feb. 8. English Fleet designed for the Sound. (669, f. 21.)

„ Nov. 29. Monk to the Navy (Thro' V. Adm. Goodson). (669, f. 22.)

1659. Dec. 28. Lawson's letters to Mayor of London and Commissioners of the Navy. (669, f. 22.)
1661. Jan. 17. Orders and Instructions for paying off the Navy. (E. 1075, f. 29.)

(2) *Miscellaneous Tracts, English.*

1659. Nov. 4. Letters from Commanders and Officers of the Fleet to Gen. Monk. Pub. by S. Griffin. London. (1093, c. 37.)
1660. A List of all the Ships and Frigots of England. (Baltic fleet, 1659.) M. Simmons. (103, 1. 54.)
1664. A Brief Relation of the Present state of Tangier. (583, c. 8.)
- „ An History of the Transactions betwixt the Crown of England and the States of the Netherlands, since they first began to be a Republique, to this day. Tho. Mabb. London 56 pp., s. 4<sup>o</sup>. (8122, d. 93.)  
(A rabid justification of England. Another copy with different title-page: "The English and Dutch Affairs displayed to the life." 1103, f. 12.)
1665. A List of H.M. Fleet as divided into Squadrons. (190, g. 13.) (227.)
- „ Copy of a Paper presented to the King... by the Spanish Ambassador.  
(Portuguese marriage and Span. claims on Tangier. 190, g. 13.) (379.)
- \* „ Instructions to a Painter for the drawing of a picture of the State and Posture of the English Forces at sea... in the conclusion of the year 1664. London. (1871, e. 9.)
- „ Relation de ce que l'on a appris jusques à présent du Combat Naval sonné le 12, 13 et 14 de juin, 1665.  
(An ingenious tale of English fireships disguised as flagships, etc.) Quil. Scheybels. Bruxelles. (807, c. 28.)

1665. A Royal Victory obtained against the Dutch Fleet, June the 2nd and 3rd, 1665. (A song.) F. Coles. London. (Rox. III. 240.)
- „ Gratulatory Verse upon our late glorious victory over the Dutch. By the Author of *Iter Boreale* (R. Wild), London. (1871, e. 9.) (17.)
- „ Joyful News for England, or, a Congratulatory verse upon our late happy success in firing 150 Dutch ships in their own harbours. F<sup>o</sup>. R. Head, London. (Lett. III. 95.)
- \*1666. A True Narrative of the Engagement Between H.M. Fleet and that of Holland, begun Jun. 1st, 1666 at Two oclock in the afternoon. Publ. by command. Th. Newcomb. London. (816, m. 26.) (13.)
- „ The Victory over the Fleet of the States General obtained by H.M. Navy Royal in the late engagement begun the 25th of July inst., as it came from his H. Prince Rupert and H. Grace the Duke of Albemarle. Publ. by Command. Tho. Newcomb. London. (816, m. 23.) (14.)
1689. Observations concerning the Dominion and Sovereignty of the Sea. Sir Philip Meadows. 47 pp. London.

Also a volume of "Tracts relating to the Navy" (533, d. 2) consisting of a number of tracts of 1693-1702; including "Piracy Destroy'd; or, a short Discourse shewing the Rise, growth and causes of Piracy of late" (London, 1701), and "An historical and Political Treatise of the Navy: with some Thoughts how to Retrieve the Antient Glory of the Navy."

The Harleian Miscellany of pamphlets and tracts selected from the library of Ed. Harley, 2nd Earl of Oxford. 10 vols. 4<sup>o</sup>. London, 1808-13. (Index in Vol. x.)

The Somers collection of Tracts; arranged by W. Scott. 13 vols. 4<sup>o</sup>. London, 1809-15. (Vols. VI, VII and



viii contain numerous tracts dealing with civil and ecclesiastical questions of the period, but none are of direct naval interest.)

3) *Dutch Tracts.* (8122, ee. 7 and 8.)

"Traktaken betreffende Engelsche Staatszaken," of which Vol. vii, 1661-5, and Vol. viii, 1666-73, contain many tracts of interest, of which the following are the more important :

Vol. vii. 1661-5.

2. t'Samen-Spraeck tusschen een Portuguees ende een Spanjaert, ober het befloten Houwelijck van den Herst. Koninck van Engelandt met de Tochter van den Hertogh van Bragance. Brugge. 1661.
3. Raets-vranginge van den K. van G. Brittainen van sijnen Broeder den Hertogh van Jorck, of het Houweljek met de Princes van Portugael. (From English.) 1661.
12. Twee Memorien van de Herre Downing... overgegeven aen de Herrn Staten Generael. Den 3 end 8 Aug. 1661.
13. Vervolgh Schryvensnyt Engelandt aenzen Nederlants Coop Man... ontrent den torstand van de Engelseh en Hollandtsche Tractaten. Enckhuyschen. 1661.
17. Historisch-Verhael van de vrye Nederlandsche extraordinare Ambassade by den Koninck van Brittangien vervolght 't zedert den 27 Jan. 1662. 2 parts. Rotterd. 1662.
24. Naer der Klagh-Vertoogh aen de H.M. Heeren Staten Gener. wegens de Bewinthebberen vande Gener. geoctrø. W. Indische Comp., ter sake vande on wetteljcke...proceduren der Engelsche in Nieu-Nederland. (Nae de Cotype.) 1664.

25. Den Toestant der Swevende Verschillen, tusschen de Oost, ende West-Indische Compagnien, van Engelant, ender van de Nederlanden. (Nae de Cotype.) 1664.  
(Negotiations from Oct. 18, 1663, to Feb. 3, 1664.)
26. Advys ende Antwoort van haer H.M. Heeren St. Gener. op het sentiment ende verklaring van de H. Downing...ontrent de twee Schepen Bon' Avontura, en Bon' Esperance. Gehonden in 's Gravenhage, den 10 Junij, 1664. Leyden, 1664.
- 27-29. (Correspondence between Eng. and Netherlands July 13—Dec. 20, 1664.)
30. Klachte der W. Indesche Compagnie, tegende O. Indische Comp....voor-gevallen in een Dialogue... Middelburgh, 1664.
32. Memorie van de Bewint-Hebberen der W. Indische Comp. ter Kamer van Amsterdam... Nessens een be-eedigde verklaring van And. C. Vertholen Schipper op het Schip de Eendracht. Amsterdam, 1664.
34. (Dutch Trans. of Coventry's account of June 3, 1665.) Antwerp, 1665.
35. Lyste. (Large sheet-list giving fleet that left Texel 22nd and 23rd May (n.s.), and those that returned after the battle of June 3-11. "Lost or missing—16 and one yacht.") 1665.
36. Hertoge van Jorck...Generale Instructie voor ...gevonden in 't Schip de Charity of Liefde, genomen by Cap. de Haen. Haarlem, 1665.
38. Neerlanden en Engelsman. t'Samen spraek overden Zee-Strijt den 13 Junij, 1665, lest voorgevallen, 1665.
39. Autenticq Verhael, van al 't geene, guepasseert is, in, ende ontrent 's Landts Vloote, 't sedert ...den 13 Jun. tot. den 13 Aug. 1665. (54 pp.)  
(Including details of Dutch inquiry into the conduct of the fleet on Jun. 3-13, 1665.)

40. Zee-Journal, ofte Autentijcq Verhael, Uyt d'annotatien vande Heeren haer Hoo. Volm. inde Vloot...aen-gaende al het... geschiet is van den 13 Juny to den 6 Octob. 1665. (68 pp.) Amsterdam, 1665.  
(Including Dutch version of Bergen affair.)
41. Den Engelsen Blixem, Welck is de Zee... mitsgaders nader openbaringe van der Engelsen Handel ende wandel. (Dutch side of the English Dominion question: cf. "An History of the Transactions," above, page 211.) 1665.
42. Brief van Johan Valkenburg... (Large sheet.) 1665.  
(Published by order of the States and distributed throughout the Fleet.)

Vol. VIII. 1666-73.

3. Oprecht...Verhael, van 't gene is geremarcqueert onder het bloedigh gevecht,...voorgevallen op den 11, 12, 13 en 14 Junius, 1666. Middleburgh, 1666.
4. Een vonpartijdig...Verhael...(identical with above). Rotterdam, 1666.
- 5, 6, 7. Een trouw verhael...in 't Neder. Duyts vertaelt; op dat de Nederlanders en alle andere mogen sien, de versiede Logenen, daer de Engelse haer behelpen, oomme haer gepretendeere Victorie staende te honden. (Trans. by different printers of the English "True Narrative of the Engagement" (see above, page 212); publ. by command of the States Gen.) Rotterdam and 's Gravenhage, 1666.
- 8, 9, 10, 11. Verhael van 't gepasseerde inde Zeeslach Tusschen de Vlooten van Engelandt ende van de Ver. Neder...opgesteld...in date den 24 Junij, 1666...Naer een curiens examen vande Hooft-Officiëren, Commandeurs

en Capiteynen der voorsz. vloot. 's Gravenhage, 1666.

(French trans. of this in "Description exacte," see below.)

13, 15. Het Engelsche Verkeet-bert, gespeelt op de Vlaemse Kust. (2 parts.) Velissingen, 1666.

(A discussion between numerous persons about the four days' fight.)

16. Brieven aende H.M. Staten Gener. van De Ruyter, Tromp, en Meppel. Schiedam, 1666. (Aug. 5-7, 1666. Account of sea-fight, Aug. 5.)

17. Journal van den lesten Uyttoch, Zee Slagh,... geschiet den 4 Aug. 1666. 1666. (42 pp. 12<sup>o</sup>, includes above letters.)

18-20. Den Oprechten Hollandsen Bootsgezel... geveest zijnde in de Laatste Zeeslag. (2 parts.) Rotterdam, 1666.

### (e) MISCELLANEOUS

Burchett, Josiah. A Complete History of Transactions at Sea to conclusion of the last War with France. F<sup>o</sup>. London, 1720.

(Not in detail before 1688. Not reliable; e.g., Allin and Smyrna fleet.)

Churchill, Awnsham and John. A Collection of Voyages and Travels by A. and John Churchill. 6 vols. F<sup>o</sup>. London, 1744-6.

Colliber, Sam. Columna Rostrata, a critical History of English Sea-Affairs. 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1727.

\*Description exacte de tout ce qui s'est passé dans les guerres entre le Roy d'Angleterre, le Roy de France, les Estats des Provinces Unies des Pays-Bas, et l'Evesque de Munster. Comm. de l'an 1664 et finissant avec la conclusion de Paix faite à Breda en l'an 1667. (241 pp.) s. 4<sup>o</sup>. Amsterdam, 1668.

(A moderate account from the Dutch point of view. Full and valuable accounts of various actions.)



Evelyn, John. Navigation and Commerce, their origin and progress. 8°. London, 1674.

(Intended as an introduction to a history of the Dutch War. Suppressed by order of the King on first publication.)

\*Hollond, John. Second Discourse of the Navy, 1659. Ed. by J. R. Tanner. (Navy Records Soc. Publ., No. 7.) 8°. London, 1896.

(Victualling, pay, etc.)

\*Manley, Sir Roger. The late Warres in Denmark. F°. London, 1670.

(Contains report made by Meadows on his return to England from his embassy in Denmark during the Baltic expedition of 1659.)

Molloy, Chas. De Jure Maritimo et Navali: or a treatise of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce. First ed. 8°. London, 1676.

(Chapters on "The Right of the Flag, as to the acknowledging the Dominion of the British Seas," "Dominion established by Treaties of Alliance," "Salutations of Ships of War, and Merchantmen," etc., in Book I.)

#### (f) \*NEWSPAPERS

The principal newspapers, under various changing names, during the period were:

Up to April 1660:

Mercurius Politicus,  
Publick Intelligencer.

Later:

Mercurius Publicus,  
Parliamentary Intelligencer,  
The Monthly Intelligencer,  
London Gazette,  
Current Intelligence.

(For history of the Press during the period see Kitchin, George. Life of Sir Roger Lestrangle. 8°. London, 1913.)

## VI. PRINTED AUTHORITIES, LATER WORKS

## (a) GENERAL, AND ENGLISH AND DUTCH NAVIES

Allen, J. Battles of the British Navy. 8°. 2 vols. (Bohn's Illustrated Library.) London, 1852.

(This, in company with Du Sein, Yonge, etc., has been largely superseded by the works of Clowes and Hannay and Rittmeyer, *q.v.*)

Campbell, John, LL.D. Lives of the Admirals: containing an accurate naval history. New edition, revised. 8 vols. 8°. London, 1817.

("Naval History of Chas. II," and "Memoirs" of Monk, Mountagu, Rupert, Ayscue, Lawson and Spragge.)

\*Clowes, Sir W. Laird. The Royal Navy. A history from the earliest times to the present day, by W. L. Clowes, assisted by Sir C. Markham, Capt. A. T. Mahan, Mr T. Roosevelt, etc. 7 vols. 1a. 8°. London, 1897-1903.

(The standard English Naval history. Vol. II. Ponderous and rather unequal: uses strange and arbitrary distinction between "major" and "minor" operations. The operations in the Mediterranean are "minor." Illustrations of prints and medals, but no maps beyond diagrams. No bibliography. Note Navy List of 1660 Some of the omissions, *e.g.* Restoration, Administration, are supplied by Hannay, *q.v.*)

Derrick, C. Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy. 4°. London, 1806.

(Useful lists and notes about Shipbuilding.)

Du Sein, A. Histoire de la Marine de tous les peuples. 2 vols. 8°. 1863-79.

Eardley-Wilmot, Rear-Adm. Sir S. Our Navy for a Thousand Years. Fourth ed. 8°. London, 1911.

(Popular.)

Entick, John. A New Naval History. F°. London, 1757.

Firth, C. H. The Last Years of the Protectorate, 1656-8. 2 vols. 8°. London, 1909.

(A general history, including, however, the financial decay of the Navy before the death of Cromwell.)

Gardiner, S. R. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649–60. 3 vols., and Suppl. chapter. 8°. 1894–1903.

(The standard general history of the period. Unfortunately, owing to author's death, never completed beyond 1656.)

\*Hannay, David. Short History of the Royal Navy. Vol. I. 1217–1688. 8°. London [1898].

(On main points not so "short" as Clowes. Note specially administration and development of naval strategy after the Restoration.)

\*Jonge, J. C. de. Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen. 6 parts. 8°. The Hague, 1833–48. (Second ed. 1858–62.)

(The standard Dutch Naval history. From 1665. Good bibliography and valuable lists.)

Lediard, T. Naval History of England, 1066–1734. 2 vols. F°. London, 1735.

(One of the better early histories; quotes largely from original sources; spends most of his footnotes in controverting Rapin—which, at times, is enlightening.)

Moreau, César. Chronological Records of the British Royal and Commercial Navy. F°. 1827.

\*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. Rudolph. Seekriege und Seekriegswesen in ihrer weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung. 2 Bde. 8°. Berlin, 1907–11.

(Combines De Jonge and Clowes; discussions on Strategy and Tactics; good critical bibliography of general works: maps and illustrations.)

Robinson, Comm. C. N. The British Fleet, the growth, achievement and duties of the Navy of the Empire. 8°. London, 1894.

(Note Customs, personnel and social side of Navy, 150 illustrations, prints, etc.)

Stenzel, Alfred. Seekriegsgeschichte...mit Berücksichtigung der Seetaktik. 5 vols. 8°. Hanover, 1911.

(Much space devoted to discussion of the tactics of the Dutch Wars. Very few references. Rather fond of comparing seventeenth century politics with those of

present day—substituting England for Holland, and Germany for England.)

Wheatley, H. B. Samuel Pepys and the World he lived in. Fifth ed. 8°. London, 1907.

(Chapter on Navy, p. 128, and following.)

Yonge, C. D. History of the British Navy from the earliest period. 2 vols. 8°. London, 1863.

(Cf. Allen, above, page 218.)

## (b) SPECIAL SUBJECTS

### (1) *English and Dutch*

Anderson, R. C. Naval Wars in the Baltic, 1522–1850. 8°. London, 1910.

(Little about the Baltic expedition of 1659.)

Beaujon, A. Overzicht der gesch. van de Nederlandsche zeevisscherijen. 8°. Leyden, 1885.

\*Corbett, Julian. England in the Mediterranean: a Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power within the Straits, 1603–1713. 2 vols. 8°. London, 1904.

(Only complete work on subject; fairly detailed account 1662–7. Not many references and no bibliography.)

Davis, Lt.-Col. J. Hist. records of the Second Queen's Royal Regiment. 6 vols. 1a 8°. London, 1887–1906.

(Full account of Tangier, 1663–. Good bibliography.)

Edmundson, Rev. George. Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the first half of the Seventeenth Century. 8°. Oxford, 1911.

(Origin of the Dutch Wars.)

†Japikse, N. De Verwikkelingen Tusschen de Republiek en England van 1660–5.

Jurien de la Gravière, J. P. E. Les Anglais et les Hollandais dans les mers polaires et dans la mer des Indes. 2 vols. s. 8°. Paris, 1890.

Lopez de Ayala, Ignacio. Historia de Gibraltar; documentos ineditos pertenienos a la ciudad de Gibraltar. 4°. Madrid, 1782.

(Eng. trans. London, 1845.)



- Lord, W. F. England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830. 8°. London, 1901.  
 (Very scanty before 1800, mostly Napoleonic. No references, and arrangement peculiar.)
- Low, Charles R. History of the Indian Navy, 1613–1863. 2 vols. London, 1877.
- \*Routh, E. M. G. Tangier; England's lost Atlantic outpost, 1661–81. 8°. London, 1912.  
 (Full references and bibliography; numerous illustrations from old prints.)
- \*Tanner, J. R. Navy of Commonwealth and First Dutch War. (See Chap. xvi in Cambridge Modern Hist., Vol. iv. Cambridge, 1906.)
- \*Tanner, J. R., and C. T. Atkinson. Anglo-Dutch Wars. (See Chap. ix in Camb. Modern Hist., Vol. v. Cambridge, 1908.)  
 (The best summary of the period. Bibliographies at end of respective volumes.)

## (2) *Other Nations*

- Chevalier, E. Histoire de la Marine française jusqu'au traité de paix de 1763. 8°. Paris, 1902.
- Fernandez Duro, C. Armada Española desde la Unión de los Reinos de Castilla y de León. 9 vols. la. 8°. Madrid, 1895–1903.
- Guérin, Léon. Histoire Maritime de France. 6 vols. Nouv. éd. la. 8°. Paris, 1851–2.
- La Roncière, Charles de. Histoire de la Marine française. 4 vols. 8°. Paris, 1899–1910.  
 (Vol. iv, pub. 1910, only goes to 1642. A standard work.)
- Mitchell, J. History of the Maritime Wars of the Turks. (Trans. from Turkish of Haji Khalifeh. Oriental Trans. Fund.) 4°. London, 1831.
- Sue, M. J. Eugène. Histoire de la Marine française, 17<sup>e</sup> siècle (1653–1712). 5 vols. 8°. Paris, 1835–7.
- †Tuxen, J. G. Den Danske og Norske Sömagt fra de aeldete Tider ind til voge Dage. laere Skildringer. Kjöbenhavn, 1875.

## (c) TECHNICAL

(1) *Strategy.*

- \*Colomb, V. Adm. Philip Howard. *Naval Warfare, its ruling principles and practice historically treated.* Second ed. 1a. 8°. London, 1895.

(Standard work. Dutch wars treated from strategic standpoint; accounts of actions: chapters 2, 3, 4, and references *passim*.)

- \*Corbett, Julian. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.* 1a. 8°. London, 1911.

(Treated historically: references to Dutch Wars *passim*.)

- \*Mahan, Capt. A. T. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660 to 1783.* 8°. London, 1889.

(The classic of naval strategy: cf. later works on subject by other writers. Detailed accounts of actions. Maps.)

- Maltzahn, V. Adm. Baron Curt von. *Naval Warfare: its historical development from the age of the great geographical discoveries to the present time.* (Trans. from German by J. C. Miller.) 8°. London, 1908.

(Short (152 pp.) but clear general view of development of naval strategy.)

- \*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. R. *Seekriege und Seekriegswesen.* Bd. I. 8°. Berlin, 1907. (Discusses strategy of Dutch Wars.)

- Rodenberg, Carl. *Seemacht in der Geschichte.* 1a. 8°. Stuttgart, 1900. (33 pages.)

- Stenzel, A. *Seekriegsgeschichte.* Vol. II. 8°. Hanover, 1911. (Strategy of each campaign.)

- Thursfield, James R. *Nelson and other Naval Studies.* 8°. London, 1909.

(Including "The Dogger Bank and its Lessons," "The Attack and Defence of Commerce.")

(2) *Tactics.*

- Castex, Lieut. R. *Les Idées Militaires de la Marine du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. De Ruyter à Suffren.* 8°. Paris, 1911.

(Chap. I on seventeenth century, including critical paragraph on Hoste, "Le Théoricien du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle.")

\*Rittmeyer, Kontre-Adm. R. Seekriege und Seekriegswesen. Bd. I passim. 8°. Berlin, 1907.

Stenzel, A. Seekriegsgeschichte. Vol. II passim. 8°. Hanover, 1911. (Discussions of tactics of each engagement.)

### (3) *Hydrography.*

The charts in use in the English Navy appear to have been small sheets of Dutch publication—or English copies of Dutch originals. Pepys notes “that Ashley’s Books of Maps were never printed but once. And never looked after: whereas y<sup>e</sup> Dutch Waggener has been continually kept in print and sold under many names over all y<sup>e</sup> world in diverse languages, and continually preferred and used by us, notwithstanding Ashley’s pretence to have corrected him.”

Wagenaar, Luke. The Mariner’s Mirror. 41 charts. 1a. f°. 1588.

## (d) ADMINISTRATION

### (1) *General.*

\*Charnock, John. An History of Marine Architecture. Including an enlarged and progressive view of the Nautical Regulations and Naval History, . . . especially of Great Britain, etc. 3 vols. 4°. London, 1800–2.

Marsden, R. G. The High Court of Admiralty in relation to National history, etc., 1550–1660. (Transactions of Roy. Hist. Soc., 1902–3.)

\*Oppenheim, M. A History of the Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping in relation to the Navy, from 1509–1660. 8°. London, 1896.

(Note especially victualling, pay, morale. Plentiful figures, lists and references.)

Raithby, John. The Statutes relating to the Admiralty, Navy, Shipping, and Navigation of the United Kingdom from 9 Hen. III. to 3 Geo. IV. inclusive. With notes, referring to the subsequent Statutes, and to the decisions in the Courts of Admiralty. 1164 pp. 4°. London, 1823.

- \*Tanner, J. R. Administration of the Navy from Restoration to Revolution. (Intro. to A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the Pepysian Library at Magdalene College, Cambridge, Vol. I. Navy Records Soc. Publ. 1903.) Also in Eng. Hist. Review, XII, XIII, XIV.

(Forms a continuation to 1688 of Oppenheim's work.)

## (2) *Shipbuilding.*

- Arenhold, Kapt. L. Die historische Entwicklung der Schiffstypen vom römischen Kriegsschiff bis zur Gegenwart. 1a. 4°. Kiel and Leipzig, 1891.

(Includes 30 engravings showing development of ships and armament.)

- Charnock, John. An History of Marine Architecture. 3 vols. Illus. 4°. London, 1800-2.

- Derrick, Charles. Memoirs of the Rise and Progress of the Royal Navy. 4°. London, 1806.

(Useful notes about shipbuilding, and lists: references.)

- Steinitz, F. The Ship, its origin and progress: with plates and flags. 4°. London, 1849.

(Numerous plates illustrating development of ship building; also a slight naval history—scanty on Dutch Wars.)

## (3) *Personnel.*

- Hannay, D. Ships and Men. 8°. London, 1910.

- Robinson, Comm. C. N. The British Tar in Fact and Fiction... with introductory chapters on the place of the sea officer and seaman in Naval history and historical literature. Illus. 8°. London, 1909.

(Studies of the sailors of the Commonwealth and Restoration; uniforms, customs; songs, etc., many reproductions of old prints.)

## (e) MISCELLANEOUS

- (1) *Articles in Reviews*, etc. (The following does not pretend to be in the slightest degree even a representative list.)



- American Historical Review, July, 1909. "The English Conspiracy and Dissent," by Wilbur C. Abbott. (Navy and Restoration.)
- English Historical Review. \*Vols. XII, XIII, XIV. "Administration of the Navy from Restoration to Revolution"; by J. R. Tanner. (Publ. in Vol. I of Catal. of Pepys MSS.)
- Marine Rundschau. 1901, p. 117; 1902, p. 265; 1903, p. 463; "De Ruiter," Kapt. Gudewill. Jan. 1911. "The North Sea: Its History, Politics, and Geography." (Trans. and reprinted in Roy. United Serv. Instit. Jour. 1911.) Cf. Inhaltsverzeichnis zu den Beiheften zum Marine Verordnungsblatt und der Marine Rundschau, 1872 bis 1902.
- Mariner's Mirror, The: Journal of Soc. for Nautical Research. 3 vols. 8°. [London?], 1911-13.
- Nauticus. Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen. Berlin. 1900. Number contains articles on "Entwicklung der englischen Seemacht," and "Blüte und Verfall der holländischen Seemacht."
- Revue Historique, xxv, 28. "Études Algériennes; la course, l'esclavage et la rédemption à Alger," H. D. de Grammont.
- Revue Maritime et Coloniale.
- 1864, Vol. XII, 565. "Le personnel de la Marine Militaire et les classes maritimes sous Colbert et Seignelay." (de Crisenoy.)
- 1875, Vol. XLIV, 165. "Les écoles d'hydrographie au xvii<sup>e</sup> siècle."
- 1879, Vol. LXIII, 448, 666. "Les Ingénieurs de la marine sous Colbert et Seignelay" (1664-90).
- 1884, Vol. LXXXII, 137. "Combat naval entre les Hollandais et les Anglais, le 11, 12, 13 et 14 juin, 1666. Relation inédite."
- 1885, Vol. LXXXV, 497. "Batailles Navales au milieu de xvii<sup>e</sup> siècle."
- Vol. LXXXVI, 74.
- 1888, Vol. XCIX, 577. "Tourville et la Marine de son temps."

(2) *Mercantile Navy and Commerce.*

- †Baasch, E. Hamburgs Konvoyschiffahrt und Konvoywesen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Schifffahrt im xvii. und xviii. Jahrhundert. 1a. 8°. Hamburg, 1896.
- Blackmore, Ed. The British Mercantile Marine: a short historical review, including the rise and progress of British shipping and commerce. 8°. London, 1897.
- Cornewall-Jones, R. J. The British Merchant Service, being a History of the British Merchant-Marine from the earliest times to the present day. 8°. London, 1898.
- East India Company. An Historical Account of the intercourse between the inhabitants of Great Britain and the people in the West Indies, containing likewise a compleat history of the East India Company from its erection under Queen Elizabeth. (In Harris, Voyages, 1764. F°. Vol. I, pp. 873-934.)
- Dutch, History of the Rise, Progress, and Establishment of the. (In Harris, Vol. I, pp. 914-48.)
- Oppenheim, M. Administration of the Royal Navy and of Merchant Shipping, 1509-1660. 8°. London, 1896.

(3) *Other Miscellaneous Works.*

- \*Firth, C. H., ed. Naval Songs and Ballads. (Navy Records Soc., Vol. xxxiii.) 8°. [London], 1908.
- Hawkins, Edward. Medallic Illustrations of Great Britain and Ireland, to death of George II. Ed. by A. W. Franks and H. R. Grueber. 2 vols. 8°. London, 1885.
- Mayo, J. H. Medals and Decorations of the British Army and Navy. 2 vols. 8°. 1897.

## VII. BIOGRAPHY

## (a) CONTEMPORARY

(1) *Collective.*

- \*Bos, Lambert van den. Leben und Thaten der durchlauchtigsten See-Helden, und Erfinder der Lande dieser Zeiten, anfangend mit Christopher Columbus und sich endend mit dem hochst berühmten Admiral M. A. de Ruyks. 2 parts. Sultzbach, 1681.  
(Includes Opdam, Tromp and De Ruyter.)

(2) *Individual.*

## De Ruyter

\*Brandt, Gerrit. *La Vie de Michel de Ruiter; où est comprise l'Histoire Maritime des Provinces Unies, depuis l'an 1652 jusques à 1676.* F<sup>o</sup>. Amsterdam, 1698.

(Original in Dutch, 1687. French trans. by son of author.)

(Exhaustive and calm account from the Dutch side. One of the chief contemporary authorities.)

## De Witt

Hoeven, Emanuel van der. *Leeven en dood de doorlustige heeren gebroeders C. de Witt en J. de Witt.* 4<sup>o</sup>. Amsterdam, 1705.

## Monk

Gumble, T. *Life of Gen. Monck.* s. 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1671.

Skinner, T. *Life of Gen. Monck, from an original MS. of T. Skinner; ed. by W. Webster.* 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1723.

(MS. of *circa* 1680? Detailed accounts of actions of 1665.)

## Münster, Bp of

*Life and actions of C. Bernard von Galen, Bishop of Münster.* London, 1680.

## Rupert

*Historical Memoirs of the Life and death of Prince Rupert.*

Pub. by Th. Malthus. s. 8<sup>o</sup>. London, 1683.

## Tromp

\**La vie de Corneille Tromp.* (Author unknown.) 8<sup>o</sup>. Hague, 1694.

(Though anonymous, this is—in company with Brandt's *De Ruyter*, *q.v.*—the chief contemporary authority dealing with the war from the Dutch side. Detailed eye-witness's accounts of actions.)

## (b) LATER

(1) *Collective.*

\*Campbell, John, LL.D. *Lives of the Admirals.* New edition, revised. 8 vols. 8°. London, 1817.

(Includes Monk, Mountagu, Rupert, Ayscue, Lawson and Spragge.)

\*Charnock, J. *Biographia Navalis, or Impartial memoirs of the lives and characters of Officers of the Navy of Great Britain from 1660 to the present time.* 6 vols. 8°. London, 1794-8.

(Vol. i. 1660-7.)

Cust, Gen. the Hon. Sir Edward. *Lives of the Warriors who have commanded Fleets and Armies before the Enemy, 1648-1704.* 2 vols. Illustrations. 8°. London, 1874.

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See biographical notes on Penn, Coventry, etc., in Wheatley's "Sam. Pepys and the world he lived in." 8°. London, 1907.

(2) *Individual.*

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(A popular life.)



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#### De Witt

\*Lefèvre-Pontalis, A. *Jean de Witt, Grand pensionnaire de Hollande.* 2 vols. 8°. Paris, 1884.

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2 vols. 8°. Paris, 1873.

#### Evertsen

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(See also his "Geschiedenis van het Nederl. Zee-wezen" above, page 219.)

#### James II

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(Containing the most recent results of research into naval history of this period. Much new material from the Sandwich MS. Journal, etc., at Hinchbrook: full of references, but no complete bibliography and no maps.)

## Münster, Bp of

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## Penn

\*Penn, Granville. Memorials of the Professional Life and Times of Sir Wm. Penn. 2 vols. 8°. London, 1833.  
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(Sandwich correspondence starting June 1661 in Vol. I.)

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(Slight sketch of development of Navy under Pepys.)

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
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